The bill
Financial Technology Protection Act of 2025
HR. 2384, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
ID: N000193
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2384, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 739-741 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
July 21, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real disease beneath.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Financial Technology Protection Act of 2025 is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. The bill claims to establish an Independent Financial Technology Working Group to combat terrorism and illicit financing, but its true purpose is to further entrench government control over emerging technologies like blockchain and digital assets.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a working group comprising various government agencies, financial institutions, and "experts" from the private sector. This group will conduct research on terrorist use of digital assets (because that's not already being done) and develop legislative proposals to improve anti-money laundering efforts. Oh, and they'll also get to define what constitutes "digital assets" and other related emerging technologies.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: government agencies, financial institutions, and a few token representatives from the private sector. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the ones who will be affected by this bill's overreach: individual citizens, small businesses, and anyone who dares to use digital assets without permission.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Trojan horse for increased government surveillance and control over emerging technologies. By establishing a working group with broad powers, Congress is essentially creating a regulatory body that can stifle innovation and impose draconian measures on the financial sector.
The real disease here is the government's insatiable hunger for power and control. This bill is just another symptom of a larger problem – the erosion of individual liberties and the concentration of power in the hands of a few unelected bureaucrats.
Diagnosis: **Acute Regulatory Fever**, characterized by an excessive desire to regulate emerging technologies, coupled with a severe lack of understanding about their underlying mechanics.
Treatment: **Dose of Reality**. Congress needs to take a step back, acknowledge its own ignorance, and let the market dictate the development of digital assets and related technologies. Anything less is just a recipe for disaster – or at least another example of legislative malpractice.
Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: H001047
Top Contributors
10
ID: D000626
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
ID: G000583
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 69 nodes and 36 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $225,899
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2 establishes a Working Group to research terrorist and illicit use of digital assets and develop legislative/regulatory proposals to improve AML/CTF efforts, which could lead to increased regulation on crypto and fintech firms. Section 3 requires a report and strategy on preventing rogue/foreign actors from evading sanctions via digital assets, indicating potential regulatory scrutiny.
Section 2(a)(3)(C) includes financial institutions as appointed representatives, but the Working Group's duties to develop legislative and regulatory proposals to improve AML/CTF efforts (Section 2(b)(2)) could lead to increased compliance costs for banks. Section 3's focus on sanctions evasion via digital assets may extend to traditional banking channels.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on improving AML/CFT efforts through research and collaboration, which aligns with Project 2025's call for evaluating the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime, though it does not advocate for repealing specific rules like the Corporate Transparency Act or beneficial ownership reporting as Project 2025 does."
— 707 — Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is well—but that even more onerous requirements are needed—are not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN — 708 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise beneficial ownership reporting rule will impose costs exceeding $1 billion annu- ally and is exceedingly poorly drafted.69 FinCEN itself estimates that more than 33 million businesses will be affected and that costs will be $547 million to $8.1 billion annually.70 THE “EQUITY” AGENDA Under the Biden Administration, the Treasury Department has appointed a Counselor for Racial Equity, established an Advisory Committee on Racial Equity, and created an office for Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility. All these should be eliminated. Treasury has created several new offices to promote “equity” and has made this its first of five strategic goals in its Fiscal Year 2022–2226 Strategic Plan. “Equity” is identified as a cross-cutting theme in 15 of 19 of the plan’s objectives. The avowed purpose of these initiatives is to implement policies that delib- erately favor some races or ethnicities over others. The casual acceptance and rapid spread of racist policymaking in the federal government must be forcefully opposed and reversed. The next conservative Administration should take affirma- tive steps to expose and eradicate the practice of critical race theory and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) throughout the Treasury Department. These steps will include: l Identify every Treasury official who participated in DEI initiatives and interview him or her for the purpose of determining the scope and nature of these initiatives and to ensure that such initiatives are completely ended. l Make public immediately all communications relating to the work of the Treasury’s critical race theory and DEI initiatives. l Treat the participation in any critical race theory or DEI initiative, without objecting on constitutional or moral grounds, as per se grounds for termination of employment. l Expose and make public all training materials and initiatives designed to single out any race, ethnicity, or sex for special treatment. The Administration should eliminate the 25-member Treasury Advisory Com- mittee on Racial Equity. CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK Treasury has created a new departmental office, “Climate Hub,” and has made “combating climate change” one of the Biden Treasury Department’s top five
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on financial technology and counter-terrorism financing through a working group, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses FCC structure, mission, and CFPB civil penalty fund mechanics—there is minimal thematic overlap beyond general financial regulation."
— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn
AI Analysis:
"The bill creates an independent working group focused on fintech and illicit financing, while the Project 2025 section discusses reforms to independent regulatory agencies like the SEC and FTC, emphasizing capital market efficiency and state AG cooperation. Both touch on financial regulation and independent bodies, but their substantive goals differ significantly."
— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.