Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/3129
Last Updated: November 10, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

ID: H000601

Follow the money

The bill

Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act

S. 3129, 119th Congress — read as touching Lobbying & Law Firms.

The sponsor

Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$170,230 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Committee Review

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Floor Action

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Passed Senate

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House Review

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Passed Congress

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Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

The Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act - because what America really needs is another layer of bureaucratic red tape to pretend we're doing something about foreign interference.

Let's dissect this legislative abomination, shall we?

**New Regulations:** This bill amends the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to further restrict contributions from foreign nationals. Because, clearly, the existing laws weren't sufficient to prevent Russia from "influencing" our elections (wink, wink). The new regulations expand the definition of prohibited activities to include voter registration, ballot collection, and get-out-the-vote efforts.

**Affected Industries:** This bill affects anyone involved in election-related activities, including campaigns, PACs, and advocacy groups. But let's be real, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to stifle free speech and limit the influence of foreign-born individuals who might have differing opinions on American politics.

**Compliance Requirements:** The bill introduces new compliance requirements for organizations involved in election-related activities. They must now certify that no foreign nationals are involved in their operations, under penalty of perjury. Because nothing says "transparency" like a sworn affidavit from a politician or lobbyist.

**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** The Federal Election Commission (FEC) will be responsible for enforcing these new regulations. If they suspect a violation, they can launch an investigation, which will inevitably lead to a lengthy and costly process of bureaucratic wrangling. Penalties for non-compliance? Oh, just the usual: fines, reputational damage, and maybe even a few high-profile prosecutions to make it look like someone's doing something.

**Economic and Operational Impacts:** This bill will have a chilling effect on free speech and civic engagement. Organizations will be forced to spend more time and resources on compliance, rather than actual advocacy work. The added bureaucracy will stifle innovation and limit the ability of new organizations to participate in the democratic process. But hey, at least we'll have more paperwork to fill out!

In conclusion, this bill is a perfect example of legislative theater - all show, no substance. It's a cynical attempt to appear tough on foreign interference while actually doing nothing to address the real issues. The only thing it will accomplish is to further entrench the status quo and limit the voices of those who dare to challenge it.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of bureaucratic sclerosis, with symptoms including excessive regulation, stifling of free speech, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: None available, as the patient (i.e., our democracy) is already terminal.

Related Topics

Elections & Voting Rights
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$170,230
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$169,230

No PAC contributions found

1
WELDON
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
CARTER, JOY
1 transaction
$13,200
2
FULLER, CHRIS
1 transaction
$10,410
3
RADER, SALLY
1 transaction
$9,400
4
HALBOWER, JULIE MRS.
1 transaction
$9,400
5
HALBOWER, MATTHEW
1 transaction
$9,400
6
JOHNSON, CHARLES B. MR.
1 transaction
$9,400
7
LES, JASON
1 transaction
$9,400
8
MASIERO, THOMAS
1 transaction
$9,400
9
PRESTON, TAYLOR
1 transaction
$9,400
10
PYSH, PRESTON
1 transaction
$9,400
11
ROUDI, ROD
1 transaction
$9,400
12
KEENEY, MICHAEL E.
1 transaction
$7,400
13
RADER, JOHN
1 transaction
$7,150
14
DORRELL, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,870
15
MUZINICH, JUSTIN
1 transaction
$6,600
16
NESSEL, ARIEL
1 transaction
$6,600
17
COHEN, KARI A.
1 transaction
$6,600
18
RITCH, JOE
1 transaction
$6,600
19
JOHNSON, ROBERT WOOD IV
1 transaction
$6,600
20
VALDEZ, MIKE
1 transaction
$6,600

Donor Network - Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 41 nodes and 21 connections (37 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $170,230

Top Donors - Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

1 Org20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.

  • Section 3(a)(1) prohibits federal entities from collecting donor identification information for tax-exempt organizations, which would hinder lobbying and law firms that rely on donor data for client intelligence and compliance work.

  • Section 3(a)(1) restricts federal collection of donor information, which could impact for-profit education entities that solicit donations and rely on donor data for fundraising and compliance.

  • −Labor Unionsconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(1) prohibits federal collection of donor identification, which could affect labor unions that engage in political spending and rely on donor transparency for compliance with campaign finance laws.

  • −Teachers Unionsconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(1) restricts federal collection of donor information, which could impact teachers unions that engage in political activities and rely on donor data for compliance and reporting.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Hagerty, Bill [R-TN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 26 contributions
    • GIANCARLO, J.$8,600
    • DUNN, BRENDAN$6,600
    • ROGERS, ED$4,700
    • LAI, JOSEPH$4,500
    • OLSWANGER, SAMUEL$3,500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Very Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly strengthens the Federal Election Commission's ability to enforce the foreign money ban, which is a core focus of the Project 2025 FEC section on election integrity and campaign finance reform."

Key themes:foreign election interferencecampaign finance regulationFederal Election Commissioncontribution restrictionsindirect contributions

— 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023). — 861 — 29 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION Hans A. von Spakovsky MISSION/OVERVIEW The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is an independent federal agency that began operations in 1975 to enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) passed by Congress in 1971 and amended in 1974.1 FECA governs the raising and spending of funds in all federal campaigns for Congress and the presidency. The FEC has no authority over the administration of federal elections, which is per- formed by state governments. While the FEC has exclusive civil enforcement authority over FECA,2 the U.S. Justice Department has criminal enforcement authority, which is defined as a knowing and willful violation of the law.3 Because the FEC is an independent agency and not a division or office directly within the executive branch, the author- ity of the President over the actions of the FEC is extremely limited. As former FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith has said, the FEC’s “[r]egulation of campaign finance deeply implicates First Amendment principles of free speech and association.”4 The FEC regulates in one of the most sensitive areas of the Bill of Rights: political speech and political activity by citizens, candidates, political par- ties, and the voluntary membership organizations that represent Americans who share common views on a huge range of important and vital public policy issues. NEEDED REFORMS Nomination Authority. The President’s most significant power is the appoint- ment of the six commissioners who govern the FEC, subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Commissioners may only serve a single term of six years but

Federal Election Commission

Moderate
Vector: 68%
Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on expanding foreign contribution bans and enforcement mechanisms under FECA, while Project 2025 critiques the FEC's structure, litigation authority, and overenforcement tendencies. Both address FECA reform and FEC operations, but the bill does not directly advance Project 2025's specific recommendations like removing FEC litigating authority or addressing commissioner term overstays."

Key themes:Federal Election CommissionFECA reformelection enforcementcampaign finance regulation

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Department of Justice

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 596-598AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 DOJ section aim to protect election integrity, but the bill focuses on restricting foreign financial influence while the policy addresses domestic voter fraud and DOJ jurisdictional authority over §241 investigations, resulting in moderate thematic overlap."

Key themes:election integrityvoter registrationDOJ enforcementfraud preventioncampaign finance

— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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