TICKET Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/281
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]

ID: S001227

Follow the money

The bill

TICKET Act

S. 281, 119th Congress — read as touching Entertainment & Streaming.

The sponsor

Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$158,400 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 859-862 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 63.

April 28, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of congressional incompetence, masquerading as consumer protection. Let's dissect this farce.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The TICKET Act claims to promote transparency in event ticket sales by requiring sellers to disclose comprehensive information about prices and fees. How quaint. In reality, it's a half-hearted attempt to address the symptoms of a diseased system, rather than the underlying corruption and greed that drives it.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill mandates all-inclusive ticket price disclosure, prohibits speculative ticketing (good luck enforcing that), and requires clear disclosures about fees and refund policies. Oh, and there's a lovely provision allowing secondary market ticket issuers to sell "services" to obtain event tickets on behalf of consumers, as long as they don't call it an event ticket. Because, you know, semantics matter.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: ticket sellers, secondary market ticket issuers, and consumers who are too clueless to realize they're being fleeced. The real stakeholders, however, are the lobbyists and special interest groups that will find ways to exploit these "protections" for their own gain.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It won't address the root causes of ticket price inflation or speculative ticketing. Instead, it will create new opportunities for exploitation and confusion. Consumers will still get ripped off, but now they'll have the "protection" of knowing exactly how much they're being gouged.

In short, this bill is a masterclass in legislative theater, designed to make politicians look like heroes while doing nothing to actually protect consumers. It's a symptom of a larger disease: the corruption and incompetence that plagues our political system.

Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of greed and cowardice.

Prescription: A healthy dose of skepticism and outrage from the public, followed by a strong antibiotic of real reform. But don't hold your breath; this patient is terminal.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$158,400
23 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$13,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$145,400

No PAC contributions found

1
ELEVATE MISSOURI
2 transactions
$6,700
2
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA TRIBE
1 transaction
$2,900
3
PETER J SPALITTO DDS PC
1 transaction
$2,900
4
KIRKWOOD PLUMBING INC
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
POPOLO, JOE
2 transactions
$13,200
2
WALTON, TROY
1 transaction
$11,600
3
PFAUTCH, ROY
1 transaction
$11,600
4
ROSS, DONALD
1 transaction
$10,000
5
TAYLOR, ANDREW
1 transaction
$6,600
6
TAYLOR, BARBARA
1 transaction
$6,600
7
KELSEY, J DAVID
1 transaction
$6,600
8
FOGEL, DAVID
1 transaction
$6,600
9
PALOMO, OSWALDO
1 transaction
$6,600
10
TAMASI, DAVID
1 transaction
$6,600
11
MCKNIGHT, ANDREW
1 transaction
$6,600
12
POPOLO, CHRIS
1 transaction
$6,600
13
ASHWORTH, CAROL
1 transaction
$6,600
14
ASHWORTH, JIMMY
1 transaction
$6,600
15
GIBBS, HALLIE H.
1 transaction
$6,600
16
GIDWITZ, RONALD J.
1 transaction
$6,600
17
STEWARD, DAVE
1 transaction
$6,600
18
MANDELBLATT, DANIELLE
1 transaction
$6,600
19
MANDELBLATT, ERIC
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Markey, Edward J. [D-MA]

ID: M000133

Top Contributors

22

1
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jun 28, 2024
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jul 26, 2023
3
DONOHUE, JOHN
ARBELLA • INSURANCE
IndividualBELMONT, MA
$6,600
May 20, 2024
4
MARCHAND, PAUL
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS • EVP HR
IndividualMONTCLAIR, NJ
$4,200
Mar 11, 2024
5
MOUTOUDIS, ELEFTHERIA
ELEFTHERIA MOUTOUDIS • SELF EMPLOYEED
IndividualSOUTHBOROUGH, MA
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024
6
MOUTOUDIS, EVANGELOS
DEKK GROUO • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualSOUTHBOROUGH, MA
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024
7
SCHMIDT, WENDY
NONE • INVESTMENTS AND PHILANTHROPY
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$3,300
Oct 2, 2024
8
SWIG, MARY
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Aug 31, 2024
9
ABRAMS, JEFFREY J.
BAD ROBOT • FOUNDER
IndividualENCINO, CA
$3,300
Oct 10, 2023
10
ABRAMS, JEFFREY J.
BAD ROBOT • FOUNDER
IndividualENCINO, CA
$3,300
Oct 10, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 52 nodes and 52 connections

Total contributions: $52

Top Donors - Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

4 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • The bill imposes disclosure and refund requirements on ticket sellers for live events, which affects platforms that sell tickets to concerts, theatrical performances, and sporting events—core activities of entertainment and streaming companies like Live Nation (though not explicitly listed, the industry includes ticketing as part of event promotion). Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 mandate price transparency, ban speculative ticketing, require refunds, and enforce disclosures, increasing compliance cost

  • Broadcast and print media companies often promote and sell tickets to events (e.g., radio station concert promotions, newspaper event listings). The bill’s restrictions on speculative ticketing (Sec. 3) and requirements for clear disclosures (Sec. 2, 4) and refunds (Sec. 5) apply to any entity offering tickets, including media companies acting as ticket sellers, increasing operational burdens.

  • Some sports betting and casino platforms (e.g., DraftKings, FanDuel) offer event tickets or bundled experiences as part of promotions. The ban on speculative ticketing (Sec. 3) and requirement to not misrepresent ticket affiliation (Sec. 4) could limit promotional ticketing practices, imposing compliance costs.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Weak
Vector: 59%
Pages: 859-862AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the TICKET Act and the Project 2025 SEC section emphasize transparency and disclosure requirements, but they apply to different sectors (event ticketing vs. securities markets) and lack substantive policy overlap beyond the general theme of consumer/investor protection through clearer information."

Key themes:transparencydisclosure requirementsconsumer protectionregulatory oversight

— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 57%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The TICKET Act focuses on consumer protection and transparency in event ticketing, while the Project 2025 Financial Regulatory Agencies section critiques the CFPB and advocates for reducing its authority, particularly regarding disclosures and enforcement. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill expands disclosure requirements akin to CFPB-style rules, which Project 2025 generally opposes."

Key themes:consumer protectiondisclosure requirementsfinancial regulation

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 57%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The TICKET Act addresses consumer transparency in event ticketing, while Project 2025's financial regulatory section focuses on deregulating securities and commodities markets, limiting SEC/CFTC authority, and opposing Dodd‑Frank‑style mandates; the two share only a tangential concern with disclosure and consumer protection."

Key themes:consumer protectiondisclosure requirementsfinancial oversight

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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