A resolution congratulating the Philadelphia Eagles on their victory in Super Bowl LIX in the successful 105th season of the National Football League.

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/sres/84
Last Updated: May 6, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA]

ID: F000479

Follow the money

The bill

A resolution congratulating the Philadelphia Eagles on their victory in Super Bowl LIX in the successful 105th season of the National Football League.

SRES. 84, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$73,500 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

40% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 895-897 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Submitted in the Senate, considered, and agreed to without amendment and with a preamble by Unanimous Consent. (consideration: CR S1038; text: CR S1042-1043)

February 18, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

📍 Current Status

Next: The full Senate will vote on whether to pass the bill.

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Oh, joy. Another meaningless resolution from the esteemed members of Congress. Because, clearly, the most pressing issue facing this nation is congratulating a football team on their Super Bowl win.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** To waste taxpayer time and money on a feel-good resolution that accomplishes absolutely nothing. The objective? To curry favor with Eagles fans in Pennsylvania, no doubt to secure votes for the sponsors of this resolution: Fetterman, McCormick, Coons, Kim, and Blunt Rochester.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** None. Zilch. Zip. This is a non-binding resolution that doesn't even pretend to address any real issue or problem. It's a PR stunt, plain and simple. The "provisions" are just a laundry list of Eagles stats and accolades, because who needs actual policy when you can name-drop football players?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The Philadelphia Eagles organization, their fans (who will no doubt be thrilled to know that Congress is spending time on this), and the sponsors' constituents in Pennsylvania. Oh, and let's not forget the Secretary of the Senate, who gets to waste their time transmitting an enrolled copy of this resolution to various Eagles bigwigs.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Zero. Zilch. None. This resolution won't create a single job, fix a pothole, or address any pressing national issue. It's a legislative placebo, designed to make politicians look good while accomplishing nothing. The only impact will be on the taxpayers' wallets, as they foot the bill for this pointless exercise in self-congratulation.

Diagnosis: This resolution is suffering from a severe case of " Politician-itis": an acute condition characterized by an overwhelming desire to waste time and resources on meaningless gestures, while ignoring actual problems. Symptoms include excessive use of empty rhetoric, a complete lack of substance, and a desperate need for attention and approval. Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong shot of reality.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$73,500
15 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$4,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$69,500

No PAC contributions found

1
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$2,000
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$2,000

No committee contributions found

1
SIMMS, RONALD
2 transactions
$10,100
2
GOLDMAN, AMIR
2 transactions
$6,600
3
ROSMAN, ALIZA
2 transactions
$6,600
4
BISTRICER, MICHELLE
2 transactions
$6,600
5
EISENSTAT, ABRAHAM
2 transactions
$6,600
6
HABER, JAMES
2 transactions
$6,600
7
LEVINSON, SAM
2 transactions
$6,600
8
ADLERSTEIN, ARI
1 transaction
$3,300
9
LEPRINO, TERRY
1 transaction
$3,300
10
MAYER, ABRAHAM
1 transaction
$3,300
11
RAYMAN, STEVEN
1 transaction
$3,300
12
TROODLER, SHLOMO
1 transaction
$3,300
13
LIEBERMAN, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]

ID: M001243

Top Contributors

10

1
SIG SAUER PAC
PACPORTSMOUTH, NH
$2,500
Oct 4, 2024
2
SEGURO MEDICO LLC
OrganizationREADING, PA
$10,000
Aug 21, 2024
3
CLEMENTS MIDWAY PARTNERS LLC
OrganizationSALT LAKE CITY, UT
$10,000
Sep 16, 2024
4
BLOOMSBURG INDUSTRIAL VENTURES LLC
OrganizationBLOOMSBURG, PA
$4,000
Apr 23, 2024
5
SUN CENTER LP
OrganizationASTON, PA
$2,500
Dec 12, 2023
6
UTILITY ADVISORY GROUP LLC
OrganizationHAVERTOWN, PA
$1,500
May 7, 2024
7
MODEVITY LLC
OrganizationMALVERN, PA
$1,500
May 24, 2024
8
O'DONNELL PARTNERS LLC
OrganizationMALVERN, PA
$1,500
May 24, 2024
9
KRAUSE & ASSOCIATES LP
OrganizationAUSTIN, TX
$1,000
Dec 20, 2023
10
BLOOMSBURG INDUSTRIAL VENTURES LLC
OrganizationBLOOMSBURG, PA
$700
Apr 23, 2024

