The bill
Future of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Act of 2026
S. 3952, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
ID: Y000064
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3952, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 137-139 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Star Print ordered on the bill.
March 18, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The "Future of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Act of 2026" - a title that screams "we have no idea what we're doing, but it sounds good." Let's dissect this monstrosity and see what's really going on.
**New Regulations:**
* Creation of a new Center for Artificial Intelligence Standards and Innovation (because we clearly need more bureaucracy) * Establishment of voluntary artificial intelligence standards, metrics, and evaluation tools (read: toothless guidelines that will be ignored by industry giants) * Development of testbeds for testing AI systems (a.k.a. playgrounds for tech companies to play with their toys)
**Affected Industries and Sectors:**
* Artificial Intelligence (obviously) * Technology * Healthcare (because AI is going to "revolutionize" healthcare, or so the hype goes) * Finance (where AI will no doubt be used to further enrich the already wealthy)
**Compliance Requirements and Timelines:**
* Companies will have to comply with the new standards and guidelines (but only if they feel like it) * The Center for Artificial Intelligence Standards and Innovation will provide "guidance" on compliance (read: vague suggestions that will be ignored) * No specific timelines are provided, because who needs deadlines when you're dealing with cutting-edge technology?
**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:**
* None. Zilch. Zero. This bill is all about "promoting innovation" and "supporting research," but God forbid we actually hold anyone accountable for anything. * The Comptroller General will identify "risks and obstacles" related to AI, but don't expect any actual action to be taken.
**Economic and Operational Impacts:**
* This bill will likely lead to a surge in lobbying efforts from tech companies looking to influence the development of AI standards (because that's exactly what we need - more corporate meddling) * Small businesses and startups will be crushed by the regulatory burden, while industry giants will continue to thrive * The creation of new testbeds will provide a convenient excuse for companies to waste resources on "research" rather than actual innovation
In conclusion, this bill is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a feel-good measure designed to make politicians look like they're doing something about AI, while actually accomplishing nothing. The only winners here are the tech lobbyists and industry giants who will continue to reap the benefits of lax regulation. Everyone else? Just collateral damage in the game of political theater.
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C000127
Top Contributors
70
ID: B001243
Top Contributors
26
ID: H000273
Top Contributors
23
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 50 nodes and 48 connections
Total contributions: $48
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 12 helped.
The bill establishes AI standards, testbeds, and research programs that directly benefit AI and cloud infrastructure providers by supporting development, testing, and deployment of AI systems, including foundation models and cloud-based AI training/inference (see Sec. 101(c)(E), (F), (I), (O); Sec. 102(b)-(i); Sec. 201-202).
The bill includes provisions to examine semiconductor supply chain vulnerabilities and support AI hardware development, which benefits semiconductor manufacturers (see Sec. 101(c)(O): 'Examining, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, the vulnerabilities in the supply chain of hardware, including semiconductors and microelectronics...').
The bill explicitly supports AI red-teaming, blue-teaming, vulnerability assessments, and cybersecurity toolkits for AI systems, directly benefiting cybersecurity firms (see Sec. 101(c)(B), (C), (D), (E), (J), (L); Sec. 102(c)(7)(B); Sec. 102(d)).
Large tech platforms (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Amazon) are likely beneficiaries of AI research funding, testbed access, and standards development that could improve their AI offerings and cloud services (see Sec. 101(c)(I), (F); Sec. 102; Sec. 201-202).
Section 101(c)(1)(I) mentions convening meetings with Federal agencies and private sector to accelerate development and adoption of national standards for AI systems in sectors including biotechnology, agriculture, and health care. This indicates support for health care sector, which includes hospitals and health systems.
Section 101(c)(1)(I) explicitly includes biotechnology as a sector for which the Center will convene meetings to accelerate development and adoption of national standards for AI systems, indicating support for the biotech industry.
+ 6 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on AI innovation, standards, and testbeds aligns with Project 2025's call to exploit AI and machine learning for intelligence analysis and improve data exploitation, though it lacks direct ties to defense intelligence reform or national security objectives."
— 105 — Department of Defense DOD INTELLIGENCE Our national defense establishment must evolve to meet the rapid, pro- found, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security portfolios—America’s competitive advantage against rivals and adversaries is at serious risk. However, for any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel- ligence Community (IC)/Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) leadership must be addressed.16 The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel and a significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements, eight are within DOD,17 two are independent,18 and seven belong to various other departments and agencies.19 Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities, both military and civilian.”20 The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and independence. If they continue on their current path, however, both the DIE and the Intelligence Com- munity writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence assessments that mislead policymakers. Needed Reforms l Improve the intelligence process. Defense intelligence assets have been committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since September 11, 2001, at the expense of our strategic objectives, and this has led to increased risk.21 Further, the DIE has evolved into a “customer-based” model with the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense of analytical integrity. The result has been a significant politicization of intelligence. 1. Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders. As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of DIE and IC assessments as needed. 2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering China and Russia). 3. Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands. Avoid the temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support a convergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain those threats. — 106 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 4. Establish and sustain feedback loops to provide insight and direction for continuous improvement and accountability.22 We must revisit our assessments and understand where we got it right and where we got it wrong. 5. Better exploit publicly available information (PAI) data and foster innovation to improve collection and analysis. We must end the practice of multiple DIE organizations paying to acquire the same PAI data and invest more in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit open-source and classified intelligence data. 6. Remove policy obstacles that impede available technical solutions and tailored approaches in order to preclude corruption at the point of collection. 7. Develop statistical discrimination techniques based on relative value to deal with the volume and velocity of available data and information, which are rapidly exceeding our ability to exploit and analyze available data and information efficiently. l Expand the integration of intelligence activities. The prevalence of asymmetric warfare requires Defense Intelligence to leverage the unique authorities and capabilities of U.S. departments and agencies, as well as our partners and allies, to competitive advantage. 1. Create an improved cyber defense and capability. We must reevaluate the dual-hat structure between the National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2. Resurrect economic analysis capability to improve our ability to counter Chinese whole-of-government strategies that combine security with predatory economic objectives. 3. Resurrect critical thinking to provide true strategic intelligence that will enable the U.S. to counter global adversaries and emerging technologies (such as adversary advances in hypersonics, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cyber domain, advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced undersea capabilities) more effectively. 4. Rebuild human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) and improve their integration with defensive and offensive cyber operations.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on voluntary AI standards, testbeds, and international cooperation to promote innovation and trustworthiness in AI, while the Project 2025 Trade section emphasizes tariff powers, reciprocal trade agreements, and countering China's technology transfer and intellectual property practices. There is minimal direct overlap, though both touch on technology and international engagement."
— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on establishing voluntary AI standards, testbeds, and international cooperation to promote AI innovation and trustworthiness, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasizes strategic intelligence analysis, objectivity, dissenting viewpoints, cyber threat sharing, and real-time auditing. Overlap is limited to indirect connections where AI standards could support intelligence community tools and cybersecurity sharing."
— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.