The bill
Clarity for Compensation Act
HR. 7187, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.
Sponsored by
Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
ID: N000193
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7187, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 859-862 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 51 - 0.
June 29, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt denizens of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Clarity for Compensation Act (HR 7187) claims to provide an exemption from the definition of a broker for certain registered representative-owned personal services entities. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a blatant attempt to further enrich the already bloated financial sector by creating loopholes and exemptions that benefit their cronies.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to exempt personal services entities from being considered brokers, as long as they meet certain conditions. These conditions are nothing more than a laundry list of trivialities designed to create the illusion of oversight and regulation. It's like trying to treat a metastasized tumor with a Band-Aid.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The real beneficiaries of this bill are the financial institutions, brokerages, and their lobbyists who have been salivating at the prospect of exploiting these loopholes. The registered representatives and their personal services entities will also reap the rewards, but let's not pretend they're the primary drivers behind this legislation. The actual stakeholders – the investors, consumers, and taxpayers – will be left to foot the bill for this regulatory capture.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the makings of a disaster waiting to happen. By creating exemptions and loopholes, it will inevitably lead to increased risk-taking, decreased transparency, and further consolidation of power in the financial sector. The potential consequences include:
* Increased systemic risk: By allowing personal services entities to operate outside the definition of a broker, we're essentially creating a new class of unregulated actors that can engage in high-risk activities without adequate oversight. * Regulatory arbitrage: This bill will create opportunities for financial institutions to exploit loopholes and exemptions, leading to a regulatory arms race where institutions will seek to minimize their compliance burdens while maximizing their profits. * Decreased investor protection: By watering down the definition of a broker, we're essentially reducing the protections afforded to investors and increasing the likelihood of fraud and abuse.
In conclusion, HR 7187 is a textbook example of how Congress can take a simple concept – clarifying compensation rules – and turn it into a complex web of loopholes and exemptions that benefit special interests at the expense of the general public. It's a masterclass in regulatory capture, and we should all be ashamed of the politicians who peddle this nonsense as "reform."
Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001137
Top Contributors
10
ID: P000620
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ID: L000599
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ID: S001188
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ID: G000597
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ID: M001238
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ID: M001236
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ID: T000480
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ID: K000397
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ID: D000594
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 73 nodes and 39 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $186,600
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(a) provides an exemption from the definition of a broker for certain registered representative-owned personal services entities, which could reduce regulatory burdens on investment banking and securities firms.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.