Sen. Coons, Christopher A. [D-DE]

ID: C001088

Top Contributors

10

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$3,300
Dec 27, 2023
2
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,700
Dec 27, 2023
3
CHEN, YU
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
4
MIRZAIE, REZA
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$3,300
Oct 7, 2024
5
CHEN, YU
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
6
WASSERMAN, CASEY
WASSERMAN • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
7
ZHAO, PENG
CITADEL SECURITIES • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
8
WASSERMAN, CASEY
WASSERMAN • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
9
ZHAO, PENG
CITADEL SECURITIES • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$3,300
Dec 17, 2024
10
MIRZAIE, REZA
RUSS AUGUST & KABAT LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$3,300
Oct 7, 2024

Sen. Kim, Andy [D-NJ]

ID: K000394

Top Contributors

10

1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$6,600
Sep 11, 2024
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$3,300
Sep 30, 2024
3
JSTREETPAC
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Feb 15, 2024
4
JSTREETPAC
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Feb 15, 2024
5
JSTREETPAC
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Jan 11, 2024
6
COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Oct 11, 2023
7
GIVE CHANCES
OrganizationNORTHVALE, NJ
$300
Jul 10, 2023
8
GIVE CHANCES
OrganizationNORTHVALE, NJ
$300
Apr 26, 2023
9
JSTREETPAC
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$250
Feb 15, 2024
10
KIM, ANTHONY
CENTERVIEW PARTNERS • FINANCE
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$6,600
Sep 30, 2023

Sen. Blunt Rochester, Lisa [D-DE]

ID: B001303

Top Contributors

10

1
PHAROS CAPITAL GROUP LLC
OrganizationBRENTWOOD, TN
$3,300
Dec 15, 2023
2
TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LA
OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA
$3,300
Dec 29, 2023
3
POMO BAND OF THE HABEMOTOLEL INDIANS
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
May 17, 2024
4
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationMADILL, OK
$3,300
May 30, 2024
5
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationMADILL, OK
$3,300
May 30, 2024
6
THE DANIEL INITIATIVE, LLC
OrganizationSTAFFORD, VA
$3,300
Jul 24, 2023
7
TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LA
OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA
$2,500
Sep 30, 2024
8
PHAROS CAPITAL GROUP LLC
OrganizationBRENTWOOD, TN
$2,300
Dec 15, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,000
Mar 31, 2024
10
1634 ASSOCIATES
OrganizationPHILADELPHIA, PA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 47 nodes and 35 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $125,100

Top Donors - Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA]

Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs13 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Minimal
Vector: 54%
Pages: 895-897AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SRES 84 is a ceremonial resolution congratulating a sports team and contains no provisions related to election law, the FEC, DOJ enforcement, or any Project 2025 policy objectives."

Key themes:unrelatedno overlap

— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.

Department of Agriculture

Minimal
Vector: 53%
Pages: 344-346AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"SRES 84 is a ceremonial resolution congratulating the Philadelphia Eagles on a Super Bowl win and contains no provisions related to agriculture, USDA programs, or any of the policy objectives outlined in the Project 2025 Department of Agriculture section."

