The bill
STABLE Act of 2025
HR. 2392, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
ID: S001213
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2392, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 866-868 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 68.
May 5, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
The STABLE Act of 2025 - because what the world really needs is more regulatory theater to prop up a dying fiat currency system.
Let's dissect this legislative abomination, shall we?
**New regulations being created or modified:** The bill introduces a slew of new definitions and regulations for payment stablecoins, which are essentially digital assets designed to maintain a stable value relative to a national currency. Because, you know, the free market can't be trusted to innovate without the benevolent guidance of our esteemed lawmakers.
**Affected industries and sectors:** This regulatory monstrosity will primarily impact the fintech industry, particularly companies involved in issuing payment stablecoins. But don't worry, it's not like they'll actually understand what's happening - after all, who needs clarity when you have 15 pages of obtuse legalese?
**Compliance requirements and timelines:** The bill requires "Federal qualified nonbank payment stablecoin issuers" to obtain approval from the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator (because that's not a mouthful). They'll also need to maintain minimum capital requirements, implement anti-money laundering protocols, and submit regular reports. Oh, and they have 12 months to comply - plenty of time for them to hire an army of lawyers and accountants to navigate this regulatory quagmire.
**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ah, the fun part! The bill authorizes the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC to impose fines of up to $1 million per day for non-compliance. Because what's a little regulatory extortion between friends?
**Economic and operational impacts:** This bill will likely stifle innovation in the fintech space, as companies will need to divert resources away from actual product development and toward compliance with these Byzantine regulations. It'll also create new barriers to entry, ensuring that only the largest players can afford to participate in the stablecoin market.
In conclusion, the STABLE Act of 2025 is a textbook example of regulatory capture - a bill written by and for the benefit of established financial interests, designed to strangle competition and maintain the status quo. It's a legislative disease, and we're all just along for the ride.
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 71 nodes and 45 connections (68 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $218,695
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
The bill creates a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins, allowing certain entities to issue them under federal or state oversight, which benefits crypto and fintech firms involved in stablecoin issuance and related services (see Sections 3-7).
The bill requires monthly certification of reserve reports by independent registered public accounting firms, increasing demand for audit and attestation services (see Section 4(a)(4)).
Insured depository institutions (including commercial banks) can issue payment stablecoins through subsidiaries, creating a new business line (see Sections 3, 5, and 6).
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The STABLE Act’s focus on creating a clear federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins aligns with Project 2025’s call for the SEC and CFTC to clarify digital asset treatment and provide responsible regulation that protects investors and fosters market stability. Both emphasize regulatory clarity, consumer protection, and oversight of digital assets."
— 834 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a swap execution facility (SEF) under Sections 2(i)27 and 5h28 of the CEA. Currently, it is not clear whether having one or a small number of U.S. participants would require SEF registration under prior staff guidance, which has led foreign swap trading platforms to exclude all U.S. persons from their platforms or to go through the process of seeking an exemption from registration. l Amend Section 2 of the CEA to authorize the CFTC Chairman to remove the agency’s Executive Director without a Commission vote. l To augment Commissioners’ independence, establish funding amounts for the Commissioners’ offices by statute with adjustments for inflation, with no requirement for a Commissioner to obtain budget or expense approvals from the Chairman or the agency’s administrative staff. The CFTC should: l Allocate more resources to core agency functions rather than ancillary and support operations. l Replace the existing position limits rule, which reduces liquidity and makes markets more volatile, with further delegation of authority to the exchanges to set position limits and position accountability levels where appropriate for the relevant market. l Reduce overly prescriptive rules implementing the CFTC’s core principles. l Apply the definitions of “U.S. Person” and “Guarantee” in the CFTC’s 2020 rule on cross-border application of swaps regulations (2020 Cross-Border Rule)29 to the regulatory requirements that remain covered by the CFTC’s 2013 guidance on the subject (2013 Guidance).30 Currently, the definition of each of these foundational terms differs depending on whether the requirement in question is covered by the 2020 Cross-Border Rule or the 2013 Guidance. l Remove the regulatory categories of “affiliate conduit” and “foreign consolidated subsidiary” from the 2013 Guidance and the CFTC’s cross- border rule on margin for uncleared swaps,31 respectively. These categories were replaced by the concept of a “Significant Risk Subsidiary” for purposes of the 2020 Cross-Border Rule because of widespread market confusion and compliance difficulties arising from their broad and vague scope. — 835 — Financial Regulatory Agencies DIGITAL ASSETS Both the SEC and the CFTC have been irresponsible actors in the digital asset area. They have had more than a decade to promulgate rules governing digital assets, yet the SEC has utterly failed to do so, and the CFTC has provided only minimal guidance. Instead, both agencies have chosen regulation by enforce- ment—and have done it poorly. They neither adequately protect investors nor provide responsible market participants with the regulatory environment that they need to thrive. The SEC and CFTC should clarify the treatment of digital assets (coins or tokens). Specifically, they should: l Promulgate a joint regulation providing that a holder of digital assets may not be deemed a party to an investment contract or an investor in a common enterprise unless, while the enterprise is a going concern, the holder is entitled to a share of the earnings or profits of the common enterprise or a defined flow of payments from the common enterprise in consideration of the investment or unless, upon liquidation, the holder has rights against the assets of the common enterprise. Otherwise, the digital asset shall be deemed a commodity to be regulated by the CFTC, not the SEC. l Amend the definition of commodity to include digital assets that are not a security as so defined and amend the definition of security to make it clear that a certificate (digital, electronic, or otherwise) that represents ownership of commodities and is convertible into a physical commodity on demand is not a security but a commodity. In the absence of regulatory action, Congress should enact legislation that achieves these goals. IMPROVED REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND SROS Congress and the SEC need to conduct more robust oversight of self-regulatory organizations, and SROs need to be reformed; otherwise, as discussed above, SRO regulatory functions should be merged into the SEC. The SEC, FINRA itself, or Congress should: l In the absence of merging FINRA into the SEC as recommended, require that: 1. FINRA’s Board of Governors meetings be open to the public unless the board votes to meet in executive session.
