Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8036
Last Updated: August 3, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

ID: B001307

Follow the money

The bill

Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026

HR. 8036, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$43,900 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 25 - 19.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026 is a laughable attempt to address the "national security risks" posed by China's military-civil fusion strategy. Let me dissect this farce for you.

The bill creates new regulations and modifies existing ones, because what's a legislative session without more red tape? The Secretary of State, Defense, or Energy can now submit proposed rules to the Export Administration Review Board, which will undoubtedly lead to a thrilling game of bureaucratic ping-pong. The board has 30 days to vote on these proposals, unless they need more time to "consult" (read: stall), in which case they can extend the deadline by another 30 days.

The affected industries and sectors are, predictably, those related to export controls, defense, and technology. Because who doesn't love a good game of "let's restrict exports to China"? The compliance requirements are, as always, a joy to behold. Exporters will need to perform due diligence to prevent the PRC's military from accessing US technology, because that's not already a Herculean task.

The enforcement mechanisms and penalties are, of course, the usual toothless wonders. The bill requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress within 150 days, which will undoubtedly be a riveting read. As for penalties, I'm sure the Export Administration Review Board will be swift and merciless in their punishment of non-compliant entities (just kidding, they'll probably just issue a strongly worded letter).

The economic and operational impacts of this bill will be negligible, except for the usual suspects: defense contractors, tech companies, and exporters who will have to navigate the new regulatory landscape. But hey, who needs a functioning economy when you can have more bureaucracy?

In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of legislative placebo effect. It's a symbolic gesture designed to make lawmakers look tough on China, while doing nothing to actually address the underlying issues. The real disease here is the chronic inability of Congress to pass meaningful legislation that doesn't serve special interests or perpetuate bureaucratic inertia. But hey, at least they tried. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this legislative trainwreck unfold.

Related Topics

Trade & International CommerceInternational Treaties & AgreementsEnergy Production & Conservation
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$43,900
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$42,900

No PAC contributions found

1
TORCHBEARER PUBLIC AFFAIRS
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
NICOSON, JON
2 transactions
$9,900
2
BAIRD, BEAU
1 transaction
$3,300
3
GOODRICH, CHARLES D
1 transaction
$3,300
4
CARRIER, JAMISON
1 transaction
$3,300
5
WALTON, ROBERT S
1 transaction
$3,300
6
NICOSON, BARBRA
1 transaction
$3,300
7
NESSEL, ARIEL
1 transaction
$2,500
8
LANGLEY, THOMAS
1 transaction
$2,000
9
KUMAR, SHALABH
1 transaction
$2,000
10
AITKEN, MARK
1 transaction
$1,000
11
ANDREW, JAMES
1 transaction
$1,000
12
MOONEY, PATRICK J
1 transaction
$1,000
13
TSIPOURIA, MELORY
1 transaction
$1,000
14
HESSERT, BILL
1 transaction
$1,000
15
RISK, JAMES III
1 transaction
$1,000
16
CUSTER, VERLIN
1 transaction
$1,000
17
LEHMAN, GARY J
1 transaction
$1,000
18
MOORE, WILLIAM H
1 transaction
$1,000
19
PURUCKER, JAMES
1 transaction
$1,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

21

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Messmer, Mark B. [R-IN-8]

ID: M001233

Top Contributors

59

1
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
2
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
3
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
4
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
5
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
6
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
7
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
8
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
9
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
10
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,000
Apr 11, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 46 nodes and 42 connections

Total contributions: $42

Top Donors - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Org19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Section 3(a)(4) requires review of PRC's strategic technology sectors including semiconductor, and Section 3(b)(1)(A)-(E) allows proposing changes to export control policy such as additions to Military End-User List or new rules, which could impose restrictions on semiconductor exports to PRC entities, harming the industry.

  • Section 3(a)(4) includes artificial intelligence as a strategic technology sector tied to PRC military, and Section 3(b) allows proposing export control policy changes (e.g., Military End-User List additions, new rules) that could restrict AI-related exports, harming AI & cloud infrastructure firms.

  • −Biotech & Researchconfidence 0.70

    Section 3(a)(4) includes biotechnology as a strategic technology sector linked to PRC military, and Section 3(b) permits proposing export control policy changes (e.g., restrictions, new rules) that could limit biotech exports or collaborations, harming the biotech industry.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong
Vector: 70%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly implements multiple Project 2025 priorities by enhancing interagency coordination in export controls, mandating a review of China's military-civil fusion strategy, and targeting technology sectors of concern—aligning with the call to modernize the EAR, tighten controls on authoritarian regimes, and address civil-military fusion exploitation."

Key themes:export control modernizationChina military-civil fusioninteragency coordinationtechnology transfer restrictionsEntity List enforcement

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Very Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly implements multiple Project 2025 objectives by enhancing interagency coordination in export controls, mandating a review of China's military-civil fusion strategy, and strengthening oversight of sensitive technology transfers—core priorities outlined in the Department of Commerce section of Project 2025."

Key themes:export control reformmilitary-civil fusioninteragency coordinationtechnology transfer restrictionsChina-focused national security

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly strengthens export control oversight and targets PRC military-civil fusion, aligning with Project 2025's goals of strategic decoupling from China, protecting critical and emerging technologies, and reversing loosened export‑control rules to safeguard U.S. national security."

Key themes:export controlsChina technology transfermilitary-civil fusionemerging technologiesinteragency coordination

— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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