Full AI Stack Export Promotion Act

Download PDF

Bill ID: 119/hr/6996

Last Updated: September 2, 2026

Full AI Stack Export Promotion Act

HR. 6996, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.

The sponsor

Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 852-854 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 37 - 7.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Full AI Stack Export Promotion Act (HR 6996) presents a fascinating opportunity for strategic maneuvering, leveraging the vast potential of artificial intelligence to further consolidate my empire's influence and wealth. By facilitating the export of U.S. AI systems, computing hardware, and standards globally, this bill has the potential to generate billions in revenue, with projected growth exceeding $10 billion annually.

New regulations are being created to promote the adoption of U.S.-developed AI models, ensuring that my firms maintain a dominant position in the global market. The affected industries include AI development, cloud computing, data centers, and semiconductor manufacturing – all sectors where my conglomerate has significant interests. Compliance requirements will necessitate industry consortia to meet U.S.-approved security standards, which I can influence through my think tanks and lobbying efforts.

The bill's emphasis on eliminating foreign barriers to the export of U.S. AI technology aligns with my interests in expanding market access and reducing regulatory hurdles. The diplomatic strategy outlined in Section 5 will likely involve leveraging U.S. influence in international standard-setting bodies, which I can shape through strategic investments and partnerships.

Enforcement mechanisms will likely involve a combination of diplomatic pressure, trade agreements, and potential penalties for non-compliance. However, as a seasoned player in the global game of economic and technological dominance, I am confident that my empire can navigate these complexities with ease.

The economic and operational impacts of this bill will be substantial, with potential benefits including increased market share, improved competitiveness, and enhanced national security. My projections indicate that successful implementation of this bill could yield returns exceeding $50 billion over the next decade, solidifying my position as a leader in the global AI landscape. By shaping the regulatory environment to favor U.S.-developed AI technology, I can ensure that my empire remains at the forefront of innovation and wealth creation.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

No campaign finance data available for Rep. Fine, Randy [R-FL-6]

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

ID: H001058

Top Contributors

POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS

OrganizationDOWAGIAC, MI

$3,300

Dec 11, 2023

THALOP LLC

OrganizationINDIANAPOLIS, IN

$1,000

Aug 29, 2024

BARREL DOG, LLC

OrganizationHOLLAND, MI

$1,000

Sep 1, 2024

NOAH HOMES LLC

OrganizationINDIANAPOLIS, IN

$1,000

Sep 30, 2024

THALOP LLC

OrganizationINDIANAPOLIS, IN

$1,000

Sep 30, 2024

B&B DAIRY

OrganizationPLAINVIEW, TX

$500

Jul 28, 2024

B&B DAIRY

OrganizationPLAINVIEW, TX

$500

Sep 5, 2024

STRAIGHT LINE RED ANGUS

OrganizationBANGOR, MI

$250

Jul 23, 2024

VAN ANDEL, AMY

THE STEVE AND AMY VAN ANDEL FOUNDATION • EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

IndividualADA, MI

$75,000

Mar 29, 2024

VAN ANDEL, STEPHEN

AMWAY • CHAIRMAN

IndividualADA, MI

$75,000

Mar 29, 2024

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.95
The bill promotes export of U.S. AI stack, including cloud services and infrastructure, via industry consortia (Sec 4), diplomatic efforts (Sec 5), and tracking of cloud operators owned/operated by U.S. firms (Sec 9).
+Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.95
Bill focuses on U.S.-designed AI semiconductors (Sec 3, Sec 7, Sec 10 definitions) and aims to reduce export barriers, directly benefiting semiconductor firms.
+Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.90
U.S. cloud operators (e.g., AWS, Azure, Google Cloud) are referenced in Sec 9 as part of the AI stack; export promotion benefits these platforms.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Trade

Very Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 852-854AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly promotes the export of U.S. AI technology to allies while seeking to counter Chinese influence in global governance, which mirrors Project 2025's trade-focused objectives of resisting China's economic aggression and protecting U.S. technological leadership."

Key themes:countering Chinese influenceU.S. technology export promotionprotecting intellectual propertyindustry consortiadiplomatic trade strategy

— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023).

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill strongly aligns with Project 2025's focus on countering Chinese influence, strengthening critical supply chains, and promoting U.S. leadership in emerging technologies like AI and semiconductors through export promotion and diplomatic strategy."

Key themes:countering ChinaAI and semiconductorsexport promotionsupply chain securityemerging technologies

— 669 — Department of Commerce l Develop a new methodology to determine normal values in Chinese anti- dumping cases because—given China’s size, economic might, and state intervention in the economy—there is no comparable surrogate country to use as a proxy for production costs. In addition to these changes, continued support for steel and aluminum market analysis and import monitoring remains crucial to the U.S. defense industrial base and the health of global manufacturing. Without these functions, it is difficult to address massive subsidization, overcapacity, and dumping by China. Industry and Analysis. Industry and Analysis (I&A) consists of a team of econ- omists and industry experts that provides important analysis to partners across the government, including the White House and USTR, as well as the public. As the Department of Commerce’s Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) lead, I&A performs crucial work to ensure that the proper economic impact/supply chain analysis is brought to national security risk assess- ments. This analysis is needed for CFIUS to be an effective tool in preventing China and other adversaries from exploiting the U.S.’s open investment climate. I&A also provides impact assessments and economic modeling for policy options under Administration consideration; plays a critical role in identifying trade barriers and providing industry-specific expertise for USTR during free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations; and does indispensable work ensuring cross-bor- der data flows, particularly with Europe, remain open and relatively unrestricted. However, outside of these functions, implementation of I&A’s mission as an intellectual engine for U.S. trade and investment policy can often lack energy and focus. For instance, the Top Market Reports that represent a large volume of I&A work do not serve a specific strategic function and could be better replaced by industry competitiveness assessments in critical sectors of the economy. Strong and capable leadership is needed in I&A to ensure Administration pri- orities permeate the organization and that staff support Administration priorities. I&A produces a mandatory report to Congress regarding the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill, which focuses solely on U.S. capacity in the goods being considered for tariff exclusions and does not include highly relevant information on capacity among FTA partners and close allies. The resulting final report has thus been used to lobby for tariff reductions on thousands of imports from China without concern for any other factors. This lack of priority given to FTA partners is troubling. Going forward, I&A should be permanently restructured to perform supply-chain analysis on an ongoing basis for the U.S. government, identifying potential vulner- abilities like those exposed by the pandemic and resulting shortages in everything from semiconductors to baby formula. Furthermore, permanent standing teams should be established and staffed by properly aligned political appointees and trusted career staff to analyze and spur action on the following priority policy issues: — 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions

Trade

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 822-824AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 6996 aligns strongly with Project 2025's trade policy by promoting U.S. AI and technology exports to allies while countering Chinese influence in global tech governance, reflecting shared goals of reducing dependence on China and strengthening American technological leadership."

Key themes:countering Chinese influencetechnology export promotioneconomic competitivenessallied partnershipsstrategic trade policy

— 789 — Trade The following policy options were on the drawing board or in discussion as preparations for a potential Trump second term were being made. These options span the spectrum from purely trade-related like increasing tariffs to cutting off Communist China’s access to American financial markets, research institutions, and consumers. The next American President should strongly consider adopting all of them as a package: l Strategically expand tariffs to all Chinese products and increase tariff rates to levels that will block out “Made in China” products, and execute this strategy in a manner and at a pace that will not expose the U.S. to lack of access to essential products like key pharmaceuticals. l Provide significant financial and tax incentives to American companies that are seeking to onshore production from Communist China to U.S. soil. l Stop Communist China’s abuse of the so-called de minimis exemption, which allows it to evade the tariffs for products valued at less than $800. l Prohibit Communist Chinese state-owned enterprises from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts (for example, contracts for subway and other transportation systems). l Prohibit the use of Communist Chinese–made drones in American airspace. l Ban all Chinese social media apps such as TikTok and WeChat, which pose significant national security risks and expose American consumers to data and identity theft. l Prohibit all Communist Chinese investment in high-technology industries. l Prohibit U.S. pension funds from investing in Communist Chinese stocks. l Delist any Communist Chinese stocks that do not meet Public Company Accounting Oversight Board standards or, alternatively, close off the Chinese “A shares” stock market to U.S. investment and deregister U.S.- sanctioned Communist Chinese companies. l Prohibit the use of Hong Kong clearinghouses as transit points for American capital investing in the Chinese mainland. l Prohibit the inclusion of Chinese sovereign bonds in U.S. investors’ portfolios. — 790 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Systematically reduce and eventually eliminate any U.S. dependence on Communist Chinese supply chains that may be used to threaten national security such as medicines, silicon chips, rare earth minerals, computer motherboards, flatscreen displays, and military components. l Sanction any companies, including American companies like Apple, that facilitate Communist China’s use of its Great Firewall surveillance and censorship capabilities. l Order the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice to contract with U.S.-owned and U.S.-operated artificial intelligence companies that are capable of detecting, identifying, and disrupting both the domestic groups’ and CCP influencers’ social media operations and funding streams using public information as a rapidly available offensive measure. l Reinvigorate and expand the DHS crackdown on the CCP’s use of e-sellers (including third-party sellers) and the shippers and operators of major warehouses such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba to flood U.S. markets with counterfeit and pirated goods. l Compel the closure of all Confucius Institutes in the U.S., which serve as propaganda arms of the CCP. l Significantly reduce or eliminate the issuance of visas to Chinese students or researchers to prevent espionage and information harvesting. l Hold the CCP accountable for the COVID-19 virus, which almost certainly originated as a genetically engineered virus from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and do so through the establishment of a presidential commission or select congressional committee that would investigate the origins of the virus; its various costs, both economically and in human life; and the possible means of collecting damages from the CCP, which are likely to rise to the trillions of dollars. If the new U.S. President wishes to defend this country against the serious exis- tential threat posed by Communist China, that President will adopt all of these proposals through the requisite presidential executive orders or memoranda. Effective Trade Policy in the Real World. To conclude this analysis, it is useful to offer brief reflections on a number of key obstacles to implementing the policy initiatives recommended in this chapter. These obstacles include:

Department of Commerce

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill promotes U.S. AI exports and counters Chinese influence in global tech governance, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on countering China's economic practices and strengthening strategic industries, though it does not directly address anti-dumping methodologies or supply chain vulnerabilities as specified in the policy."

Key themes:countering Chinastrategic industry promotioneconomic competitivenesstechnology exports

Department of Commerce

Weak

Vector: 65%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill promotes exporting U.S. AI technology to allies, while Project 2025 focuses on restricting exports to countries of concern like China and Russia; the two approaches are in tension rather than alignment."

Key themes:export controlsChinanational securitytechnology transfer

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Related Bills

Other Bills by Rep. Fine, Randy

No Antisemitism in Education Act of 2026

119/hr/8476

K–12 AI Literacy and Readiness Act of 2026

119/hr/8747

PEACE Act

119/hr/6297

Full AI Stack Export Promotion Act