— 311 — Department of Agriculture ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 2. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System,” https://www.usda. gov/fst (accessed December 14, 2022). 3. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1. 4. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150 Years,” https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/ history (accessed December 16, 2022). 5. The law stated, “[T]here is hereby established at the seat of government of the United States a Department of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” Gladys L. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13, https://babel. hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33 (accessed December 16, 2022). 6. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p. 2. 7. Ibid., p. 2. 8. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, p. 3, https://www.usda.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 9. News release, “USDA Announces Framework for Shoring Up the Food Supply Chain and Transforming the Food System to Be Fairer, More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supply- chain-and-transforming (accessed December 14, 2022). 10. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System.” 11. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, pp. 1–2. 12. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Background on the U.S. Approach to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit,” August 4, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UN- Food-Systems-Summit.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 13. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,” https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/un- summit (accessed December 14, 2022). 14. Mark Bittman et al., “How a National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could- save-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html (accessed December 14, 2022); Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, “No, We Don’t Need to Transform the American Food System,” The Daily Signal, February 26, 2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/ no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/ (accessed December 14, 2022); and Daren Bakst, “Biden’s Food Conference Should Put People First, Not Environmental Extremism,” The Daily Signal, September 22, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-people- first-not-environmental-extremism/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 15. News release, “USDA to Invest Up to $300 Million in New Organic Transition Initiative,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 22, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300- million-new-organic-transition-initiative (accessed December 14, 2022). 16. Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s Green New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures, November 14, 2022, https://www. farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster (accessed December 16, 2022). 17. See, for example, Catherine Greene et al., “Growing Organic Demand Provides High-Value Opportunities for Many Types of Producers,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6, 2017, https://www. ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunities- for-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20 by%20the%20consumer (accessed December 14, 2022), and Andrea Carlson, “Investigating Retail Price Premiums for Organic Foods,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016, https://www.ers. usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/ (accessed December 16, 2022). Further, there are many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit of organic food. One — 312 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise meta study found that “[t]he published literature lacks strong evidence that organic foods are significantly more nutritious than conventional foods.” Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., “Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 5 (September 4, 2012), pp. 348–366, https:// www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007 (accessed December 16, 2022). 18. Steve Savage, “USDA Data Confirm Organic Yields Significantly Lower Than With Conventional Farming,” Genetic Literacy Project, February 16, 2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirm- organic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 19. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021, https://www.regulations. gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001 (accessed December 16, 2022). 20. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117–169. 21. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture (1948–2019),” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivity- growth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4 Percent of Disposable Income to 10.3 Percent in 2021,” July 15, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967 (accessed December 14, 2022). 23. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021, Table 1101, https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu- income-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No.176, April 5, 2017, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf. 24. Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA Slush Fund,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6052, February 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/ budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda. 25. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, Public Law 80–806. 26. Bakst and Sewall, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power.” 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021,” November 1, 2021, https://www. regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst (accessed December 16, 2022). 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program.” 30. Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606 (accessed December 16, 2022). 31. “Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall, 14 percent of U.S. farms participated in Federal crop insurance programs.” Christine Whitt, Noah Miller, and Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, pp. 24 and 26, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247. pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which apparently does not cover crop insurance, included payments beyond just commodity payments, such as conservation payments. 32. Randy Schnepf, “Farm Safety-Net Payments Under the 2014 Farm Bill: Comparison by Program Crop,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 11, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 33. Although livestock and specialty crop producers do receive some subsidies, former American Farm Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman captured the subsidy issue well. He “dismisse[d] outright the claim that farmers couldn’t survive without subsidy money. ‘Why does the livestock industry survive without subsidies?’ he ask[ed]. ‘Why does the specialty crop [fruit and vegetable] industry survive?’” Tamar Haspel, “Why Do Taxpayers Subsidize Rich Farmers?” The Washington Post, March 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d- f3d931db7f68_story.html (accessed March 18, 2023).

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Minimal
Vector: 52%
Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill is a purely ceremonial resolution congratulating a sports team and contains no policy content related to the Executive Office of the President, Vice President roles, or any of the administrative reforms outlined in Project 2025."

— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills