A concurrent resolution extending the life of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies.

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Bill ID: 119/sconres/1

Last Updated: May 26, 2025

A concurrent resolution extending the life of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies.

SCONRES. 1, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$102,900 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Executive Office of the President of the United States" section, p. 96-98 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

January 2, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The SCONRES 1 bill, a concurrent resolution extending the life of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies. A trivial matter, really. Let's dissect it.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** This bill is an exercise in bureaucratic perpetuation, ensuring the continued existence of a committee that oversees inaugural ceremonies. Its primary objective is to maintain the status quo, rather than drive meaningful change or innovation.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill reauthorizes the joint committee and its authority to make arrangements for presidential inaugurations. It also extends the use of Capitol facilities for these events. No significant changes are proposed; it's a straightforward extension of existing powers.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The primary stakeholders are the members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, who will continue to enjoy their roles and influence. Secondary stakeholders include the President-elect, Vice President-elect, and various government agencies involved in inaugural preparations. My interests, however, remain unaffected by this bill.

**Potential Impact & Implications** From a wealth and power perspective, this bill is inconsequential. It doesn't alter the regulatory landscape or create new opportunities for consolidation. The committee's continued existence may provide some minor benefits to those with connections to its members, but these are negligible compared to the broader implications of more substantial legislation.

In conclusion, SCONRES 1 is a non-event, a mere formality that fails to address the real issues hindering growth and innovation in this country. As a visionary leader, I would rather focus on dismantling regulatory barriers and fostering an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and progress. This bill, much like our current democratic system, is a relic of inefficiency, prioritizing tradition over transformation.

Projected impact on my empire: $0.00

Recommendation: Ignore this bill and focus on more meaningful legislative initiatives that can drive real growth and consolidation.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$102,900

15 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$102,900

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

BELL, RICHARD R

2 transactions

$16,800

NESS, LARRY F

2 transactions

$11,700

HARMS, DUANE D

2 transactions

$9,700

EVANS, MICHAEL

2 transactions

$8,400

POWELL, JESSE

1 transaction

$6,600

DUHAMEL, KATHARINE B

1 transaction

$6,600

DUHAMEL, WILLIAM F JR.

1 transaction

$6,600

BARATTA, JOSEPH

2 transactions

$6,600

MCINERNEY, PAULA G

1 transaction

$5,000

MILKEN, LOWELL J

1 transaction

$5,000

WHITE, ALAN B

1 transaction

$5,000

HARMS, JEFFREY D

1 transaction

$5,000

MARQUIS, BENJAMIN L

1 transaction

$3,300

MARQUIS, DARRELL L

1 transaction

$3,300

MARQUIS, DUSTIN L

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

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Showing 30 nodes and 20 connections (36 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $102,900

Top Donors - Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount

15 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SCONRES 1 deals with the logistical extension of the inaugural ceremonies committee, whereas the Project 2025 excerpt focuses on strengthening the Vice President's policy influence within the Executive Office; the only connection is a tangential reference to the Vice President and congressional relations."

Key themes:Vice PresidentCongressExecutive Office

— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 59%

Pages: 205-207AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SCONRES 1 deals with extending the joint committee that organizes presidential inaugurations, while the Project 2025 excerpt focuses on staffing the State Department with political appointees and overseeing departmental functions. The only connection is the broader theme of ensuring a smooth transfer of power, but the substantive objectives do not overlap."

Key themes:presidential transitioninaugurationpolitical appointeesgovernment continuity

— 173 — Department of State service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration. Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years. Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it. To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration. Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success. Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills, — 174 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of political appointees. Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence well before the new Administration’s first day. Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately. The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the Presi- dent’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be pri- oritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). RIGHTING THE SHIP Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citi- zens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented immediately: Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc., pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more import- ant than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars. Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused

White House Office

Weak

Vector: 58%

Pages: 75-77AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SCONRES 1 concerns the procedural continuity of presidential inaugurations, which tangentially supports the executive branch's functioning—a theme mentioned in Project 2025's emphasis on presidential authority—but it does not address the core Project 2025 goals of limiting bureaucracy or reining in agency power."

Key themes:executive branchtransition of powerpresidential inauguration

— 42 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 3. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3. 4. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 5. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 6. H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/ PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). — 43 — 2 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Russ Vought In its opening words, Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes it abundantly clear that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 That enormous power is not vested in departments or agencies, in staff or administrative bodies, in nongovernmental organizations or other equities and interests close to the government. The President must set and enforce a plan for the executive branch. Sadly, however, a President today assumes office to find a sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly “woke” faction of the country. The modern conservative President’s task is to limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people. This challenge is created and exacerbated by factors like Congress’s decades-long tendency to delegate its lawmaking power to agency bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “inde- pendence” that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the presumed inability to hold career civil servants accountable for their performance, and the increasing reality that many agencies are not only too big and powerful, but also increasingly weaponized against the public and a President who is elected by the people and empowered by the Constitution to govern. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison warned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”2 Regrettably, that wise and cautionary note describes to a significant degree the modern executive branch, which—whether controlled

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal

Vector: 60%

Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill concerns the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies and has no relation to Federal Communications Commission policies or objectives outlined in Project 2025."

— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023).

Federal Election Commission

Minimal

Vector: 58%

Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SCONRES 1 deals with extending the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 policy recommendations concerning the Federal Election Commission, campaign finance law, and FEC structure."

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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A concurrent resolution extending the life of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies.