Protecting Americans’ Retirement Savings From Politics Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8286
Last Updated: September 13, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

ID: S001213

Follow the money

The bill

Protecting Americans’ Retirement Savings From Politics Act

HR. 8286, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.

The sponsor

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$154,506 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 863-865 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 618.

June 23, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

HR 8286, the "Protecting Americans’ Retirement Savings From Politics Act," is a masterclass in legislative misdirection—a bill so transparently designed to gut ESG and climate disclosure rules that its title should come with a disclaimer: *Warning: May cause acute irony overdose in anyone who reads it without laughing.*

Let’s diagnose this patient.

**Title I: Mandatory Materiality Requirement** This is the core malignancy. The bill amends the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to force the SEC to define "materiality" solely through the lens of a hypothetical "reasonable investor" making voting or investment decisions. Translation: If a company decides climate risk, human rights abuses in its supply chain, or board diversity aren’t "material" to short-term stock price, it doesn’t have to disclose them. Ever. The SEC loses its power to mandate disclosures it deems in the public interest—like, say, whether a fossil fuel giant is lying about its net-zero commitments. This isn’t reform; it’s regulatory surrender dressed as investor empowerment. The "reasonable investor" standard is already law (see *TSC Industries v. Northway*, 1976). This bill just lets corporations self-certify what counts as material—like letting a tobacco company decide whether lung cancer is relevant to cigarette sales.

**Title II: Public Company Advisory Committee** A new advisory body within the SEC, stacked (we can assume) with corporate reps, to "advise" on rules. In practice: a lobbying pipeline where industry gets to whisper sweet nothings into the SEC’s ear before any rule is even drafted. Think of it as regulatory capture with a committee charter and complimentary coffee.

**Titles III–X: The ESG Witch Hunt** The rest is a greatest hits compilation of anti-ESG talking points: - Study the "detrimental impact" of EU sustainability directives (because apparently, global capital markets are a threat to U.S. business sovereignty). - Study proxy advisory firms (ISS, Glass Lewis) for the crime of advising investors on governance. - Force registration of proxy advisors (a solution in search of a problem—unless the problem is that they occasionally tell pension funds Exxon’s climate plan is a joke). - Impose liability on investment advisers who fail to disclose material misstatements—*but only if they’re following ESG principles*. Fiduciary duty is redefined to exclude anything that smells like "politics," i.e., caring about whether your retirement fund invests in companies that might burn the planet before you retire. - Mandate that passive funds (like index funds) vote proxies based solely on "pecuniary factors"—code for: ignore climate, ignore labor rights, ignore anything that doesn’t show up in next quarter’s EPS. - Retail investors must be "protected" from having their savings used to advance "non-pecuniary" goals—because God forbid someone wants their 401(k) to not fund deforestation.

**Who’s affected?** Public companies (especially those with ESG commitments), asset managers, pension funds, proxy advisors, and retail investors who mistakenly believe their savings shouldn’t finance planetary collapse.

**Compliance?** Corporations get to self-declare what’s material. Asset managers must overhaul voting policies to exclude ESG considerations. Passive funds face new voting mandates. The SEC’s authority is neutered—no new climate or human rights disclosure rules without begging the Public Company Advisory Committee for permission.

**Enforcement?** Weak. The bill creates new liability for *failure* to disclose—but only under the new, corporate-friendly materiality standard. So if a company hides a climate risk and calls it "immaterial," good luck proving otherwise. Meanwhile, investment advisers who *do* consider ESG factors face heightened scrutiny—because apparently, worrying about systemic risk is now a fiduciary breach.

**Economic impact?** Short-term: relief for fossil fuels, industrials, and any sector that prefers opacity. Long-term: eroded investor trust, increased systemic risk from unpriced externalities, and a U.S. market increasingly seen as a laggard in sustainable

Related Topics

Taxation & IRS RegulationsLabor & Employment PolicyWater & Air Quality Regulations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$154,506
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$26,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$127,906

No PAC contributions found

1
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$6,600
2
HO CHUNK NATION
2 transactions
$6,200
3
ONEIDA NATION
3 transactions
$4,000
4
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$3,300
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$3,000
6
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$2,500
7
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
MAYER, SCOTT A.
3 transactions
$33,000
2
ADAMANY, KIMBERLY K.
2 transactions
$13,636
3
MAYER, SUSANNE
2 transactions
$13,200
4
G, DAVID
1 transaction
$6,870
5
WHITE, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
6
ADAMANY, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
7
BUHOLZER, GLENDA
1 transaction
$6,600
8
WILEY, LADD
1 transaction
$6,600
9
MOORE, NOEL G.
1 transaction
$6,600
10
BUSH, KATHLEEN M.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
BUSH, MARK F.
1 transaction
$6,600
12
MURESIANU, ANDREI
1 transaction
$5,000
13
BARRETT, BRAD
1 transaction
$5,000
14
SUZMAN, ANDREW
1 transaction
$5,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

ID: W000812

Top Contributors

24

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Aug 23, 2023
2
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2,000
Jul 14, 2023
3
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Mar 15, 2023
4
WINRED
OrganizationARLINGTON, VA
$9
May 9, 2024
5
WILHELM, MARK A MR.
SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP. • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Dec 18, 2023
6
DRURY, TIM M.
DRURY DEVELOPMENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Feb 27, 2023
7
DANFORTH, JOHN C
DOWD BENNETT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Feb 17, 2023
8
TRACY, RICHARD L. MR.
DOT FOODS, INC. • PRESIDENT
IndividualDES PERES, MO
$13,200
Feb 17, 2023
9
RINEY, RODGER O. MR.
T.D. AMERITRADE • ADVISOR TO CEO
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 23, 2023
10
O'CONNELL, JOHN T.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$13,200
Mar 15, 2023

Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]

ID: M001204

Top Contributors

22

1
PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORP
OrganizationDURYEA, PA
$2,500
Sep 18, 2024
2
COTLER, YUDACUFSKI, HUEBNER
OrganizationSAINT CLAIR, PA
$1,000
Apr 23, 2024
3
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Mar 25, 2024
4
PEYKOFF, ANDY
NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC • CEO
IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV
$6,600
Mar 22, 2024
5
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Sep 18, 2024
6
ROWAN, MARC J
APOLLO MANAGEMENT • MANAGEMENT
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
7
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
8
RICH, BRIAN R MR. JR
GILBERTON COAL CO. • EXECUTIVE SALES
IndividualCONSHOHOCKEN, PA
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
9
VOLPE, ELLEN M
SELF • HOMEMAKER
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023
10
VOLPE, CHARLES J
EXCALIBUR INSURANCE MGMT • PRESIDENT
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 51 nodes and 68 connections

Total contributions: $68

Top Donors - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

7 Orgs14 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped, 3 harmed.

  • Title V requires registration of proxy advisory firms, which are often affiliated with investment banks and asset managers, imposing compliance costs and regulatory burdens (Sec. 501).

  • Title VII, Section 701 imposes disclosure duties on institutional investment managers, which include private equity and hedge funds, requiring them to report proxy voting decisions and economic analyses, thereby increasing regulatory scrutiny and compliance burden, which is a harm (-1). However, the bill's focus on 'best economic interest' and limiting non-pecuniary factors in Title X may benefit private equity and hedge funds by reducing ESG-related shareholder proposals that could interfere wi

  • Title VII, Section 701 applies to 'institutional investment managers' which includes insurance companies that manage large investment portfolios. The requirement to disclose proxy voting decisions and perform economic analyses increases compliance costs for insurance firms' investment arms, representing a harm (-1). However, Title X's restriction on considering non-pecuniary factors in investment advice benefits insurance companies by allowing them to prioritize pure financial returns in their i

  • −Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80

    Title VII requires institutional investment managers (including those managing tech-heavy portfolios) to disclose voting decisions and economic analyses related to proxy advisory firms, increasing compliance costs (Sec. 701).

