The bill
SHADOW Fleet Sanctions Act of 2026
S. 2904, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
Sponsored by
Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
ID: R000584
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2904, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 326.
February 9, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity and expose the real disease beneath.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SHADOW Fleet Sanctions Act of 2026 is a thinly veiled attempt to impose sanctions on Russia's "shadow fleet" – a euphemism for vessels suspected of participating in or supporting Russian illicit shipping activities. The bill's sponsors claim it aims to counter Russia's alleged circumvention of Western sanctions, but I'll get to the real motivations later.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This 200-page behemoth is a laundry list of bureaucratic busywork, with provisions that:
1. Impose sanctions on vessels suspected of supporting Russian illicit shipping activities. 2. Require foreign persons to disclose their involvement in Russian shadow fleet operations. 3. Mandate reports on specific licenses granted under Executive Order 14024 (because who doesn't love more paperwork?). 4. Establish minimum standards for operating as a flag state registry (read: more red tape).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. Russia's "shadow fleet" operators, who will likely find creative ways to circumvent these sanctions. 2. Foreign persons and companies involved in Russian shipping activities, who will face increased scrutiny and potential penalties. 3. The U.S. government, which will need to allocate more resources for enforcement and implementation (because that always works out well). 4. American taxpayers, who will foot the bill for this bureaucratic exercise.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "sanctions theater" – a feel-good measure designed to appease hawkish constituents while accomplishing little in reality. The real impact will be:
1. Increased costs and regulatory burdens on American businesses, particularly those involved in international trade. 2. Further erosion of diplomatic relations with Russia, because who needs diplomacy when you can impose sanctions? 3. A potential escalation of tensions between the U.S. and Russia, which could have far-reaching consequences (but hey, at least our politicians will look tough).
Now, let's get to the real disease beneath this legislative monstrosity:
**Diagnosis:** This bill is a symptom of "Sanctions-itis" – a chronic condition characterized by an excessive reliance on economic coercion as a foreign policy tool. The underlying causes are:
1. **Corruption**: Politicians seeking to appease special interest groups and donors. 2. **Cowardice**: Lawmakers unwilling to engage in meaningful diplomacy or take bold action, instead opting for symbolic gestures like sanctions. 3. **Stupidity**: A fundamental misunderstanding of the complexities of international trade and geopolitics.
**Treatment:** None, because our politicians are too busy grandstanding to actually address the underlying issues. Just more of the same: empty rhetoric, bureaucratic posturing, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy.
Sen. Risch, James E. [R-ID]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S001181
Top Contributors
21
ID: C001095
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ID: W000802
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ID: R000618
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ID: B001277
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ID: C001088
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ID: G000359
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ID: K000384
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ID: W000437
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ID: C001114
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 38 nodes and 41 connections
Total contributions: $41
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 8 harmed.
The bill targets Russian-origin petroleum products and crude oil transported by the shadow fleet (Sec. 111, 112, 113, 141, 142, 151, 161, 162, 163, 164). Sanctions on vessels, ports, and persons involved in transporting, refining, or dealing in Russian-origin oil directly harm the oil_gas industry by restricting market access and increasing compliance costs for Russian oil exports.
The bill imposes sanctions on foreign persons that own or operate ports accepting Russian-origin oil above the price cap (Sec. 113) and on vessels transporting Russian-origin petroleum products in circumvention of sanctions (Sec. 111). This directly targets midstream energy infrastructure involved in oil transport, storage, and terminal operations, which falls under the energy_infrastructure industry.
Section 111(a)(2)(B) imposes sanctions on foreign persons providing underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance necessary for Russian shadow fleet vessels, directly harming the insurance industry.
Sec. 171(a)(1)(C) explicitly includes 'semiconductors and associated manufacturing equipment' as goods relating to the Russian defense industrial base. Sanctions on persons providing these items to Russia harm the semiconductors_hardware industry by restricting sales to Russian defense entities.
Section 204 authorizes $200M emergency appropriations for the Countering Russian Influence Fund to assist allies in combating cyber threats, directly benefiting cybersecurity firms.
