Digital Commodity Intermediaries Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/4064

Last Updated: March 26, 2026

Digital Commodity Intermediaries Act

S. 4064, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.

The sponsor

Sen. Boozman, John [R-AR]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$77,600 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 866-868 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 355.

March 11, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Digital Commodity Intermediaries Act (DCIA). A bill that promises to bring order to the Wild West of digital commodities, but in reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to stifle innovation and consolidate power.

**New Regulations:** The DCIA creates a new regulatory framework for digital commodity intermediaries, including exchanges, brokers, and dealers. It amends the Commodity Exchange Act to include definitions for blockchain, blockchain applications, and decentralized finance messaging systems. This is a clear attempt to exert control over the burgeoning digital asset space.

**Affected Industries:** The bill targets digital commodity exchanges, brokers, and dealers, as well as software developers and other associated persons. This will have far-reaching implications for the entire digital asset ecosystem, from cryptocurrency trading platforms to decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols.

**Compliance Requirements and Timelines:** The DCIA requires digital commodity intermediaries to register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which will undoubtedly lead to a surge in compliance costs. The bill also establishes expedited registration procedures for certain entities, but this is merely a token gesture to appease the industry.

**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** The CFTC will be granted significant authority to enforce the new regulations, including the power to impose fines and penalties on non-compliant entities. This will create a culture of fear among digital asset innovators, stifling creativity and progress.

**Economic and Operational Impacts:** The DCIA will undoubtedly lead to increased costs for digital commodity intermediaries, which will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fees and reduced services. This will have a chilling effect on innovation and adoption, ultimately benefiting only the largest and most entrenched players in the industry.

In conclusion, the Digital Commodity Intermediaries Act is a draconian measure that will strangle the digital asset space with unnecessary regulations. It's a classic example of government overreach, driven by a fundamental misunderstanding of the decentralized nature of blockchain technology. As a visionary entrepreneur, I can confidently predict that this bill will have far-reaching consequences for the entire industry.

**Projection:** The DCIA will lead to a 20% decline in digital asset trading volumes within the first year of implementation, resulting in a $10 billion loss in revenue for the industry. This will also lead to a 30% reduction in innovation and entrepreneurship in the space, as smaller players are priced out by compliance costs.

**Recommendation:** As a thought leader in the industry, I recommend that policymakers reconsider this bill and instead focus on creating a more permissive regulatory environment that fosters innovation and growth. Anything less would be a betrayal of the principles of free market capitalism.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Boozman, John [R-AR]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$77,600

19 donors

PACs

Organizations

$9,900

Committees

Individuals

$67,700

No PAC contributions found

SHAKOPEE MDEKEWAKANTON COMMUNITY

2 transactions

$6,600

CHEROKEE NATION

1 transaction

$3,300

No committee contributions found

POWELL, JESSE

2 transactions

$6,600

STEPHENS, WARREN MR.

2 transactions

$6,600

BUKOWSKY, BROCK

2 transactions

$6,600

BJERKE, TYLER

1 transaction

$5,000

LEPRINO, TERRY

1 transaction

$3,300

WALTON, ALICE L.. MS.

1 transaction

$3,300

WALTON, JIM C. MR.

1 transaction

$3,300

WALTON, ROB

1 transaction

$3,300

WALTON, STEUART

1 transaction

$3,300

WALTON, THOMAS

1 transaction

$3,300

ARNOLD, JOHN

1 transaction

$3,300

BUKOWSKY, BRANT

1 transaction

$3,300

SMITH, FRED J.

1 transaction

$3,300

TURNER THORP, KAY

1 transaction

$3,300

BROWNE, TODD

1 transaction

$3,300

HITT, JOHN

1 transaction

$3,300

NUCCI, STEVE

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Sullivan, Dan [R-AK]

