Economic Espionage Prevention Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1486
Last Updated: July 12, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

ID: M001218

Follow the money

The bill

Economic Espionage Prevention Act

HR. 1486, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$140,600 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

62% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

May 5, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of congressional theater, where our esteemed leaders pretend to care about national security while lining their pockets with lobby money.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Economic Espionage Prevention Act (HR 1486) claims to impose sanctions on foreign entities engaging in economic or industrial espionage against the United States. The bill's primary objective is to punish China for allegedly supporting Russia's military capabilities by exporting semiconductors and other critical components.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to submit a report within 90 days, detailing Chinese entities involved in transactions with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors. The President can then impose sanctions on these entities, including asset freezes, travel bans, and export restrictions. This is just a rehashing of existing laws, with some minor tweaks to make it sound like they're doing something new.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected: Chinese companies, Russian defense contractors, and anyone else who might be caught in the crossfire. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the politicians and lobbyists who will benefit from this bill. They'll get to grandstand about national security while raking in campaign donations from the defense industry.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a joke. It won't stop China or Russia from doing whatever they want, but it might give our politicians some nice soundbites for their re-election campaigns. The real impact will be on American businesses that rely on Chinese components and technology – they'll face increased costs, delays, and bureaucratic headaches.

In medical terms, this bill is a placebo – it looks like treatment, but it won't actually cure the disease. The disease, in this case, is corruption, incompetence, and greed. Our politicians are just treating the symptoms while ignoring the underlying illness.

Diagnosis: Terminal Stupidity Syndrome (TSS). Symptoms include:

* Grandstanding about national security without actual action * Ignoring the root causes of economic espionage (e.g., our own country's lack of investment in R&D) * Prioritizing campaign donations over effective policy

Prognosis: Poor. This bill will not address the real issues, and we'll be back to square one soon enough.

Related Topics

Trade & International CommerceNational Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$140,600
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$140,600

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
OGLESBY, CHARLES
2 transactions
$20,000
2
HAMILTON, ANNE
1 transaction
$10,000
3
VERMA, VIKAS
1 transaction
$6,600
4
KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS
1 transaction
$6,600
5
LUKE, DEBRA
1 transaction
$6,600
6
BATMASIAN, JAMES H
1 transaction
$6,600
7
KOLLAR, CLINT
1 transaction
$6,600
8
KOLLAR, HEATHER
1 transaction
$6,600
9
STEBBINS, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
10
MONSON, MATTHEW
1 transaction
$6,600
11
WINCHESTER, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
12
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
1 transaction
$6,600
13
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
1 transaction
$6,600
14
TAYLOR, MARGARETTA MISS
1 transaction
$6,600
15
DON & OKSANA, DONALD LEE
1 transaction
$6,600
16
HENNESSY, MARK W
1 transaction
$6,600
17
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
18
QUINONES, PETER
1 transaction
$5,800
19
EDWARDS, MELISSA
1 transaction
$5,800

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

ID: M001194

Top Contributors

10

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationSHELBYVILLE, MI
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
2
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
3
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationDOWAGIAC, MI
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
4
SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE TRIBAL OPERATIONS
OrganizationMOUNT PLEASANT, MI
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
5
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
6
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
OrganizationFULTON, MI
$3,300
Mar 12, 2024
7
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$3,300
Jun 20, 2024
8
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE CHIPPEWA INDIANS
OrganizationSAULT SAINTE MARIE, MI
$2,900
Dec 19, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,500
Mar 4, 2024
10
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$2,500
Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]

ID: B001322

Top Contributors

10

1
THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION
OrganizationNESPELEM, WA
$3,300
Jul 30, 2024
2
THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION
OrganizationNESPELEM, WA
$3,300
Aug 23, 2024
3
KALISPEL TRIBAL ECONOMIC AUTHORITY
OrganizationAIRWAY HEIGHTS, WA
$2,300
Oct 29, 2024
4
THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION
OrganizationNESPELEM, WA
$2,000
Dec 31, 2024
5
KALISPEL TRIBAL ECONOMIC AUTHORITY
OrganizationAIRWAY HEIGHTS, WA
$1,000
Jul 29, 2024
6
YAKAMA NATION
OrganizationTOPPENISH, WA
$1,000
Oct 16, 2024
7
JHASHI, VAJA
SELF-EMPLOYEDENERGY CONSULTANT
IndividualNYACK, NY
$13,200
Jul 22, 2024
8
BENNETT, GREGG
NONERETIRED
IndividualORONDO, WA
$6,600
Mar 10, 2024
9
CONNORS, JOHN
VENTURE CAPITALIGNITION PARTNERS
IndividualMEDINA, WA
$6,600
Mar 28, 2024
10
CONNORS, KATHY
NONEHOMEMAKER
IndividualMEDINA, WA
$6,600
Mar 28, 2024

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

10

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITEDOWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC.BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELFPRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTECEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 57 nodes and 29 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $173,600

Top Donors - Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Section 2 findings note China's export of semiconductors to Russia, and Section 4(b)(3) allows sanctions for violation of U.S. export control laws, which would affect semiconductor manufacturers and exporters.

  • Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85

    Section 4(b)(2) targets provision of material support to foreign adversaries' military, intelligence, or national security entities, which could impact defense contractors engaging with sanctioned foreign persons.

  • Section 4(b)(1) covers economic or industrial espionage with respect to trade secrets or proprietary information owned by U.S. persons, which could apply to AI and cloud firms' intellectual property.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate61.8%
Pages: 705-707

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Introduction

Moderate60.8%
Pages: 248-250

— 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception? — 217 — Intelligence Community Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the Asia–Pacific in, for example, a “Nine Eyes” framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China. Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter China’s capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of China’s successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. No longer can America’s information and technological dominance be assumed. China’s gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. China’s centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic “Made in China 2025” and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum infor- mation sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics. The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally non- government and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In addition, to combat China’s economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General. Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform China’s unique and more com- prehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy. Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. “When people ask me why I did that,” he explained in an interview, “I say, ‘Because no one would let me increase it by 40%.’ I had an $85 billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and military intelligence program. My perspective was, ‘Whatever we’re spending on countering China, it isn’t enough.’”31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount importance that the “whole of government” be rowing together.

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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