Subtitle C imposes sanctions on persons selling, leasing, or providing goods or services relating to the Russian defense industrial base, including semiconductors, CNC tools, fiber optic cables, and other critical defense-related items (Sec. 171). This directly impacts defense contractors that may supply dual-use or defense-related components to Russia.
+ 4 more industries not shown.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on sanctions against Russia's shadow fleet to counter sanctions evasion, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of tightening export controls and sanctions on countries of concern like Russia. However, the bill does not address export enforcement training, EAR revisions, or specific export control mechanisms emphasized in the Project 2025 policy."
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on countering Russian illicit shipping and sanctions evasion aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on addressing Russian activities in strategic regions like the Arctic, though the bill does not explicitly mention Arctic waters or economic freedom initiatives. Both share concerns about Russian behavior and the need for coordinated international response."
— 190 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise the region and ensures that Russian use of Arctic waters and resources does not exceed a reasonable footprint. The U.S. should unapologetically pursue American interests in the Arctic by promoting economic freedom in the region. Economic freedom spurs prosperity, innovation, respect for the rule of law, jobs, and sustainability. Most important, economic freedom can help to keep the Arctic stable and secure. The U.S. should work to ensure that shipping lanes in the Arctic remain avail- able to all global commercial traffic and free of onerous fees and burdensome administrative, regulatory, and military requirements. While this should be the next Administration’s policy with respect to all countries that might seek to block free-flowing commercial traffic, the next Administration will clearly have to exert substantial attention toward Russia. Both the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy are vital tools to ensure an unmo- nopolized Arctic. It is imperative that the Navy and Coast Guard continue to expand their fleets, including planned icebreaker acquisitions, to assure Arctic access for the United States and other friendly actors. The remote and harsh con- ditions of the Arctic also make unmanned system investment and use particularly appealing for providing additional situational awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Coast Guard should also consider upgrading facilities, such as its Barrow station, to reinforce its Arctic capabilities and demonstrate a greater commitment to the region. The People’s Republic of China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” which is an imaginary term non-existent in international discourse. The United States should work with like-minded Arctic nations, including Russia, to raise legitimate concerns about the PRC’s so-called Polar Silk-Road ambitions. Concerning Greenland, the opening of a U.S. consulate in Nuuk is welcome. A formal year-round diplomatic presence is an effective way for the U.S. to better understand local political and economic dynamics. Furthermore, given Green- land’s geographic proximity and its rising potential as a commercial and tourist location, the next Administration should pursue policies that enhance economic ties between the U.S. and Greenland. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Defending and protecting the American people and advancing their interests requires the United States to engage in a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral relationships, including participating in international organizations. Working with other governments through international organizations like the United Nations (U.N.) can be tremendously useful—but membership in these organizations must always be understood as a means to attain defined goals rather than an end in itself. Engagement with international organizations is one relatively easy way for the U.S. to defend its interests and to seek to address problems in concert with other — 191 — Department of State nations, but it is not the only option—and American diplomats should be clear- eyed about international organizations’ strengths and weaknesses. When such institutions act against U.S. interests, the United States must be prepared to take appropriate steps in response, up to and including withdrawal. The manifest failure and corruption of the World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic is an example of the danger that international organizations pose to U.S. citizens and interests. The next Administration must end blind support for international organi- zations. If an international organization is effective and advances American interests, the United States should support it. If an international organization is ineffective or does not support American interests, the United States should not support it. Those that are effective will still require constant pressure from U.S. officials to ensure that they remain effective. Serious consideration should also be given to withdrawal from organizations that no longer have value, quietly undermine U.S. interests or goals, or disproportionately rely on U.S. financial con- tributions to survive. The Trump Administration’s “tough love” approach to international organiza- tions served American interests. For example, the Trump Administration withdrew from, or terminated funding for, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and the WHO. The results were redeployment of taxpayer dollars to better uses—and other organizations “getting the message” that the United States will not allow itself and its money to be used to undermine its own interests. The Biden Administration reversed many of these decisions. Currently, U.S. funding for international organizations is more than $16 billion in fiscal year 2021—a sharp increase from $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2015.19 Millions of American taxpayer dollars go to support policies and initiatives that hurt the United States and American citizens. The next Administration should direct the Secretary of State to initiate a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of U.S. participation in all international organizations. This review should take into account long-standing provisions in federal law that prohibit the use of taxpayer dollars to promote abortion, popu- lation control, and terrorist activities, as well as other applicable restrictions on funding for international organizations and agencies with a view to withholding U.S. funds in cases of abuses. International organizations should not be used to promote radical social pol- icies as if they were human rights priorities. Doing so undermines actual human rights and weakens U.S. credibility abroad. The next Administration should use its voice, influence, votes, and funding in international organizations to pro- mote authentic human rights and respect for sovereignty based on the binding
AI Analysis:
"The bill targets Russian illicit shipping to undermine sanctions evasion, which supports broader energy security goals; the Project 2025 DOE policy emphasizes protecting U.S. energy infrastructure from cyber and physical threats, including sabotage. Both share concerns about illicit activities that threaten energy security and call for enhanced coordination and threat detection."
— 410 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. Sean Michael Kerner, “Colonial Pipeline Hack Explained: Everything You Need to Know,” TechTarget, April, 26, 2022, https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Colonial-Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to- know (accessed February 13, 2023). 2. Jacob Knutson, “N.C. Power Company: Substation Repairs Complete After Alleged Attack,” Axios, December 7, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/12/07/duke-energy-moore-county-substation-attack (accessed February 13, 2023). 3. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 4. H.R. 5376, Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117-169, August 16, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ169/PLAW-117publ169.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 5. S. 826, Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91, 95th Congress, August 4, 1977, https://www. congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-91/STATUTE-91-Pg565.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 6. DOE also promotes domestic energy security by providing research and coordination between government and the private sector on physical and cyber-related threats to energy security. This work should continue and be enhanced under the next Administration. 7. Elimination of OE, NE, FE, and EERE might also be considered; however, there are benefits from having political appointees run separate offices. Specifically, separate program offices can focus on threats that are unique to their energy areas, and having political appointees run separate offices helps to ensure focused, unobstructed pursuit of policy objectives. 8. H.R. 6586, Natural Gas Act, Public Law No. 75-688, 75th Congress, June 21, 1938, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg821a.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Energy, “Promoting Energy Justice,” https://www.energy.gov/promoting-energy-justice (accessed February 13, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Economic Impact and Diversity, “Justice40 Initiative,” https://www. energy.gov/diversity/justice40-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 11. Press release, “DOE Releases First-Ever Plan to Advance Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 1, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-first-ever-plan- advance-diversity-equity-inclusion-and-accessibility (accessed February 14, 2023). 12. Including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, etc. 13. Table, “Environmental Management: Lifecycle Cost by Project Baseline Summary (PBS) ($M),” in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pd (accessed February 13, 2023). 14. KPMG, “Independent Auditor’s Report, United States Department of Energy Nuclear Waste Fund Annual Financial Report as of and for the Years Ended September 30, 2022 and 2021,” November 8, 2022, p. 8, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Office of Cyber Assessments and Data Analytics, Audit Report: The Department of Energy Nuclear Waste Fund’s Fiscal Year 2022 Financial Statement Audit, DOE- OIG-23-05, November 2022, p. 10, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/DOE-OIG-23-05.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 15. See Patty-Jane Geller, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 481–506, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 16. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, pp. 9, 21, 23, and 43, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/ files/2022-03/doe-fy2023-budget-in-brief-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 17. H.R. 4346, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law No. 117-167, 117th Congress, August 9, 2022, https://www. congress.gov/117/plaws/publ167/PLAW-117publ167.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 18. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ceser/ceser-mission (accessed February 27, 2023). — 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
A bill to amend the Public Lands Corps Act of 1993 to modify the cost-sharing requirement for conservation projects carried out by a qualified youth or conservation corps, and for other purposes.
119/s/1228
A bill to amend the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act to authorize the use of funds for certain additional Carey Act projects, and for other purposes.
119/s/1257
Urban Canal Modernization Act
119/s/2753