Export Dispute Resolution Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/7962

Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Export Dispute Resolution Act

HR. 7962, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$140,600 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Export Dispute Resolution Act, HR 7962, is a bill that warrants scrutiny from a rational, self-interested perspective. As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect this legislation to uncover its true implications for my empire's growth and profitability.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill aims to amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, specifically refining the interagency dispute resolution process. The primary objective is to streamline decision-making regarding export controls, particularly for countries under comprehensive US arms embargoes. From a strategic standpoint, this could lead to increased efficiency in navigating bureaucratic red tape, potentially benefiting my business interests.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces several key changes:

1. **Clarification of dispute resolution**: The chair of the Committee is now authorized to decide cases where the Committee cannot reach a majority vote. This concentration of power could lead to more predictable outcomes, which I can leverage to my advantage. 2. **Definition of countries under arms embargoes**: The bill explicitly includes countries listed in the Code of Federal Regulations and the Russian Federation as being subject to comprehensive US arms embargoes. This clarification may impact my business dealings with these nations, requiring strategic adjustments to maintain profitability.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The primary stakeholders affected by this bill are:

1. **Exporters**: Companies like mine, which engage in international trade, will need to adapt to the revised dispute resolution process. 2. **Government agencies**: The Committee and other government bodies involved in export control decisions will require adjustments to their procedures.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From a wealth and power perspective, this bill presents both opportunities and challenges:

1. **Increased efficiency**: Streamlined dispute resolution may lead to faster decision-making, allowing my business to capitalize on emerging markets and opportunities. 2. **Regulatory clarity**: The bill's definitions and clarifications could reduce uncertainty, enabling more informed strategic decisions. 3. **Potential for consolidation**: As smaller players struggle to adapt to the new regulatory landscape, I may be able to acquire or partner with them, further consolidating my market share.

In conclusion, the Export Dispute Resolution Act has significant implications for my business empire. By understanding and navigating these changes, I can leverage this legislation to drive growth, increase efficiency, and solidify my position as a leader in the global market. The inefficient democratic process may have produced this bill, but it's up to visionary entrepreneurs like myself to capitalize on its opportunities and shape the future of international trade.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$140,600

19 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$140,600

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

OGLESBY, CHARLES

2 transactions

$20,000

HAMILTON, ANNE

1 transaction

$10,000

VERMA, VIKAS

1 transaction

$6,600

KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS

1 transaction

$6,600

LUKE, DEBRA

1 transaction

$6,600

BATMASIAN, JAMES H

1 transaction

$6,600

KOLLAR, CLINT

1 transaction

$6,600

KOLLAR, HEATHER

1 transaction

$6,600

STEBBINS, ROBERT

1 transaction

$6,600

MONSON, MATTHEW

1 transaction

$6,600

WINCHESTER, JOHN

1 transaction

$6,600

CASCARILLA, CHARLES

1 transaction

$6,600

CASCARILLA, MARISSA

1 transaction

$6,600

TAYLOR, MARGARETTA MISS

1 transaction

$6,600

DON & OKSANA, DONALD LEE

1 transaction

$6,600

HENNESSY, MARK W

1 transaction

$6,600

UIHLEIN, RICHARD

1 transaction

$6,600

QUINONES, PETER

1 transaction

$5,800

EDWARDS, MELISSA

1 transaction

$5,800

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP

OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY

$1,000

Feb 24, 2024

BATMASIAN, JAMES

INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 27, 2023

BATMASIAN, JAMES

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 29, 2023

AUSTIN, ROBERT

UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Jul 18, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 15, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 22, 2024

SCALA, MARY ELLEN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY

$5,300

Aug 27, 2023

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

SELF • PRESIDENT

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 24, 2024

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 25, 2024

PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL

GOLDEN TASTE • CEO

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,400

Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 50 nodes and 23 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $154,800

