American FIRST Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6550
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

ID: L000583

Follow the money

The bill

American FIRST Act of 2025

HR. 6550, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$66,000 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 869-871 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 454.

February 24, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The American FIRST Act of 2025 is a laughable attempt to increase transparency in interactions between Federal banking supervisory agencies and global financial regulatory or supervisory forums. The bill's sponsors claim it will promote accountability and ensure that the United States maintains its sovereignty in financial regulation. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Federal Reserve Act to require annual reporting on interactions between the Board of Governors and global financial regulatory or supervisory forums. This includes a laundry list of details, from membership lists to funding sources, organizational charts, and meeting summaries. Oh, joy.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Federal Reserve, banking supervisory agencies, global financial regulatory or supervisory forums, and – of course – the politicians who sponsored this bill. One can only assume that these stakeholders will be thrilled to provide more paperwork and bureaucratic busywork.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's not pretend that this bill will have any meaningful impact on the opaque world of international finance. It's a Potemkin village, designed to create the illusion of transparency while allowing the real players to continue their backroom deals and regulatory capture.

In reality, this bill is likely a response to lobbying efforts by financial institutions seeking to curry favor with regulators and lawmakers. The added reporting requirements will only serve to increase compliance costs for banks, which will then be passed on to consumers in the form of higher fees and interest rates.

Meanwhile, the politicians who sponsored this bill will tout it as a victory for transparency and accountability, all while collecting campaign contributions from the very same financial institutions they're supposedly regulating. It's a classic case of regulatory theater, where everyone involved is playing their part in a farce designed to distract from the real issues.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), characterized by a complete disconnect between stated goals and actual outcomes. The prognosis is poor, as LLSS often leads to further bureaucratic bloat, regulatory capture, and a continued erosion of trust in the financial system.

Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong prescription of critical thinking and a thorough examination of the bill's true motivations. Unfortunately, this treatment is unlikely to be effective, given the entrenched interests and cognitive biases at play.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsBanking & Financial Services
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$66,000
13 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
STEPHENSON, DONNA MRS.
2 transactions
$6,600
2
STEPHENSON, JAMES MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
STEPHENS, WARREN
2 transactions
$6,600
4
TEAGUE, GREGORY D. MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
5
DICKERSON, JASON
2 transactions
$6,600
6
LIEBERMAN, RONALD MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
7
YOUNG, E. HOWARD MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
8
BOLCH, CARL MR. JR.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
MORRIS, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
10
LAKO, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
11
WALLACE, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300
12
YOUNG, REBECCA H. MRS.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
NICHOLAS, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Barr, Andy [R-KY-6]

ID: B001282

Top Contributors

10

1
TED J. BALESTRERI ENTERPRISES
OrganizationMONTEREY, CA
$1,000
Dec 6, 2023
2
QUEENSLAKE
OrganizationGEORGETOWN, KY
$300
Feb 12, 2024
3
VESTER, NANCY
NONE • RETIRED
IndividualCENTERVILLE, MA
$6,600
Sep 15, 2024
4
KOLLAR, CLINT WILLIAM
SIXTH STREET PARTNERS • INVESTOR
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$6,600
Mar 22, 2023
5
FIELD, CHESTER JACK
NONE • RETIRED
IndividualSUMMERTON, SC
$6,600
Jun 4, 2024
6
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 21, 2024
7
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 21, 2024
8
BROWN, CHRIS
MINDSET • PARTNER
IndividualCHEVY CHASE, MD
$5,600
Mar 7, 2023
9
DARWISH, SAM
SINGULARITY INVESTMENTS LLC • CEO
IndividualMCKINNEY, TX
$5,000
Oct 28, 2024
10
CORRELL, JESS T.
FIRST SOUTHERN BANK • BANKER
IndividualSTANFORD, KY
$5,000
May 7, 2024

Rep. Flood, Mike [R-NE-1]

ID: F000474

Top Contributors

10

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
2
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1,919
Jun 24, 2024
3
SUGAR CREEK REALTY
OrganizationSAINT LOUIS, MO
$1,500
Oct 1, 2024
4
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$959
May 28, 2024
5
LAMA COMMUNITY TRUST
OrganizationSAN CRISTOBAL, NM
$833
Jun 26, 2024
6
RADCLIFFE GILBERTSON & BRADY
OrganizationLINCOLN, NE
$500
Oct 20, 2024
7
CASSLING, MICHAEL
CASSLING • CEO
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$13,200
Mar 13, 2023
8
BRADFORD VI, DANA
C3 BRANDS • CEO
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Mar 28, 2023
9
HAWKINS JR, FRED
HAWKINS CONSTRUCTION • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
May 11, 2024
10
DUGGER, CATHERINE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Oct 21, 2024

Rep. Rose, John W. [R-TN-6]

