The bill
A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against Venezuela that have not been authorized by Congress.
SJRES. 90, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA]
ID: K000384
Follow the money
The bill
SJRES. 90, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 143-145 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
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📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another case of legislative theater, where our esteemed lawmakers pretend to care about the Constitution and the rule of law. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of SJRES 90 is to appear as if Congress is reasserting its authority over war powers, while actually doing nothing meaningful. The objective is to create a smokescreen of constitutional rectitude, allowing lawmakers to claim they're standing up for the principles of democracy.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill's key provisions are a masterclass in legislative doublespeak:
* Section 1 (Findings) is a laundry list of obvious statements about Congress's war powers and the lack of authorization for military action in Venezuela. It's like stating that water is wet. * Section 2 (Termination of Hostilities) directs the President to terminate the use of US Armed Forces in hostilities against Venezuela, unless explicitly authorized by Congress. Sounds good on paper, but we all know how well presidents follow congressional directives.
The only real change this bill proposes is a minor tweak to existing law: it invokes Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act (50 U.S.C. 1546a) and Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. These provisions are already on the books, so this bill is essentially a rehashing of existing law.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include:
* The Venezuelan government (which will likely be thrilled to see Congress pretending to care about their sovereignty) * US military personnel and contractors in Venezuela (who might actually have to follow orders for once) * Lobbyists and special interest groups pushing for regime change or other nefarious agendas * Voters who are gullible enough to believe this bill means anything
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of SJRES 90 is precisely zero. This bill will not:
* Stop US military involvement in Venezuela (because the President can simply ignore it) * Prevent future unauthorized wars (since Congress has a proven track record of rubber-stamping executive overreach) * Restore constitutional balance (as lawmakers are more interested in posturing than actual governance)
In reality, this bill is just a symptom of a deeper disease: the chronic inability of our legislative branch to meaningfully check executive power. It's a Potemkin village of accountability, designed to distract from the fact that Congress has abdicated its constitutional responsibilities.
Diagnosis: Terminal case of Legislative Theater-itis, with symptoms including empty posturing, constitutional lip service, and a complete lack of actual governance. Treatment: None available; patient is terminal.
Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 56 nodes and 30 connections (80 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $138,300
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(a) directs the President to terminate the use of United States Armed Forces for hostilities within or against Venezuela, which could reduce defense contracts and military operations.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"SJRES 90 focuses on congressional war powers and limiting unilateral military action in Venezuela, while the Project 2025 DoD section emphasizes military readiness, force structure, and combat effectiveness against near-peer adversaries like China. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address defense modernization, personnel policy, or strategic concepts outlined in Project 2025."
— 110 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise there are no general or field-grade officers who served as planners or commanders against a near-peer adversary in combat. 4. Examine the logic of emerging Army concepts about employing massed long-range fires and effects without considering how to gain advantage by closing with and dominating an adversary on land. 5. Recognize that high-intensity land combat operations cannot be sustained through short-term individual or unit rotations in the style of the sustained low-intensity campaigns conducted over the past 20 years. 6. Transform how the National Guard is employed during extended operations short of declared war to preclude back-to-back federal and state deployments of National Guard soldiers in order to stabilize and preserve military volunteerism in our communities. 7. Revamp Army school curricula to concentrate on preparation for large- scale land operations that focus on defeating a peer threat. 8. Address the underlying causal issues driving increasing Army suicide rates, which have surpassed pre–World War II rates and are now eclipsing the rate among civilians. U.S. NAVY As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “provide and maintain a Navy.” Inherent in this phrase is a recognition that there is a vital national interest in the maritime environment and that this national interest requires sustained planning and investment. This is as true today as it was almost 250 years ago and will remain true into the future. The U.S. Navy (USN) exists for two primary reasons: to project prompt, sus- tained, and effective combat power globally, both at sea and ashore, and to deter aggression by potential adversaries by maintaining a forward operating presence in conjunction with allies and partners. Today, the People’s Republic of China Peo- ple’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can challenge the USN’s ability to accomplish its mission in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the production, employment, and control of maritime forces, the USN must consider the scope and rate of technological change and, where appropriate, adapt its processes and workforce development. In balancing the necessary long-term industrial model of naval platforms against emerging short-term opportunities, the USN must take account of advances that may present vulnerabilities and risks as well as what is assured and secure.
AI Analysis:
"SJRES 90 focuses on limiting unilateral military actions and requiring Congressional authorization for hostilities in Venezuela, while the Project 2025 DoD section emphasizes rebuilding Army readiness, increasing budgets, modernization, and warfighting capability. The two texts share only a tangential concern with military deployment and readiness, but their objectives diverge significantly."
— 108 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise U.S. ARMY The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term. All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission. Needed Reforms l Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs. 1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power. 2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance. 3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness. 4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously. — 109 — Department of Defense 5. Reform recruiting efforts. The Army missed its 2022 recruitment goal by 25 percent, or 15,000 soldiers. l Focus on deployability and sustained operations. The U.S. Army’s very lethal ground force capability is irrelevant if it cannot quickly deploy to locations for employment in decisive operations to secure our global security interests. Additionally, Army logisticians provide the ground transportation (of both personnel and equipment); fuel, food, and water; munitions (bombs and bullets); medical supplies and services; and veterinary services (food safety) that are critical to sustainment of the other services. 1. Immediately increase the production and stockpiling of critical munitions and repair parts. 2. Prioritize expeditionary logistics in all force design and operational planning to guarantee entry into a contested theater of war. 3. Increase the level of Joint Force training, synchronization, and coordination focused on logistics. 4. Prepare to deploy forces from degraded U.S.-based transportation infrastructure that is compromised by opposing forces. l Transform Army culture and training. The Army can no longer serve as the nation’s social testing ground. A rebuilt Army that is focused again on its core warfighting mission and empowered it with the tools, resources, and authorities it needs to accomplish that mission must be the next Administration’s highest defense priority. 1. Stop using the Army as a test bed for social evolution. Misusing the Army in this way detracts from its core purpose while doing little to reshape the American social structure. The Army no longer reflects national demographics to the degree that it did before 1974 when the draft was eliminated. 2. Demand accountability in senior leaders to reverse the decline in public support for military service. 3. Reestablish the experiential base for the planning, execution, and leadership of Army formations in large-scale operations. Currently,
AI Analysis:
"SJRES 90 focuses on requiring congressional authorization for military hostilities in Venezuela, emphasizing war powers restraint, while the Project 2025 DOD section centers on streamlining arms sales, exportability, and reducing congressional notification delays. Both touch on Congress's role in defense decisions, but their objectives diverge—one seeks greater congressional oversight, the other seeks less bureaucratic hurdles for sales."
— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10 — 102 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 1. Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the delivery of defense articles to our global partners. 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allow us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases. DOD PERSONNEL The men and women of America’s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy, but in recent years, they have been overextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Young civilians who would thrive in a military environ- ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wearing Ameri- ca’s uniform. The United States military is an extraordinary institution, staffed by exceptional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history, but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. We must restore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will meet the rigorous standards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’s greatest fighting force. Needed Reforms l Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint Force. 1. Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress, DOD, and all other interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention. 2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis system that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and unwarranted rejections.11 3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
A bill to designate the General George C. Marshall House in the Commonwealth of Virginia, as an affiliated area of the National Park System, and for other purposes.
119/s/603
A bill to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 10660 Page Avenue in Fairfax, Virginia, as the "Congressman Gerald E. Connolly Post Office Building".
119/s/3294
A bill to prohibit the transfer of certain offices and functions of the Department of Education to other Federal agencies, and for other purposes.
119/s/5046