Top Donors - Rep. McCormick, Richard [R-GA-7]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Section 2 amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to include countries subject to a comprehensive United States arms embargo, which may lead to increased export controls and potentially benefit defense contractors through increased demand for their products and services.
+Aerospace (Commercial)confidence 0.60
The amendment to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 in Section 2 may also impact the aerospace industry, potentially benefiting commercial airplane manufacturers through changes in export regulations and increased scrutiny of foreign competitors.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 64%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 7962 aligns closely with Project 2025's goal of improving export control dispute resolution by enhancing interagency processes, increasing transparency, and strengthening oversight—particularly regarding countries of concern like Russia and China. The bill's focus on structured dispute resolution, inclusion of embargoed countries, and preventing stalemates supports Project 2025's call for clearer authority, accountability, and modernized licensing adjudication within the Bureau of Industry an"

Key themes:export control dispute resolutioninteragency coordinationcountries of concern (Russia/China)licensing transparencynational security oversight

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 61%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 7962 aligns strongly with Project 2025's goal of improving interagency dispute resolution in export licensing by establishing a clearer, more efficient process—including tie-breaking authority and inclusion of embargoed countries like Russia—mirroring the policy’s call for structured adjudication and enhanced oversight."

Key themes:export control dispute resolutioninteragency licensing disagreementsarms embargoed countriesBIS authorityCongressional oversight

Department of Commerce

Moderate

Vector: 64%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy focus on strengthening U.S. export controls concerning countries of concern, particularly Russia, and improving enforcement mechanisms. The bill enhances the dispute‑resolution process to ensure timely decisions, which supports the broader goal of tighter export‑control enforcement outlined in Project 2025, though it does not directly implement the substantive EAR revisions advocated there."

Key themes:export controlsRussiaenforcement efficiencydispute resolutionarms embargo

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Trade

Weak

Vector: 61%

Pages: 834-836AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on improving internal U.S. export control dispute resolution processes, particularly concerning arms embargoed countries like Russia, while Project 2025's Trade section emphasizes broad trade policy reforms such as repealing the Jones Act, restoring TPA, and addressing China-related trade abuses. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address tariffs, trade agreements, or WTO reform."

Key themes:trade policyexport controlsinternational trade

— 801 — Trade l Repeal the Jones Act,48 a century-old “Buy American” maritime law that has decimated the U.S. shipbuilding industry. l Work with Congress to restore the President’s Trade Promotion Authority, which would expedite the negotiation of trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Taiwan, the European Union, and other allies, and keep trade-unrelated provisions out of trade agreements. l Restore the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution process to full strength. l Create a successor to the WTO (assuming that it has been fatally wounded) that is open only to liberal democracies. This would prevent authoritarian countries like China from abusing the organization for their own ends. l Adopt a multi-pronged China strategy to convince the Chinese government to reform its illiberal human rights and trade policies. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whose 11 members are developing institutional trade norms in an important geopolitical region without U.S. input or involvement. l Reorient the proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to focus only on trade issues, which it currently ignores in favor of progressive wish-list policies. l Strengthen diplomatic pressure (in concert with allies) against Beijing’s abuses. Encourage cultural and intellectual engagement with the Chinese people, remembering that blue jeans and rock ’n’ roll helped to win the Cold War. Tariff Relief. When people try something repeatedly and it still doesn’t work, they should stop doing it—especially when the consequences turn out to be just what conservative economists have long predicted they would be.49 With tariffs, the proper reform is not only to get rid of the individual tariffs that have backfired, but also to build institutional safeguards against future abuse. We are five years into the biggest experiment with tariffs since the Great Depres- sion, and the results are in: The new tariffs raise consumer prices for ordinary Americans by about $1,200 per household every year50 and benefit only a small number of special interests. Steel and aluminum tariffs, enacted on national security grounds, angered allies. Beijing made not a single substantive reform in — 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that

Trade

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 843-845AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on improving internal U.S. interagency dispute resolution for export controls, while Project 2025's Trade section emphasizes renewing Trade Promotion Authority, reforming WTO dispute resolution, and shaping trade agreements; both touch on dispute resolution but address different forums and objectives."

