The bill
Earned Wage Access Consumer Protection Act
HR. 9330, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
ID: S001213
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9330, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Labor and Related Agencies" section, p. 624-626 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 690.
August 31, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 9330: Earned Wage Access Consumer Protection Act**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 9330 is to “protect consumers” by regulating earned wage access (EWA) services—apps that let workers tap into already-earned but unpaid wages before payday, often for a fee. Ostensibly, it aims to curb predatory practices in a market that has grown alongside stagnant wages and employer reluctance to offer real pay advances. In reality, it’s a performative band-aid on a hemorrhage: lawmakers pretending to fix worker exploitation while ignoring the root cause—poverty wages and employer greed. The bill’s true objective? To give Congress a photo-op for “doing something” about financial precarity without challenging corporate power or raising the minimum wage.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill imposes three core requirements on EWA providers: - **No-cost option mandate**: If a provider offers a fee-based early wage access, they must also offer a free alternative—though the free transfer can take up to one business day (vs. instant for paid options). - **Enhanced disclosures**: Providers must reveal usage limits, fee structures, tip policies, and transaction details both before agreement and before each disbursement, including year-to-date fee/tip tracking. - **Tip regulation**: If tips are solicited or accepted, providers must disclose upfront whether tips are suggested, expected, or voluntary—and cannot tie access to tipping.
These rules treat symptoms (confusing fees, pressure to tip) while ignoring the disease: workers needing EWA because they’re paid too little, too late. Notably, the bill does *nothing* to cap fees, ban predatory tip-suggesting designs, or hold employers accountable for forcing workers into this cycle.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **EWA providers** (e.g., DailyPay, Earnin): Must restructure offerings to include free (but slower) options and comply with disclosure burdens—annoying, but unlikely to break their models. Many already offer “free” tiers; this just formalizes it with delays. - **Low-wage workers**: Gain marginally clearer info and access to no-fee options—but only if they can wait a day. Those needing cash *today* still pay fees or feel pressured to tip. - **Employers**: Largely unaffected. They continue to offload wage liquidity onto third-party apps instead of paying workers promptly or fairly. - **Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)**: Gains enforcement authority—assuming it isn’t neutered by the next administration.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This is regulatory theater. By mandating a slow, free alternative, the bill lets providers keep profiting from instant-fee models while claiming compliance. Workers get the illusion of choice: pay for speed or wait. The disclosure avalanche may overwhelm users already stressed by time and money—ironically replicating the fine-print traps the bill claims to prevent.
Worse, it legitimizes EWA as a permanent fix for wage theft via delay, rather than addressing why workers need it: employers hoarding wages, irregular schedules, and the death of the two-week paycheck. In essence, Congress is regulating the band-aid industry while the patient bleeds out from a severed artery labeled “stagnant wages.”
If passed, this bill will do little to reduce reliance on EWA—because it doesn’t make wages *accessible sooner*. It just makes the exploitation slightly more transparent. A victory for bureaucrats, a shrug for workers, and a green light for providers to keep innovating new ways to monetize desperation—now with extra disclosures.
In short: **Congress diagnosed the symptom, prescribed a placebo, and called it reform.** *(Word count: 398)*
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 51 nodes and 68 connections
Total contributions: $68
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.
Section 2(8)(B) prohibits earned wage access providers from accepting payment through a consumer's credit card unless it's part of the service, which may impact fintech payment platforms.
Section 2(4)(B) and (7) imply that earned wage access providers may not impose financial penalties or cancellation charges, which could influence banking and financial institutions' involvement in these services.
Section 2(8)(A) restricts earned wage access providers from sharing fees with employers, potentially affecting private equity investments in these providers.
Section 2(11) subjects earned wage access providers to consumer data protections under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which may affect big tech platforms that offer or integrate such services.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on regulating earned wage access services for consumer protection, while the Project 2025 policy addresses overtime pay thresholds, regular rate calculations, and guidance document reform—topics with minimal thematic overlap."
