Dismantle Foreign Scam Syndicates Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]
ID: S001229
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 48 - 0.
December 2, 2025
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
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4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Dismantle Foreign Scam Syndicates Act (HR 5490) claims to target transnational criminal syndicates perpetuating online scams against Americans, specifically the "pig butchering" scams that have allegedly robbed thousands of their life savings. How noble. The real purpose, of course, is to create a new bureaucracy, expand government powers, and provide a platform for politicians to grandstand about fighting cybercrime.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes an interagency Task Force, led by the Secretary of State, to "dismantle and shut down" these scam syndicates. Because, you know, creating another task force is always the solution to complex problems. The Task Force will develop a comprehensive strategy, coordinate with various agencies, and share information. Wow, how original. The bill also authorizes the intelligence community to provide support, because who doesn't love a good surveillance state?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Department of State, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and various regulatory agencies. Oh, and let's not forget the "stakeholder organizations" that will be consulted quarterly, because their expertise in combatting online scams is undoubtedly invaluable. Meanwhile, the real stakeholders – the American people – will continue to be scammed, because this bill does nothing to address the root causes of these scams or provide meaningful protections.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact will be negligible, except for the expansion of government powers and the creation of new bureaucratic positions. The bill's proponents claim it will "disrupt and dismantle" transnational criminal entities, but we all know how well that's worked in the past (see: War on Drugs, War on Terror). In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, designed to appease voters and provide a talking point for politicians. The scammers will adapt, the victims will continue to be victimized, and the government will continue to pretend it's doing something about it.
In conclusion, HR 5490 is a textbook example of legislative placebo effect: it looks good on paper, sounds good in press releases, but ultimately accomplishes nothing meaningful. It's a cynical attempt to exploit public concern about online scams for political gain, while ignoring the underlying issues and perpetuating the same failed policies that have allowed these scams to thrive. Bravo, Congress. You've done it again.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]
ID: M001194
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Rulli, Michael A. [R-OH-6]
ID: R000619
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]
ID: H001058
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Suozzi, Thomas R. [D-NY-3]
ID: S001201
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Yakym, Rudy [R-IN-2]
ID: Y000067
Top Contributors
10
Rep. McDowell, Addison P. [R-NC-6]
ID: M001240
Top Contributors
10
Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large]
ID: M001219
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]
ID: G000583
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]
ID: R000622
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 37 nodes and 35 connections
Total contributions: $129,887
Top Donors - Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped,3 harmed.
- −Crypto & Fintech confidence 0.90
The bill targets transnational criminal syndicates using cryptocurrency investment schemes (pig butchering) and includes provisions to sanction foreign persons involved in online financial scams, which would disrupt crypto-related illicit activities. Section 4(g)(3) mentions consulting with cryptocurrency exchanges to disrupt scam infrastructure, and Section 7 imposes sanctions on entities responsible for online financial scams, many of which use crypto. This imposes costs on crypto firms that m
- −Big Tech Platforms confidence 0.85
Section 4(g)(3) explicitly lists social media platforms, online dating applications, internet service providers, application stores, search engines, and search optimization companies as private sector actors to partner with for disrupting scam infrastructure. This indicates potential regulatory scrutiny, data sharing demands, or content moderation obligations, imposing costs on big tech platforms.
- −Telecommunications confidence 0.80
Section 4(g)(3) includes telecommunication carriers among private sector actors the Task Force shall develop partnerships with to disrupt scam infrastructure. This implies potential regulatory or cooperative pressure on telecoms to block or monitor scam-related traffic, imposing compliance costs or operational changes.
- +Labor Unions confidence 0.70
Section 8 authorizes programs to support victims of forced criminality (human trafficking) within scam centers, including trauma-informed care and reintegration. This could benefit labor unions by aiding victims who may be workers, though indirect. However, the bill's focus on rescuing trafficking victims aligns with labor union interests in combating forced labor, suggesting a potential benefit.
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]) received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HARMS
- from 1contribution
- ESSINGTON, MICHAEL$250
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and Project 2025 policy are tangentially related through their focus on combating cyber threats, but the bill's approach to creating a task force and expanding government powers does not directly align with the policy's emphasis on sharing cyber threat intelligence and reforming classification procedures. The overlap is weak due to differences in strategy and objectives."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and the Project 2025 policy are tangentially related through their shared concern about cyber threats, but they differ significantly in focus and approach, with the bill targeting transnational criminal syndicates and the policy focusing on state-sponsored cyber aggression and establishing norms for cyberspace behavior."
— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and Project 2025 policy are tangentially related through their shared concern about cyber threats, but the bill's focus on transnational criminal syndicates and online scams does not directly align with the policy's emphasis on state-sponsored cyber aggression and establishing enforceable norms in cyberspace. The overlap is limited to general themes of cybersecurity and combating malicious activities."
— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy. — 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.
Showing 3 of 4 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.