ID: R000612

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
2
EVANS, JOHN B.
NGU RISK MANAGEMENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$13,200
Feb 24, 2023
3
HUDSON, PHILLIP JR.
CUMBERLAND SUPPLY CO. INC. • SHAREHOLDER
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$13,200
May 20, 2023
4
VADEN, JAMES L.
SELF-EMPLOYED • ORTHODONTIST
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$13,200
May 8, 2023
5
BARNES, SAM T. DR.
SELF-EMPLOYED • PHYSICIAN
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$10,000
Feb 12, 2024
6
EVANS, JOHN B.
SELF-EMPLOYED • SALES
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$10,000
Feb 27, 2024
7
BARNES, SAM T. DR.
SELF-EMPLOYED • PHYSICIAN
IndividualCOOKEVILLE, TN
$6,600
Dec 8, 2023
8
LIPMAN, ROBERT S.
LIPMAN BROTHERS • EXECUTIVE
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Nov 9, 2023
9
SMITH, BRAD
RUSSELL STREET VENTURES • CEO
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Oct 26, 2023
10
SMITH, LAUREN
LH SMITH CONSULTING • PRESIDENT
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Oct 26, 2023

Rep. Sessions, Pete [R-TX-17]

ID: S000250

Top Contributors

10

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
May 16, 2024
2
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$5,000
Sep 12, 2023
3
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 17, 2024
4
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
May 24, 2023
5
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
6
HOWARD, RONALD VANCE
BANKERS LIFE • MANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
7
HOWARD, KAREN
ELEMENTS MASSAGE • MANAGEMENT
IndividualHUNTSVILLE, TX
$5,000
Mar 13, 2023
8
SINGH, PRITPAL
BETA SOFT SYSTEMS • MANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
9
KAUR, MANJIT
SINGH SEMICONDUCTORS & SYSTEMS • MANAGEMENT
IndividualFREMONT, CA
$5,000
Jun 23, 2023
10
BEHRINGER, TODD
THE BEHRINGER GROUP, LLC • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualWOODWAY, TX
$3,400
Sep 1, 2023

Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]

ID: D000626

Top Contributors

10

1
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
PAXOS • CEO
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Apr 22, 2024
2
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
NA • HOMEMAKER
IndividualMIAMI, FL
$6,600
Apr 22, 2024
3
FISHER, KENNETH
FISHER INVESTMENTS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 22, 2024
4
FISHER, SHERRILYN
PLANO 6500 LLC • MEMBER
IndividualPLANO, TX
$6,600
May 22, 2024
5
GROW, RICHARD
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCINCINNATI, OH
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
6
ROBINSON, ROBERT S
SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualFAIRFIELD TOWNSHIP, OH
$6,600
May 5, 2023
7
BEAMAN, LEE
BEAMAN VENTURES • INVESTOR
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Apr 13, 2023
8
PHELAN, BRENT J
PHELAN INSURANCE • INSURANCE
IndividualWEST CHESTER, OH
$6,600
Apr 19, 2023
9
RICKETTS, J. PETER
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$6,600
Jun 30, 2023
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CEO / OWNER
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Moore, Tim [R-NC-14]

ID: M001236

Top Contributors

10

1
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
SOUTHLAND • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Apr 26, 2024
2
HUCKABEE, BOBBY
IndividualWRIGHTSVILLE BEACH, NC
$6,600
Jun 26, 2024
3
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
CPFRM • EXECUTIVE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
4
WORDSWORTH, ELAINE
IndividualNASHVILLE, NC
$6,400
Dec 31, 2023
5
KELLER, OSCAR A III
SELF EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Apr 23, 2024
6
KELLER, OSCAR A III
IndividualSANFORD, NC
$5,000
Jun 23, 2024
7
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
SUMMIT HOSPITALITY • PRESIDENT
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
8
PARRISH, RODDRICK DOYLE
IndividualRALEIGH, NC
$4,400
Sep 30, 2024
9
BELL, III, JAMES
BELLLEGAL GROUP • ATTORNEY
IndividualGEORGETOWN, SC
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
10
BEAM, DREW
BROAD RIVER HOLDINGS • REAL ESTATE
IndividualSHELBY, NC
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 43 nodes and 35 connections (30 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $143,419

Top Donors - Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]

Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount

13 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90

    The bill requires annual reporting on interactions between Federal banking supervisory agencies (including the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC) and global financial regulatory forums, imposing new reporting obligations and transparency requirements on these agencies, which oversee commercial banks. This increases regulatory scrutiny and compliance burden on the banking industry.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 67%
Pages: 869-871AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy seek to enhance transparency and congressional oversight of financial regulatory agencies through mandatory annual reporting, though the bill focuses on the Federal Reserve’s international forum interactions while the policy emphasizes SEC/CFTC SRO supervision and CFPB accountability."

Key themes:transparencyannual reportingcongressional oversightfinancial regulatory agenciesaccountability

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 67%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy emphasize increased transparency and oversight of financial regulatory agencies, though the bill focuses on the Federal Reserve's international engagements while the Project 2025 section centers on the CFPB's civil penalty fund and structural accountability."

Key themes:transparencyoversightfinancial regulatorscongressional reporting

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 69%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on increasing transparency of the Federal Reserve's interactions with global financial forums, while the Project 2025 section targets abolishing or curbing the CFPB and specific Dodd‑Frank provisions. Both address financial regulatory oversight, but their objectives and mechanisms are largely unrelated."

Key themes:financial regulationtransparency and accountabilityagency oversightregulatory reform

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

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