AI Analysis:
"Both the STABLE Act and the Project 2025 Financial Regulatory Agencies section emphasize strengthening financial oversight, enhancing transparency and accountability, and protecting consumers, though the former targets stablecoins specifically while the latter focuses on broader SEC/FINRA reforms."
— 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office — 841 — Financial Regulatory Agencies of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Fall 2022 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions: Active Regulatory Actions Listed by Agency,” https://www.reginfo.gov/ public/do/eAgendaMain (accessed February 20, 2023); “Human Capital Management Disclosure,” RIN: 3235- AM88, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AM88 (accessed February 20, 2023); “Corporate Board Diversity,” RIN: 3235-AL91, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AL91 (accessed February 20, 2023). 10. 15 U.S. Code § 77z–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/77z-3 (accessed February 20, 2023); 15 U.S. Code § 78mm, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78mm (accessed February 20, 2023). 11. S. ___, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2022, discussion draft, 117th Congress, 2nd Session, https:// www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0discussiondraft.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Entrepreneurial Capital Formation,” Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 5, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/entrepreneurial- capital-formation; “Removing Barriers to Small Business Capital Formation and Expanding Investor Opportunities,” Section 6 in Nicholas Anthony, Norbert J. Michel, Jennifer J. Schulp, George Selgin, and Jack Solowey, “Sound Financial Policy: Principled Recommendations for the 118th Congress,” ed. Norbert J. Michel and Ann Rulon, Cato Institute, 2022, pp. 22–27, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-10/sound- financial-policy-118th-congress.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton and Norbert J. Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, Submission to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 18, 2021, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David%20 Burton%20and%20Norbert%20Michel%20-%202021-3-18.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3182, February 14, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3182.pdf. 12. The small issues exemptive authority has been in the Securities Act since its initial enactment. 13. The crowdfunding exemption was created by Title III of the 2012 JOBS Act. See H.R. 3606, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Public Law No. 112-106, 112th Congress, April 5, 2021, Title III, § 302, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ106/pdf/PLAW-112publ106.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 14. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws,” Chapter 6 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/06_ProsperityUnleashed_ Chapter06.pdf. 15. Andrew N. Vollmer, “Abandon the Concept of Accredited Investors in Private Securities Offerings,” Securities Regulation Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Spring 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3719280 (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Your Money’s No Good Here: How Restrictions on Private Securities Offerings Harm Investors,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 833, February 9, 2018, https:// www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa833.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Congress Should Increase Access to Private Securities Offerings,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4899, August 29, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/IB4899.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Evidence on the Use of Disclosure Documents in Private Securities Offerings to Accredited Investors,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/publications/financial-regulation/ evidence-use-disclosure-documents-private-securities-offerings-0 (accessed February 20, 2023). 16. For a detailed discussion, see “Micro-Offerings,” Section IId in Burton and Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, pp. 15–17. 17. David R. Burton, “Let Entrepreneurs Raise Capital Using Finders and Private Placement Brokers,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3328, July 10, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/ BG3328.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Make It Easy for Startups to Sell Stock,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Discourse, September 21, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/make-it-easy- startups-sell-stock (accessed February 20, 2023). 18. See H.R. 531, S-Corp Access to Crowdfunding Act, 115th Congress, introduced January 13, 2017, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-115hr531ih/pdf/BILLS-115hr531ih.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David Burton, “The Tax Law Makes It Almost Impossible for ‘S Corporations’ to Use Equity Crowdfunding,” The Daily Signal, April 19, 2016, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/04/19/the-tax-law-makes-it-almost-impossible-for- s-corporations-to-use-equity-crowdfunding/.
AI Analysis:
"The STABLE Act of 2025 aligns moderately with Project 2025's Treasury Department focus on financial institutions and regulatory oversight, particularly through its expansion of the definition of financial institutions to include digital asset entities and its emphasis on transparency and accountability in financial systems."
— 715 — Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines “financial institutions” to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, “The Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Re: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,” Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498–59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022–2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, “Paris Agreement,” 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” GE.5–62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. “What Is ESG?” ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, “Why Business Should Dispense with ESG,” American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, “What are the Principles for Responsible Investment?” https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, “Articles of Association of PRI Association,” Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.