— 592 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Overtime Pay Threshold. Overtime pay is one of the most challenging aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act rules. “Nonexempt workers” (e.g., workers whose job duties fall within the law’s power or whose total pay is low enough) must be paid overtime (150 percent of the “regular rate”) for every hour over 40 in a work- week. Overtime requirements may discourage employers from offering certain fringe benefits such as reimbursement for education, childcare, or even free meals because the benefits’ value may be included in the “regular rate” that must be paid at 150 percent for all overtime hours. And because some of these fringe ben- efits may be more valuable (and often come with tax preferences that benefit the worker), the goal should be to set a threshold to ensure lower-income workers have the protections of overtime pay without discouraging employers from offering these benefits. l DOL should maintain an overtime threshold that does not punish businesses in lower-cost regions (e.g., the southeast United States). The Trump-era threshold is high enough to capture most line workers in lower-cost regions. One possibility to consider (likely requiring congressional action) would be to automatically update the thresholds every five years using the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) as an inflation adjustment. This could reduce the likelihood of a future Administration attempting to make significant changes but would also impose more adjustments on businesses as those automatic increases take hold. l Congress should clarify that the “regular rate” for overtime pay is based on the salary paid rather than all benefits provided. This would enable employers to offer additional benefits to employees without fear that those benefits would dramatically increase overtime pay. l Congress should provide flexibility to employers and employees to calculate the overtime period over a longer number of weeks. Specifically, employers and employees should be able to set a two- or four- week period over which to calculate overtime. This would give workers greater flexibility to work more hours in one week and fewer hours in the next and would not require the employer to pay them more for that same total number of hours of work during the entire period. Compliance-Assistance Programming. Labor agencies are often tempted to encourage “over compliance” by companies subject to regulation by pursuing “regulation through enforcement” strategies. Rather than giving regulated enti- ties clear boundaries for what they can and cannot do under the law, the agencies — 593 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies rely on the vagueness of the law to bring enforcement activity against businesses that fail to meet an inspector or agency head’s personal standard. This is not fair to regulated parties and results in disfavored companies bearing the brunt of the agencies’ enforcement efforts even though their behavior may be within the main- stream of employer behavior. l Labor agencies should provide compliance assistance to help businesses and workers better understand the agencies’ position on their own rules and should do so in a way that makes it easier to follow those rules. This frees people to focus on their work rather than slogging through an ever-growing body of laws, rules, and guidance documents generated by the agencies. Clear and Restrictive Rules on Guidance Documents. Federal agencies not only issue regulations to fill in gaps left by legislation, but also supplement those reg- ulations with “guidance” documents that occupy a unique and often confusing area between law and “helpful advice.” Unfortunately, wielded by overzealous enforcement agents, such guidance, some of it even hidden from public view, morphs into binding law used against unsuspecting employers. Guidance can be a tricky thing and can be used for good or bad. It should be used to make compli- cated regulations easier to understand, so that businesses can do their actual jobs and focus on providing jobs to American workers and value to consumers (really, compliance assistance). But guidance is often used to create new rules overnight without following legal requirements—like giving the public an opportunity to provide valuable input. This wrongful use of guidance hurts workers and those who employ them. In October 2019, President Trump signed an executive order ending this abusive practice and created a new, fairer system for American busi- nesses and their employees. In response, DOL published its PRO Good Guidance rule,10 which expressly limits its use of guidance in enforcement actions and gives the public the opportunity to submit comments to influence the department’s deci- sions on creating, revising, and even rescinding guidance. Under this rule, agencies cannot treat guidance as legally binding and must make all guidance documents readily accessible on their searchable online databases. This rule was immediately rescinded by the Biden Administration. l DOL should reinstitute the PRO Good Guidance rule via notice and comment. l Congress should amend the Administrative Procedure Act11 to explicitly limit the use of guidance documents.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on consumer protection in earned wage access services through transparency and fee regulations, while the Project 2025 section critiques the CFPB and advocates for reducing its authority—creating a tension between the bill’s potential expansion of CFPB-like oversight and Project 2025’s goal to limit such agencies."
— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on consumer protection for earned wage access services, while the Project 2025 policy section addresses securities regulation, capital markets, and SEC administrative reforms—there is no substantive overlap in subject matter or objectives."
— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.