The bill
Maverick Act
S. 4161, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Sheehy, Tim [R-MT]
ID: S001232
Follow the money
The bill
S. 4161, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 149-151 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
May 3, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The "Maverick Act" - how quaint. How utterly, mind-numbingly predictable.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to transfer three surplus F-14D Tomcat aircraft from the Navy to the U.S. Space and Rocket Center Commission in Huntsville, Alabama. Because, you know, what every museum needs is a few outdated fighter jets to gather dust and serve as a reminder of America's military prowess.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to convey the aircraft without consideration (i.e., for free) to the Commission, provided they agree to certain conditions. These conditions include maintaining the aircraft in compliance with FAA regulations, not transferring ownership or possession to another party without prior approval, and reverting ownership back to the United States if the Commission fails to comply. Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory "we're not liable for any accidents or damages" clause - because accountability is overrated.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The Navy, the U.S. Space and Rocket Center Commission, and the taxpayers who will inevitably foot the bill for the maintenance and operation of these relics. One can only assume that the good people of Huntsville, Alabama, are simply thrilled to have three outdated fighter jets taking up space in their museum.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill will be negligible, except perhaps as a symbol of congressional incompetence. It's a classic case of "pork barrel politics" - a meaningless gesture designed to appease local interests and garner votes. The real question is: what's the quid pro quo? Who's getting paid off or rewarded with campaign contributions for sponsoring this bill? Don't worry, I'm sure it's all just a coincidence that the Commission happens to be located in a state with significant military contracting interests.
In conclusion, the "Maverick Act" is a perfect example of legislative malpractice - a pointless exercise in bureaucratic busywork designed to waste taxpayer dollars and perpetuate the illusion of congressional relevance. It's a disease, really - a symptom of a deeper corruption that infects our political system. And we're all just along for the ride, watching as our elected officials engage in this farcical dance of self-interest and incompetence. Bravo, Congress. Bravo.
Sen. Sheehy, Tim [R-MT]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
No individual contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000377
Top Contributors
24
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 8 nodes and 67 connections
Total contributions: $67
Showing top 4 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2(a) authorizes conveyance of surplus F-14D Tomcat aircraft from the Navy to the U.S. Space and Rocket Center Commission, which benefits defense contractors by preserving naval aviation heritage and potentially supporting maintenance, restoration, and display contracts.
Section 2(e)(1) allows the Commission to enter into agreements with qualified nonprofit organizations for restoring and operating the aircraft for public display, airshows, and commemorative events, which supports the aerospace industry through preservation and potential commercial use in events.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Sheehy, Tim [R-MT])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The Maverick Act focuses on transferring surplus F-14D Tomcats to a museum for heritage preservation, while Project 2025's DoD section emphasizes USMC force structure transformation, divestment of specific ground systems, funding new capabilities, and Space Force posture. The overlap is limited to general DoD asset management, with no direct alignment to the policy's core objectives."