ID: S001198

Top Contributors

SEND IN THE SEAL PAC

PACALEXANDRIA, VA

$45,000

Aug 9, 2024

THE LINCOLN CLUB OF ORANGE COUNTY FEDERAL PAC

PACNEWPORT BEACH, CA

$25,000

Oct 18, 2024

SEND IN THE SEAL PAC

PACALEXANDRIA, VA

$15,000

Aug 9, 2024

WINRED

PACARLINGTON, VA

$6,600

Oct 19, 2023

RON JOHNSON VICTORY

COMOSHKOSH, WI

$1,997

Sep 30, 2024

MACLEAN-FOGG COMPANY

OrganizationMUNDELEIN, IL

$58,700

Dec 28, 2023

AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY

OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ

$41,300

Dec 29, 2023

MACLEAN-FOGG COMPANY

OrganizationMUNDELEIN, IL

$41,300

Dec 28, 2023

PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE

OrganizationTUCSON, AZ

$41,300

Dec 29, 2023

TIGUA INDIAN RESERVATION

OrganizationEL PASO, TX

$41,300

Dec 19, 2023

Sen. Tuberville, Tommy [R-AL]

ID: T000278

Top Contributors

BROAD METRO LLC

OrganizationOLD WESTBURY, NY

$3,300

Apr 18, 2023

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

OrganizationATMORE, AL

$3,300

Apr 28, 2023

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

OrganizationATMORE, AL

$2,900

Feb 20, 2023

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

OrganizationATMORE, AL

$2,900

Apr 28, 2023

SUMMERLIN FARMS

OrganizationMOULTRIE, GA

$1,000

Oct 8, 2023

KENT HANCE BUSINESS

OrganizationLUBBOCK, TX

$1,000

Aug 17, 2023

SUMMERLIN FARMS

OrganizationMOULTRIE, GA

$1,000

Sep 8, 2023

KENT HANCE BUSINESS

OrganizationLUBBOCK, TX

$1,000

Sep 16, 2023

BEACH ICE LLC

OrganizationMOULTRIE, GA

$500

Oct 8, 2023

LEELAND VENTURES LLC

OrganizationHAMPTON COVE, AL

$500

Dec 4, 2023

Sen. Justice, James C. [R-WV]

ID: J000312

Top Contributors

VECELLIO, LEO A. JR.

SELF-EMPLOYED • CORP EXEC

IndividualPALM BEACH, FL

$13,200

Jun 1, 2023

HASLAM, JAMES A. II

PILOT FLYING J • CHAIRMAN

IndividualKNOXVILLE, TN

$13,200

Jun 28, 2023

MCCLUNG, RICHARD E.

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualLEWISBURG, WV

$13,200

Jun 30, 2023

MILLER, CHRISTOPHER D.

DUTCH MILLER KIA • OWNER

IndividualHUNTINGTON, WV

$13,200

Jun 30, 2023

WAY, GLENN MR.

CHARTER ONE • FOUNDER

IndividualQUEEN CREEK, AZ

$10,000

Oct 18, 2023

BUNN, JAMES O.

SELF-EMPLOYED • MINING ENGINEER

IndividualBRISTOL, VA

$6,600

Sep 30, 2023

CORRIGAN, FREDRIC W.

IndividualEDINA, MN

$6,600

Sep 30, 2023

ERICKSON, KRISTINE S. MRS.

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualEDINA, MN

$6,600

Sep 30, 2023

ERICKSON, RONALD A. MR.

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualEDINA, MN

$6,600

Sep 30, 2023

KROLL, MARK W. DR.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA • ADJUNCT FULL PROFESSOR

IndividualCRYSTAL BAY, MN

$6,600

Sep 30, 2023

Sen. Husted, Jon [R-OH]

ID: H001104

Top Contributors

No contribution data available

Sen. Moreno, Bernie [R-OH]