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Telecommunications companies like AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile are large public companies subject to the bill's proxy voting reforms. Title VIII's prohibitions on 'robovoting' and outsourcing voting decisions (Sections 801(m) and (n)) require these companies' shareholders to engage more actively in voting processes, potentially reducing the influence of proxy advisory firms on telecom corporate governance. This empowers long-term shareholders and management in telecom firms to resist short-term a

  • −Labor Unionsconfidence 0.70

    Title IX empowers shareholders by requiring investment advisers to follow beneficiary instructions in proxy voting, potentially reducing union influence on shareholder proposals (Sec. 901).

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 20 contributions
    • SINGER, PAUL$6,600
    • ROWAN, MARC J.$6,600
    • KLEINMAN, SCOTT$5,800
    • ZELTER, JAMES C.$5,800
    • MEHLMAN, KENNETH B.$5,000
  • from 25 contributions
    • SCHLIFSKE, JOHN E.$6,300
    • FRITZ, R DAVID$5,000
    • GROGAN, JOHN$3,300
    • JONES, TODD$3,300
    • MEYER, JOYCE$3,300

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Strong
Vector: 67%
Pages: 863-865AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8286 aligns strongly with Project 2025's goal of limiting SEC authority to require non-financial disclosures by mandating that only material information be disclosed and establishing oversight mechanisms to prevent politicized or ideological reporting requirements, directly supporting the prohibition on ESG-related mandates."

Key themes:materiality standardESG disclosure restrictionsSEC regulatory oversightproxy advisory firm regulationinvestor protection

— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8286 aligns with Project 2025's goal of reforming financial regulation by reducing burdensome disclosure requirements, increasing oversight of proxy advisory firms, and promoting investor-friendly reforms—consistent with Heritage Foundation and Mercatus Center proposals cited in the policy document."

Key themes:disclosure reformproxy advisory oversightSEC regulatory reforminvestor protectionreducing regulatory burden

— 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office — 841 — Financial Regulatory Agencies of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Fall 2022 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions: Active Regulatory Actions Listed by Agency,” https://www.reginfo.gov/ public/do/eAgendaMain (accessed February 20, 2023); “Human Capital Management Disclosure,” RIN: 3235- AM88, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AM88 (accessed February 20, 2023); “Corporate Board Diversity,” RIN: 3235-AL91, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AL91 (accessed February 20, 2023). 10. 15 U.S. Code § 77z–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/77z-3 (accessed February 20, 2023); 15 U.S. Code § 78mm, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78mm (accessed February 20, 2023). 11. S. ___, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2022, discussion draft, 117th Congress, 2nd Session, https:// www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0discussiondraft.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Entrepreneurial Capital Formation,” Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 5, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/entrepreneurial- capital-formation; “Removing Barriers to Small Business Capital Formation and Expanding Investor Opportunities,” Section 6 in Nicholas Anthony, Norbert J. Michel, Jennifer J. Schulp, George Selgin, and Jack Solowey, “Sound Financial Policy: Principled Recommendations for the 118th Congress,” ed. Norbert J. Michel and Ann Rulon, Cato Institute, 2022, pp. 22–27, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-10/sound- financial-policy-118th-congress.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton and Norbert J. Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, Submission to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 18, 2021, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David%20 Burton%20and%20Norbert%20Michel%20-%202021-3-18.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3182, February 14, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3182.pdf. 12. The small issues exemptive authority has been in the Securities Act since its initial enactment. 13. The crowdfunding exemption was created by Title III of the 2012 JOBS Act. See H.R. 3606, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Public Law No. 112-106, 112th Congress, April 5, 2021, Title III, § 302, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ106/pdf/PLAW-112publ106.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 14. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws,” Chapter 6 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/06_ProsperityUnleashed_ Chapter06.pdf. 15. Andrew N. Vollmer, “Abandon the Concept of Accredited Investors in Private Securities Offerings,” Securities Regulation Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Spring 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3719280 (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Your Money’s No Good Here: How Restrictions on Private Securities Offerings Harm Investors,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 833, February 9, 2018, https:// www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa833.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Congress Should Increase Access to Private Securities Offerings,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4899, August 29, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/IB4899.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Evidence on the Use of Disclosure Documents in Private Securities Offerings to Accredited Investors,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/publications/financial-regulation/ evidence-use-disclosure-documents-private-securities-offerings-0 (accessed February 20, 2023). 16. For a detailed discussion, see “Micro-Offerings,” Section IId in Burton and Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, pp. 15–17. 17. David R. Burton, “Let Entrepreneurs Raise Capital Using Finders and Private Placement Brokers,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3328, July 10, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/ BG3328.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Make It Easy for Startups to Sell Stock,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Discourse, September 21, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/make-it-easy- startups-sell-stock (accessed February 20, 2023). 18. See H.R. 531, S-Corp Access to Crowdfunding Act, 115th Congress, introduced January 13, 2017, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-115hr531ih/pdf/BILLS-115hr531ih.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David Burton, “The Tax Law Makes It Almost Impossible for ‘S Corporations’ to Use Equity Crowdfunding,” The Daily Signal, April 19, 2016, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/04/19/the-tax-law-makes-it-almost-impossible-for- s-corporations-to-use-equity-crowdfunding/.

Trade

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 863-865AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"H.R. 8286 aligns closely with Project 2025's Trade section by seeking to reform the SEC, reduce regulatory burdens on issuers, eliminate non-financial (ESG) considerations in fiduciary duties, and enhance transparency and accountability in financial regulation—core themes in the Project 2025 agenda."

Key themes:SEC reformreducing regulatory burdeneliminating ESG/fiduciary politicizationenhancing shareholder rightsmateriality-based disclosure

— 830 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Three basic categories of firm: private firms, an intermediate category of smaller firms,4 and public firms; l Reasonable, scaled disclosure requirements; and l Specified secondary markets for the securities of these firms.5 The SEC needs to be reformed to achieve its important core functions more effectively, to improve transparency and due process, and to reduce unnecessary regulatory impediments to capital formation.6 Under current law, the SEC Chair- man has the authority to make almost all of the necessary changes.7 Unfortunately, financial regulators, particularly the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), are poorly managed and organized. With regulatory authority delegated by the government, both the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and FINRA have proved to be ineffective, costly, opaque, and largely impervious to reform. To reduce costs and improve transparency, due process, congressional oversight, and responsiveness, PCAOB and FINRA should be abolished, and their regulatory functions should be merged into the SEC. Furthermore, Congress should establish an indepen- dent board or commission and charge it with producing a detailed report within 18 months that examines the degree to which the regulatory functions of the var- ious other so-called self-regulatory organizations (SROs), which are no longer self-regulatory in any meaningful sense, should be moved to the SEC.8 Discrimination based on immutable characteristics has no place in financial regulation. Offices at financial regulators that promote racist policies (usually in the name of “diversity, equity, and inclusion”) should be abolished, and regulations that require appointments on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, or sexual orientation should be eliminated. Equal protection of the law, equal opportunity, and individ- ual merit should govern regulatory decisions.9 Congress has given the SEC broad “general exemptive authority,”10 but the SEC has used this authority only rarely. It should use this authority significantly more often to reduce the regulatory burden on issuers, particularly smaller entrepreneurs. ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITAL FORMATION Financial regulators should remove regulatory impediments to entrepreneur- ial capital formation.11 In the absence of the fundamental reform outlined above, the SEC should: l Simplify and streamline Regulation A (the small issues exemption)12 and Regulation CF (crowdfunding)13 and preempt blue sky registration and quali- fication requirements for all primary and secondary Regulation A offerings.14 — 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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