Key themes:dispute resolutiontrade policyexport controlsinteragency coordination

— 811 — Trade contains the Sections 201 and 301 tariff delegations. TPA, then called fast-track, has aided several trade agreements, including NAFTA and the USMCA, which took effect in 2020. TPA has lapsed before during slow periods in trade policy, most recently in July 2021, and remains lapsed today. The President should work with Congress to renew TPA to rationalize negoti- ations for upcoming trade agreements with the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. Both supporters and critics have questions regarding TPA’s implications for the constitutional separation of powers, and policymakers should take those questions seriously. As things currently stand, Congress has some oversight powers over the President’s negotiations under TPA, but they are limited. Congress can increase its oversight by passing new legislation superseding relevant provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. However, that is a double-edged sword. A Congress that largely favors free trade could exercise oversight to keep the President on the straight and narrow in trade negotiations. A progressive Congress would instead insist that the President negotiate for as many trade-unrelated provisions as possible to benefit labor and green constituencies while pushing progressive policies on the U.S. and its trading partners. On balance, a single voice at the negotiating table that is subject to congressional oversight is the best posture for American workers and consumers. A fractious Congress has yet to demonstrate the capacity to negotiate with other nations, but it can help to hold the Administration accountable. Trade Agreements with the United Kingdom, European Union, and Others. Even with a renewed TPA, trade agreement negotiations will likely take years. The Trump and Biden Administrations were not inclined to start the process, so that job may well fall to the next Administration. In that sense, the delays may end up being worth it. If there is one lodestar to follow, it is to restrict these agreements to trade issues only. Ever since NAFTA, trade-unrelated provisions have taken on a greater role in trade agreements. These create sticking points and are routinely hijacked by rent-seeking special interests and progressive ideologues who demand subsidies, carve-outs, and economically distorting labor and environmental standards that have nothing to do with trade. If governments are to negotiate these issues, they should do so in separate agreements so they do not torpedo efforts to liberalize and engage with allies. Trade agreements should lighten burdens, not create new ones by attempting to address non-trade issues. Policy leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, including experts from The Heritage Foundation and the Competitive Enterprise Insti- tute, have prepared a model trade agreement along these lines.73 Along with TPA renewal, this would greatly reduce negotiating costs. This template is also readily adaptable for agreements with Europe and any other allies that are willing to — 812 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liberalize their economies and build a stronger alliance with America. The draft U.S.–U.K. agreement includes an accession chapter to allow others to join on the same terms. Restoring or Replacing the WTO Dispute Resolution Process. The World Trade Organization as we know it may be mortally wounded. This deprives the U.S. of the WTO’s dispute resolution process, under which the U.S. it won 85 percent of the cases it brought. The WTO’s slow death began under the Obama Administra- tion, which refused to allow appointees to the WTO’s appellate board, which as a consequence is now nonfunctional. Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have continued the Obama Administration’s approach. That means that every case in the dispute resolution process will sputter to a halt as parties file appeals that cannot be heard. If the WTO is no longer fit for that purpose, it may be better to look in a different direction. More than 20 years ago, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow proposed that America and other free economies should form a Global Free Trade Alliance that is open to all countries that adhere to a truly free market system with appropriate safeguards such as property rights, lack of corruption, and enforcement of contracts.74 Alongside a general agreement on low to zero tariffs, the alliance would move to reduce the effect of nontariff barriers (such as the previously noted baby formula ingredient and labeling barriers) by basing trade around the principle of mutual recognition. Such an alliance could be started by a trade agreement between the United States and, for example, the United Kingdom with an accession chapter allowing others to join if they meet the criteria. It would be essential for a Global Free Trade Alliance to avoid the WTO’s most serious problem: the exemptions from its rules that are granted to developing countries. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was granted developing-na- tion status, which it continues to use to dodge rules that should apply to it. Other countries have used that status to delay needed reforms. Rule exemptions give some countries a perverse incentive to remain poor and autocratic. A Global Free Trade Alliance would allow the U.S. to enjoy the benefits of a rules- based international trading system without the WTO’s shortcomings. Negotiation costs would be lower because the countries would already be allied on many issues. In addition, there would be no separate tiers with different rules, and this would give developing countries an incentive to liberalize. In addition to being good for its own sake, liberalization would give them entry into a prestigious club that tilted toward America’s orbit and away from China’s. Closing the Export–Import Bank. The Export–Import Bank (EXIM) is an unusually clear example of how vulnerable trade protectionism is to being hijacked by special interests.75 In most years, about half of EXIM’s business benefits a single company, Boeing. Their relationship is so cozy that EXIM’s nickname around Washington is “the Bank of Boeing.”

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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