— 116 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Transform USMC force structure. a. Eliminate all USMC law enforcement battalions. b. Transform at least one Marine Infantry Regiment into a Marine Littoral Regiment. c. Reduce the size of remaining infantry battalions. 2. Divest systems or equipment that are better suited to heavier U.S. Army units. a. Maintain divestment of M1 Abrams tanks. b. Eliminate the majority of tube artillery (M777) batteries. c. Reduce the number of Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles and the number of their replacements. 3. Use funds made available by divestment of systems to support new systems that are geared to the likely needs of future conflicts. a. Increase the number of rocket artillery batteries (HIMARS). b. Increase the number of upgraded Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) companies. c. Increase the number of Unmanned Aerial Systems and anti-air systems (including counter-UAS systems). d. Develop long-range strike missiles and anti-ship missiles for the Corps. e. Modernize USMC infantry equipment. l Transform the USMC personnel paradigm. More than other services, the USMC relies heavily on junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to staff key positions across the force but especially in combat arms. For example, E-4s routinely hold squad leader billets when the Army normally has E-6s in those billets. The nature of more distributed operations and the increasingly complex responsibilities of a Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon under Force Design 2030 will only put more responsibility on the backs of squad leaders and platoon sergeants, increasing the need for more senior Marines in those critical positions. Additionally, the Corps needs to improve its retention of junior NCOs after their first enlistments (the Marines have much lower rates of reenlistment than other branches).33 1. Align the USMC’s combat arms rank structure with the U.S. Army’s (squad leader billets are for E-6s, and platoon sergeant billets are for E-7s). — 117 — Department of Defense 2. Create better incentives to retain talented junior NCOs, especially in infantry and other critical military occupational specialties. 3. Reduce unnecessary deployments to increase dwell time in order to enable more robust primary military education. l Align Navy amphibious shipbuilding with Force Design 2030. The U.S. Navy has struggled for decades to maintain an amphibious fleet that could support USMC war plans around large-scale amphibious operations. In addition, amphibious shipbuilding has often had to compete against other priorities within a constrained budget and limited shipbuilding capacity. 1. Develop and produce light amphibious warships (LAWs) to support more distributed amphibious operations, especially in the Pacific.34 2. Maintain between 28 and 31 larger amphibious warships as opposed to the 25 specified in current Navy shipbuilding plans and the 38 specified before 2020.35 U.S. SPACE FORCE U.S. space forces conduct global space operations to sustain and enhance air, land, and sea effectiveness, lethality, and superiority by providing secure broad- band global communications (precision position, navigation, and timing accuracy); attack warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information); and their assured continuity of operations both by defending U.S. assets and by conducting offensive operations that are capable of imposing unacceptable losses on adversaries that might seek to attack them. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) was established to assure continuous global and theater combat support from space, to deter attacks against U.S. space assets, and to prevail in space should deterrence fail. The USSF posture was conceived as a balance of offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities designed for maximum effectiveness. Needed Reforms l Reverse the Biden Administration’s defensive posture. The Biden Administration has eliminated almost all offensive deterrence capabilities and instead will rely solely on defensive capabilities of disaggregation, maneuver, and reconstitution—the most costly, the slowest, and ultimately the most fragile architecture selection.
AI Analysis:
"The Maverick Act focuses on transferring surplus F-14D Tomcats to a museum for heritage preservation, which does not directly address the Project 2025 DOD objectives of retaining junior NCOs, reducing deployments, aligning amphibious shipbuilding, or reforming the Space Force. Any connection is only tangential through general support of military heritage and morale."
— 117 — Department of Defense 2. Create better incentives to retain talented junior NCOs, especially in infantry and other critical military occupational specialties. 3. Reduce unnecessary deployments to increase dwell time in order to enable more robust primary military education. l Align Navy amphibious shipbuilding with Force Design 2030. The U.S. Navy has struggled for decades to maintain an amphibious fleet that could support USMC war plans around large-scale amphibious operations. In addition, amphibious shipbuilding has often had to compete against other priorities within a constrained budget and limited shipbuilding capacity. 1. Develop and produce light amphibious warships (LAWs) to support more distributed amphibious operations, especially in the Pacific.34 2. Maintain between 28 and 31 larger amphibious warships as opposed to the 25 specified in current Navy shipbuilding plans and the 38 specified before 2020.35 U.S. SPACE FORCE U.S. space forces conduct global space operations to sustain and enhance air, land, and sea effectiveness, lethality, and superiority by providing secure broad- band global communications (precision position, navigation, and timing accuracy); attack warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information); and their assured continuity of operations both by defending U.S. assets and by conducting offensive operations that are capable of imposing unacceptable losses on adversaries that might seek to attack them. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) was established to assure continuous global and theater combat support from space, to deter attacks against U.S. space assets, and to prevail in space should deterrence fail. The USSF posture was conceived as a balance of offensive and defensive deterrent capabilities designed for maximum effectiveness. Needed Reforms l Reverse the Biden Administration’s defensive posture. The Biden Administration has eliminated almost all offensive deterrence capabilities and instead will rely solely on defensive capabilities of disaggregation, maneuver, and reconstitution—the most costly, the slowest, and ultimately the most fragile architecture selection. — 118 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Reestablish offensive capabilities to guarantee a favorable balance of forces, efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum, and seriously complicate enemy calculations of a successful first strike against U.S. space assets. 2. Restore architectural balance in U.S. space forces, both offensive and defensive, to restore deterrence dominance efficiently and quickly. 3. Rapidly expand space control capability, to include cis-lunar space (the region beginning at geosynchronous altitude and encompassing the moon), to provide early warning of an enemy attack. 4. Seek arms control and “rules of the road” understandings only when they are unambiguously in the interests of the U.S. and its allies, and prohibit their unilateral implementation. l Reduce overclassification. The USSF must move beyond the Cold War– era culture of secrecy and overclassification that surrounded military space to facilitate greater coordination and synchronization of efforts across the government and commercial sectors. Declassify appropriate information about terrestrial and on-orbit space capabilities that threaten the U.S. space constellation, as well as those being pursued by our competitors, to secure the principled right to counter them offensively. l Implement policies suited to a mature USSF. No longer a “newborn,” the USSF has entered its fourth year of existence, and the lessons learned can be incorporated across all facets of the force to increase its effectiveness. 1. Restructure from the current “unity of effort” structure to “unity of command.” 2. Lead the U.S. government’s development of a clear and unambiguous declaratory policy that the United States will operate at will in space and enforce these operations with capabilities that ensure effective deterrence and the ability to impose our will if necessary. 3. End the current study phase of concept development and issue necessary guidance for the development and fielding of offensive capabilities.
AI Analysis:
"The Maverick Act deals with transferring surplus Navy aircraft for heritage display, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 DOT focus on MARAD reorganization, Jones Act reform, and transportation efficiency."
— 638 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and purpose, and therefore its funding priorities, are not well understood and his- torically have been minimalized in planning and budgeting. MARAD, including its subordinate Service Academy (the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy) should be transferred to the Department of Defense (if the Coast Guard is located there because DHS has been eliminated) or to the Department of Home- land Security. In this way, the two agencies charged with oversight and regulation of the Maritime sector—MARAD and the United States Coast Guard—would be aligned under the same department where operational efficiencies could be real- ized more easily. Serious consideration should be given to repealing or substantially reforming the Jones Act,16 which would require legislation. The economic costs of the Jones Act, which is notionally in place to promote a robust Merchant Marine, vastly exceed its effect on the supply of domestic ships. For instance, no liquified natural gas (LNG) can be shipped from Alaska to the lower 48 states because there are no U.S.-flagged ships that carry LNG. If there are genuine concerns about U.S. fleet capacity in the absence of the Jones Act, it would be possible to do so through an expansion of the Defense Reserve Fleet. Another DHS agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a frequent user of MARAD Ready Reserve Force shipping during disaster assistance missions. Transferring MARAD to DHS would make coordination and requisition of those vessels a smoother and more rapid process. DHS has responsibility for reviewing and approving Jones Act waivers. This process first requires a market survey of available shipping tonnage that is completed by MARAD. The processing of Jones Act waiver requests would be streamlined if both agencies were in the same department. Finally, DHS as a department is experienced in administering and budgeting for the operation of an existing federal service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, which is similar to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in size. There would be increased efficiencies and better alignment of the missions of these two institutions if they were under one single department that has equity in the industries served by these academies. CONCLUSION Americans need more abundant and affordable transportation. They need more affordable and safer cars as well as physical aspects of transportation such as roads, bridges, airports, ports, and rail lines. The Department of Transportation should be evaluating which aspects of transportation are contributing to the economic competitiveness of the United States and the well-being of Americans—and that therefore should continue to be funded. All too often, DOT’s mission is described as reducing the number of trips, using less fuel, and raising the costs of travel to Americans through increased use of — 639 — Department of Transportation renewables. These goals are not compatible with what should be DOT’s purpose: to make travel easier and less expensive. That is what the American people want, and that is what DOT should provide. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Steven Bradbury, David Ditch, and Robert Poole deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.