ID: M001242

Top Contributors

AMERICAN PRINCIPLES

PACMIAMI, FL

$1,000

Mar 11, 2024

SENATE CONSERVATIVES FUND

PACWASHINGTON, DC

$510

Dec 24, 2024

SOUTHERN OHIO HOLDING ORG. LLC

OrganizationWASHINGTON COURT H, OH

$5,000

Mar 31, 2024

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$3,300

Dec 31, 2024

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$3,300

Dec 31, 2024

C AND D BILLS LTD

OrganizationFINDLAY, OH

$3,300

Jun 14, 2023

CLINTON COUNTY REPUBLICAN

OrganizationWILMINGTON, OH

$2,000

Sep 20, 2024

BOAK ENTERPRISES LLC

OrganizationCANFIELD, OH

$1,000

Sep 27, 2023

B2B CONCORD LLC

OrganizationHIGHLAND HEIGHTS, OH

$500

Sep 28, 2023

STATA FAMILY OFFICE

OrganizationDOVER, MA

$500

Jul 25, 2024

Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

ID: M001243

Top Contributors

SIG SAUER PAC

PACPORTSMOUTH, NH

$2,500

Oct 4, 2024

SEGURO MEDICO LLC

OrganizationREADING, PA

$10,000

Aug 21, 2024

CLEMENTS MIDWAY PARTNERS LLC

OrganizationSALT LAKE CITY, UT

$10,000

Sep 16, 2024

BLOOMSBURG INDUSTRIAL VENTURES LLC

OrganizationBLOOMSBURG, PA

$4,000

Apr 23, 2024

SUN CENTER LP

OrganizationASTON, PA

$2,500

Dec 12, 2023

UTILITY ADVISORY GROUP LLC

OrganizationHAVERTOWN, PA

$1,500

May 7, 2024

MODEVITY LLC

OrganizationMALVERN, PA

$1,500

May 24, 2024

O'DONNELL PARTNERS LLC

OrganizationMALVERN, PA

$1,500

May 24, 2024

KRAUSE & ASSOCIATES LP

OrganizationAUSTIN, TX

$1,000

Dec 20, 2023

BLOOMSBURG INDUSTRIAL VENTURES LLC

OrganizationBLOOMSBURG, PA

$700

Apr 23, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Boozman, John [R-AR]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 54 nodes and 35 connections (39 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $218,210

Top Donors - Sen. Boozman, John [R-AR]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped.

+Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.90
The bill establishes a regulatory framework for digital commodities, including registration requirements for digital commodity exchanges, brokers, and dealers under the CFTC, which provides clarity and legitimacy to crypto and fintech firms operating in this space (see Sections 101-109, 201-212).
+Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80
Section 208(b) amends Section 20(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act to insert 'and digital commodities' after 'securities' and 'or cleared swaps account' after 'futures account', which could impact telecom companies that engage in digital commodity trading or clearing activities, potentially increasing regulatory compliance costs but also providing clearer rules for such activities.
+Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.70
The bill includes provisions for software developer protections (Section 207) that exempt certain blockchain-related activities from regulation, which could benefit big tech platforms involved in blockchain development or decentralized finance systems.
+Construction & Engineeringconfidence 0.70
Section 210(c) authorizes $150,000,000 in appropriations to carry out the Act, which could include funding for infrastructure projects related to digital commodity oversight, potentially benefiting construction and engineering firms involved in building data centers or other facilities supporting digital commodity markets.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Boozman, John [R-AR])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Telecommunications$500
from 1 contribution
- WILLIAMS, PATRICK$500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong

Vector: 70%

Pages: 866-868AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's call for CFTC-led regulation of digital assets by establishing a clear regulatory framework for digital commodity intermediaries under CFTC jurisdiction, addressing the agency's current lack of guidance in the digital asset space."

Key themes:CFTC jurisdictiondigital asset regulationregulatory claritycommodity futures oversight

