The bill
A resolution electing Robert M. Duncan, of the District of Columbia, as Secretary for the Majority of the Senate.
SRES. 14, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]
ID: T000250
Follow the money
The bill
SRES. 14, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 205-207 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Submitted in the Senate, considered, and agreed to without amendment by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S8; text: CR S8)
January 2, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The full Senate will vote on whether to pass the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another thrilling episode of "Congressional Theater" brought to you by the esteemed members of the Senate. Today's feature presentation is SRES 14, a resolution that will leave you on the edge of your seat... or not.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Oh boy, this one's a real nail-biter! The main purpose of this bill is to elect Robert M. Duncan as Secretary for the Majority of the Senate. Wow, I can barely contain my excitement. It's like watching paint dry, but with more pomp and circumstance.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Ah, the suspense is killing me! This resolution has a whopping one provision: electing Robert M. Duncan to a position that probably comes with a nice salary, benefits, and a fancy title. I'm sure it's not just a patronage appointment or a reward for some behind-the-scenes deal-making. Nope, couldn't be.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Well, let's see... the affected parties include Robert M. Duncan (the lucky winner of this prestigious position), the Senate Majority (who get to pretend they're doing something important), and the taxpayers (who will foot the bill for Mr. Duncan's salary and benefits). Oh, and I'm sure the lobbyists and special interest groups are just thrilled to have another friend in a high place.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** *yawn* The potential impact of this resolution is... wait for it... zero! Zilch! Zip! It's a non-binding, symbolic gesture that will change nothing. But hey, at least the Senate gets to pretend they're doing something useful while they line their own pockets and cater to their donors.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Legislative Ennui" – a condition characterized by a complete lack of substance, purpose, or meaningful impact. The symptoms include empty rhetoric, pointless posturing, and a healthy dose of self-serving interests. Treatment involves a strong dose of transparency, accountability, and actual governance. But don't hold your breath; this patient is terminal.
In short, SRES 14 is a perfect example of congressional navel-gazing – a meaningless exercise in self-aggrandizement that accomplishes nothing except to further erode the public's trust in government. Bravo, Senate! You've managed to make a complete mockery of the legislative process once again.
Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Total contributions: $102,900
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This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill concerns internal Senate staffing election and does not address State Department appointments, confirmation leverage, or any Project 2025 policy objectives."
— 173 — Department of State service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration. Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years. Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it. To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration. Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success. Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills, — 174 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of political appointees. Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence well before the new Administration’s first day. Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately. The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the Presi- dent’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be pri- oritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). RIGHTING THE SHIP Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citi- zens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented immediately: Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc., pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more import- ant than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars. Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused
AI Analysis:
"SRES 14 is an internal Senate resolution electing a Secretary for the Majority and does not address the Executive Office of the President, the Vice President's role, or any policy objectives outlined in the Project 2025 excerpt."
— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"SRES 14 concerns an internal Senate staffing appointment and does not address any Department of Homeland Security objectives such as expanding political personnel, Senate-confirmed leadership processes, or grant compliance."
— 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further, — 137 — Department of Homeland Security individuals wielding acting Secretary authority should have explicit authority to finalize agency actions, including regulations, to ensure that the department’s homeland security mission is fulfilled. Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices. Pending a possible presidential deci- sion to shrink or eliminate DHS itself, the next Administration will still have the obligation to protect the homeland as required by law. The Secretary therefore can and should use his or her inherent, discretionary leadership authority to “soft close” ineffective and problematic corners of the department. While those corners are to be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and opera- tional responsibility to mission-essential components of the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. This effort not only would make the department more efficient, but also would support a legislative move to shrink or dismantle the department by showing that the agency can fulfill national security–critical functions without its current bloated bureaucracy. Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel. To strengthen political decision-making and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used legally and efficiently, the Secretary should make major changes in the distribution of career personnel throughout the department. For example, personnel from parts of the department undergoing soft closure could be redistributed to what will be workload-intensive corners of the department, including national security–critical and transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement capacity should be removed immediately from office billets and deployed to field billets to maxi- mize law enforcement capacity. Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding. The next Adminis- tration should take steps to restore lawfulness and integrity to the department’s massive regimen of federal grant programs, most of which are managed and dis- tributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary should direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issued grant funding for states, localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demon- strate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission and actions support the broader homeland security mission. All applicants and potential recipients of such grant funding should be required to meet certain pre- conditions for eligibility (except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian funding) or should simply be considered ineligible for funding. Such preconditions should include at least the following: l Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers. l Certification by applicants that they are both registered with E-Verify and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.