REPORT Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/848
Last Updated: November 4, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH]

ID: H001076

Follow the money

The bill

REPORT Act

S. 848, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.

The sponsor

Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$67,600 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

63% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 201-204 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 255.

November 2, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of bureaucratic doublespeak, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The REPORT Act (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) is a bill that promises to bring transparency and accountability to the reporting of terrorism incidents. How quaint.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to create a new layer of bureaucratic red tape, requiring multiple federal agencies to submit joint reports to Congress regarding acts of terrorism. Because what we really need is more paperwork and interagency coordination. The objectives are twofold: (1) to provide a clearer picture of terrorist activities in the United States, and (2) to identify gaps in homeland security that could be addressed to prevent future attacks.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, Attorney General, Director of the FBI, and head of the National Counterterrorism Center to submit unclassified reports (with optional classified annexes) to Congress within one year of completing an investigation into a terrorist incident. These reports must include a statement of facts, identification of security gaps, and recommendations for improving homeland security. Oh, and there's a sunset clause that terminates this requirement after five years, because who needs long-term accountability?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected by this bill: federal agencies, Congress, and the public (who will supposedly benefit from increased transparency). But let's be real, the only stakeholders who truly matter are the politicians and bureaucrats who get to pad their resumes with "terrorism expert" credentials.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of action without actually addressing any underlying issues. The reports will likely be sanitized, delayed, or withheld due to "ongoing investigations" or "national security concerns." Meanwhile, the real problems – inadequate intelligence sharing, bureaucratic turf wars, and lack of resources – will remain unaddressed.

In short, the REPORT Act is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a feel-good measure designed to placate voters and provide cover for politicians who are more interested in grandstanding than actual governance. Mark my words: this bill will do nothing to prevent future terrorist attacks, but it will create a lovely paper trail of bureaucratic busywork.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of "Security Theater-itis," with symptoms including excessive reporting requirements, lack of meaningful action, and a healthy dose of bureaucratic self-interest. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: None recommended, as the patient is unlikely to survive anyway.

Related Topics

National Security & IntelligenceFederal Budget & AppropriationsGovernment Operations & Accountability
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$67,600
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$67,600

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
WOODS, ANDREW L.
2 transactions
$8,200
2
KORN, WILLIAM T.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
GEPHARDT, RICHARD
2 transactions
$6,600
4
ESTES, J. NORMAN
2 transactions
$6,600
5
BEKENSTEIN, ANITA
1 transaction
$3,300
6
BEKENSTEIN, JOSH
1 transaction
$3,300
7
HUNTER, DANIEL
1 transaction
$3,300
8
KLARMAN, SETH
1 transaction
$3,300
9
SCHWARTZ, GABRIEL
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SWINDELL, C. DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
11
RYAN, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
12
YOUNGMAN, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
13
BARROSSE, DAVID E.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
EMERSON, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
15
KRAMER, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
16
LOVIER, HEATHER
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]

ID: L000577

Top Contributors

10

1
MACRICOSTAS, GEORGE
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualINCLINE VILLAGE, NV
$13,200
May 14, 2024
2
PFAUTCH, ROY
CIVIC SERVICECONSULTANT
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$9,900
Feb 20, 2024
3
NICOLAISEN, JAMES E
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualPORTLAND, OR
$8,700
Jul 19, 2024
4
METZGER, WILLIAM
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualBOONVILLE, IN
$8,700
Jul 23, 2024
5
S., TINA
SELFRESTAURANT
IndividualMAUREPAS, LA
$8,700
Sep 10, 2024
6
DE CARLI, JAMES
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualDANA POINT, CA
$8,700
Aug 10, 2024
7
EDWARDS, ZELLA
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualCHAMBERSBURG, PA
$8,700
Sep 10, 2024
8
RICHARDSON, CHERYL
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICTPARAEDUCATOR
IndividualSLC, UT
$8,700
Jul 9, 2024
9
DONADIO, RICHARD
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualDACULA, GA
$8,700
Aug 13, 2024
10
ZALL, MARGIE
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualBOYNTON BEACH, FL
$8,700
Sep 19, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 55 nodes and 23 connections (54 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $99,400

Top Donors - Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • Section 2(b) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to submit reports to Congress regarding incidents of terrorism, which could lead to increased funding and resources for law enforcement agencies.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Hassan, Margaret Wood [D-NH])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate63.0%
Pages: 201-204

— 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 171 — 6 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Kiron K. Skinner The U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national security interests of the United States. Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American gov- ernment’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful. There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision. It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the

Introduction

Moderate61.7%
Pages: 254-256

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Introduction

Moderate61.0%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness; — 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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