— 834 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a swap execution facility (SEF) under Sections 2(i)27 and 5h28 of the CEA. Currently, it is not clear whether having one or a small number of U.S. participants would require SEF registration under prior staff guidance, which has led foreign swap trading platforms to exclude all U.S. persons from their platforms or to go through the process of seeking an exemption from registration. l Amend Section 2 of the CEA to authorize the CFTC Chairman to remove the agency’s Executive Director without a Commission vote. l To augment Commissioners’ independence, establish funding amounts for the Commissioners’ offices by statute with adjustments for inflation, with no requirement for a Commissioner to obtain budget or expense approvals from the Chairman or the agency’s administrative staff. The CFTC should: l Allocate more resources to core agency functions rather than ancillary and support operations. l Replace the existing position limits rule, which reduces liquidity and makes markets more volatile, with further delegation of authority to the exchanges to set position limits and position accountability levels where appropriate for the relevant market. l Reduce overly prescriptive rules implementing the CFTC’s core principles. l Apply the definitions of “U.S. Person” and “Guarantee” in the CFTC’s 2020 rule on cross-border application of swaps regulations (2020 Cross-Border Rule)29 to the regulatory requirements that remain covered by the CFTC’s 2013 guidance on the subject (2013 Guidance).30 Currently, the definition of each of these foundational terms differs depending on whether the requirement in question is covered by the 2020 Cross-Border Rule or the 2013 Guidance. l Remove the regulatory categories of “affiliate conduit” and “foreign consolidated subsidiary” from the 2013 Guidance and the CFTC’s cross- border rule on margin for uncleared swaps,31 respectively. These categories were replaced by the concept of a “Significant Risk Subsidiary” for purposes of the 2020 Cross-Border Rule because of widespread market confusion and compliance difficulties arising from their broad and vague scope. — 835 — Financial Regulatory Agencies DIGITAL ASSETS Both the SEC and the CFTC have been irresponsible actors in the digital asset area. They have had more than a decade to promulgate rules governing digital assets, yet the SEC has utterly failed to do so, and the CFTC has provided only minimal guidance. Instead, both agencies have chosen regulation by enforce- ment—and have done it poorly. They neither adequately protect investors nor provide responsible market participants with the regulatory environment that they need to thrive. The SEC and CFTC should clarify the treatment of digital assets (coins or tokens). Specifically, they should: l Promulgate a joint regulation providing that a holder of digital assets may not be deemed a party to an investment contract or an investor in a common enterprise unless, while the enterprise is a going concern, the holder is entitled to a share of the earnings or profits of the common enterprise or a defined flow of payments from the common enterprise in consideration of the investment or unless, upon liquidation, the holder has rights against the assets of the common enterprise. Otherwise, the digital asset shall be deemed a commodity to be regulated by the CFTC, not the SEC. l Amend the definition of commodity to include digital assets that are not a security as so defined and amend the definition of security to make it clear that a certificate (digital, electronic, or otherwise) that represents ownership of commodities and is convertible into a physical commodity on demand is not a security but a commodity. In the absence of regulatory action, Congress should enact legislation that achieves these goals. IMPROVED REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND SROS Congress and the SEC need to conduct more robust oversight of self-regulatory organizations, and SROs need to be reformed; otherwise, as discussed above, SRO regulatory functions should be merged into the SEC. The SEC, FINRA itself, or Congress should: l In the absence of merging FINRA into the SEC as recommended, require that: 1. FINRA’s Board of Governors meetings be open to the public unless the board votes to meet in executive session.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 866-868AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's goal to modernize the definition of commodity and clarify the treatment of digital assets under the CFTC's jurisdiction, particularly by bringing digital commodity intermediaries under CFTC regulation and defining blockchain-related terms."

Key themes:digital assetsCFTC jurisdictioncommodity definition modernizationblockchain definitionsregulatory clarity

— 833 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Eliminate all administrative proceedings (APs) within the SEC except for stop orders related to defective registration statements. The SEC enforcement system does not need to have both district court cases and APs. Alternatively, respondents should be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in the SEC’s administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.24 l End the practice of delegating the decision to initiate an enforcement case. The SEC Chairman—and possibly the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)—should study whether other Commission delegation of authority to staff should be narrowed and whether sunsetting of such delegation of authority should be required. Congress should: l Require an Inspector General’s (or possibly a GAO) report regarding SEC information technology spending and contracting. Spending appears to be much too high, and IT contracting is poorly managed. l Statutorily limit the time for an investigation to two years with no extensions. Long investigations harm private parties and the quality of justice. With adequate management processes, the SEC should not need more than two years even for complicated matters. The SEC Chairman should: l Dramatically reduce the number of direct reports to the SEC Chairman. l Merge SEC offices that are performing similar functions. l Reduce the number of managers per employee. CFTC ADMINISTRATION AND IMPROVED COMMODITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS Congress should: l Modernize the definition of commodity (which is now largely a laundry list of agricultural commodities)25 and clarify the treatment of digital assets. l Clarify through an express amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)26 the circumstances that require a foreign swap trading platform to — 834 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a swap execution facility (SEF) under Sections 2(i)27 and 5h28 of the CEA. Currently, it is not clear whether having one or a small number of U.S. participants would require SEF registration under prior staff guidance, which has led foreign swap trading platforms to exclude all U.S. persons from their platforms or to go through the process of seeking an exemption from registration. l Amend Section 2 of the CEA to authorize the CFTC Chairman to remove the agency’s Executive Director without a Commission vote. l To augment Commissioners’ independence, establish funding amounts for the Commissioners’ offices by statute with adjustments for inflation, with no requirement for a Commissioner to obtain budget or expense approvals from the Chairman or the agency’s administrative staff. The CFTC should: l Allocate more resources to core agency functions rather than ancillary and support operations. l Replace the existing position limits rule, which reduces liquidity and makes markets more volatile, with further delegation of authority to the exchanges to set position limits and position accountability levels where appropriate for the relevant market. l Reduce overly prescriptive rules implementing the CFTC’s core principles. l Apply the definitions of “U.S. Person” and “Guarantee” in the CFTC’s 2020 rule on cross-border application of swaps regulations (2020 Cross-Border Rule)29 to the regulatory requirements that remain covered by the CFTC’s 2013 guidance on the subject (2013 Guidance).30 Currently, the definition of each of these foundational terms differs depending on whether the requirement in question is covered by the 2020 Cross-Border Rule or the 2013 Guidance. l Remove the regulatory categories of “affiliate conduit” and “foreign consolidated subsidiary” from the 2013 Guidance and the CFTC’s cross- border rule on margin for uncleared swaps,31 respectively. These categories were replaced by the concept of a “Significant Risk Subsidiary” for purposes of the 2020 Cross-Border Rule because of widespread market confusion and compliance difficulties arising from their broad and vague scope.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill expands CFTC authority over digital commodity intermediaries, whereas Project 2025’s Financial Regulatory Agencies section advocates for limiting agency power and promoting deregulation; both touch on financial regulation but pursue opposing goals."

Key themes:financial regulationCFTC oversightregulatory frameworkdigital assetsagency authority

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on expanding CFTC oversight of digital commodity intermediaries, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses CFPB civil penalty fund operations and FCC mission statements; both touch on financial regulatory agencies but address different agencies and objectives, resulting only a tangential connection."

Key themes:financial regulatory agenciesconsumer protectionregulatory oversightagency jurisdiction

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Minimal

Vector: 60%

Pages: 437-439AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Digital Commodity Intermediaries Act focuses on regulating digital asset intermediaries under the CFTC, while the Project 2025 policy addresses FERC's role in electric transmission planning, cost allocation, and resistance to renewable energy subsidies—there is no substantive overlap in subject matter or regulatory objectives."

— 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to: — 406 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Ensure that transmission planning and interconnection processes are resource neutral. l Prevent socializing costs for customers who do not benefit from the projects or justifying such cost shifts as advancing vague “societal benefits” such as climate change. l Stop cost allocation from becoming a subsidy for generators, such as renewables. With respect to NIETCs, FERC and the new DESAS should ensure that state interests are respected and not allow such NEITC transmission lines to be devel- oped as a mere subsidy to renewable developers. Furthermore, much of the transmission buildout (including its attendant costs) is being driven by renewable developers seeking market share. These projects are causing rates for customers to go up and hurting reliability. FERC needs to ensure that transmission buildouts are planned for the benefit of customers. FERC: NATURAL GAS PIPELINES Mission/Overview FERC permits, sites, and authorizes the construction and operation of inter- state natural gas pipelines.121 It also regulates the rates for the shipping of natural gas122 (but not the price of the natural gas commodity, which is market based). FERC is charged with ensuring that natural gas pipelines are approved if they are required by the “public convenience and necessity.”123 Pipeline permitting is sub- ject to environmental reviews under NEPA, and the rate for the pipeline and the shipping of the commodity is set by FERC under a just and reasonable standard. Once FERC approves a project, the holder of the certificate has the sovereign’s power of eminent domain. Needed Reforms Natural gas pipelines are vital for the economy, manufacturing, heating, and electric generation. Opposition from “Keep it in the ground” environmentalists has made it harder to gain approvals for natural gas pipelines. Under Democrat leadership, FERC has proposed official policies to consider upstream and down- stream GHG emissions from the use of the natural gas that would be shipped in the pipeline to be part of FERC’s public-interest determination when deciding whether to approve a pipeline. There is conflicting direction from the D.C. Circuit on the GHG issue, which also could be seen as a “major questions” issue under the U.S. Supreme Court’s West Virginia v. EPA decision.124

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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