Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8036
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

ID: B001307

Follow the money

The bill

Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026

HR. 8036, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$43,900 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 25 - 19.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026 is a laughable attempt to address the "national security risks" posed by China's military-civil fusion strategy. Let me dissect this farce for you.

The bill creates new regulations and modifies existing ones, because what's a legislative session without more red tape? The Secretary of State, Defense, or Energy can now submit proposed rules to the Export Administration Review Board, which will undoubtedly lead to a thrilling game of bureaucratic ping-pong. The board has 30 days to vote on these proposals, unless they need more time to "consult" (read: stall), in which case they can extend the deadline by another 30 days.

The affected industries and sectors are, predictably, those related to export controls, defense, and technology. Because who doesn't love a good game of "let's restrict exports to China"? The compliance requirements are, as always, a joy to behold. Exporters will need to perform due diligence to prevent the PRC's military from accessing US technology, because that's not already a Herculean task.

The enforcement mechanisms and penalties are, of course, the usual toothless wonders. The bill requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress within 150 days, which will undoubtedly be a riveting read. As for penalties, I'm sure the Export Administration Review Board will be swift and merciless in their punishment of non-compliant entities (just kidding, they'll probably just issue a strongly worded letter).

The economic and operational impacts of this bill will be negligible, except for the usual suspects: defense contractors, tech companies, and exporters who will have to navigate the new regulatory landscape. But hey, who needs a functioning economy when you can have more bureaucracy?

In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of legislative placebo effect. It's a symbolic gesture designed to make lawmakers look tough on China, while doing nothing to actually address the underlying issues. The real disease here is the chronic inability of Congress to pass meaningful legislation that doesn't serve special interests or perpetuate bureaucratic inertia. But hey, at least they tried. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this legislative trainwreck unfold.

Related Topics

Trade & International CommerceInternational Treaties & AgreementsEnergy Production & Conservation
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$43,900
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$42,900

No PAC contributions found

1
TORCHBEARER PUBLIC AFFAIRS
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
NICOSON, JON
2 transactions
$9,900
2
BAIRD, BEAU
1 transaction
$3,300
3
GOODRICH, CHARLES D
1 transaction
$3,300
4
CARRIER, JAMISON
1 transaction
$3,300
5
WALTON, ROBERT S
1 transaction
$3,300
6
NICOSON, BARBRA
1 transaction
$3,300
7
NESSEL, ARIEL
1 transaction
$2,500
8
LANGLEY, THOMAS
1 transaction
$2,000
9
KUMAR, SHALABH
1 transaction
$2,000
10
AITKEN, MARK
1 transaction
$1,000
11
ANDREW, JAMES
1 transaction
$1,000
12
MOONEY, PATRICK J
1 transaction
$1,000
13
TSIPOURIA, MELORY
1 transaction
$1,000
14
HESSERT, BILL
1 transaction
$1,000
15
RISK, JAMES III
1 transaction
$1,000
16
CUSTER, VERLIN
1 transaction
$1,000
17
LEHMAN, GARY J
1 transaction
$1,000
18
MOORE, WILLIAM H
1 transaction
$1,000
19
PURUCKER, JAMES
1 transaction
$1,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

10

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITEDOWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC.BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELFPRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTECEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Messmer, Mark B. [R-IN-8]

ID: M001233

Top Contributors

10

1
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
2
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
3
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
4
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
5
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
6
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
7
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
8
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
9
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Apr 11, 2024
10
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$3,000
Apr 11, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 52 nodes and 27 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $68,000

Top Donors - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Org19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Section 3(a)(4) requires review of PRC's strategic technology sectors including semiconductor, and Section 3(b)(1)(A)-(E) allows proposing changes to export control policy such as additions to Military End-User List or new rules, which could impose restrictions on semiconductor exports to PRC entities, harming the industry.

  • Section 3(a)(4) includes artificial intelligence as a strategic technology sector tied to PRC military, and Section 3(b) allows proposing export control policy changes (e.g., Military End-User List additions, new rules) that could restrict AI-related exports, harming AI & cloud infrastructure firms.

  • Biotech & Researchconfidence 0.70

    Section 3(a)(4) includes biotechnology as a strategic technology sector linked to PRC military, and Section 3(b) permits proposing export control policy changes (e.g., restrictions, new rules) that could limit biotech exports or collaborations, harming the biotech industry.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate69.5%
Pages: 705-707

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Introduction

Moderate63.7%
Pages: 798-800

— 765 — 26 TRADE THE CASE FOR FAIR TRADE Peter Navarro For decades the world has struggled with a shifting maze of punitive tariffs, export subsidies, quotas, dollar-locked currencies, and the like. Many of these import-inhibiting and export-encouraging devices have long been employed by major exporting countries trying to amass ever larger [trade] surpluses. Warren Buffett, CEO, Berkshire Hathaway1 The Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term industrial strategy to ensure its global dominance…. Beijing’s ultimate goal is for domestic companies to replace foreign companies as designers and manufacturers of key technology and products first at home, then abroad. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission2 The United States of America is the world’s dominant superpower and remains the world’s arsenal of democracy. To maintain that global positioning—and thereby best protect the homeland and our own democratic institutions—it is critical that the United States strengthen its manufacturing and defense industrial base at the same time that it increases the reliability and resilience of its globally dispersed — 766 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise supply chains. That will necessarily require the onshoring of a significant portion of production currently offshored by American multinational corporations. Trade policy can and must play an essential role in an American manufacturing and defense industrial base renaissance. However, several major challenges in the international trading environment are pushing America in the opposite direction. The first challenge is rooted in MFN: the “most favored nation” rule of the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the MFN rule, WTO members must apply the lowest tariffs that they apply to the products of any one country to the products of every other country.3 However, WTO members can charge higher tariffs if they apply these nonreciprocal tariffs to all countries. The practical result has been the systematic exploitation of American farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, and workers through higher tariffs institutionalized by MFN. In turn, this unfair and nonreciprocal trade has resulted in chronic U.S. trade deficits with much of the rest of the world. This systemic trade imbalance serves as a brake and bridle on both GDP growth and real wages in the American economy while encumbering the U.S. with significant foreign debt. The second challenge is part of the broader existential threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its quest for global dominance. That chal- lenge is rooted in the CCP’s continued economic aggression, which begins with mercantilist and protectionist trade policy tools such as tariffs, nontariff barriers, dumping, counterfeiting and piracy, and currency manipulation. However, Com- munist China’s economic aggression also extends to an intricate set of industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that have dramatically skewed the international trading arena. Both the unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade institutionalized by the WTO and Communist China’s economic aggression are weakening America’s man- ufacturing and defense industrial base even as the fragility of globally dispersed supply chains has been brought into sharp relief by the COVID-19 pandemic with its associated lockdowns and other disruptions and by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian revanchism, in particular, has demonstrated once again how bad actors on the world stage can use trade policy (for example, export restraints on natural gas) as a weapon of war. LAYING THE TRADE DEFICIT PREDICATE The great football coach Bill Parcells once said, “You are what your record says you are.” America’s record on trade—specifically American’s chronic and ever-ex- panding trade deficit—says that America is the globe’s biggest trade loser and a victim of unfair, unbalanced, and nonreciprocal trade. During the first year of the Biden Administration, the overall U.S. trade defi- cit, including goods and services, soared by 29 percent, from $654 billion in 2020 to $845 billion in 2021.4 Over the same time period, imports of consumer goods,

Introduction

Moderate60.8%
Pages: 758-760

— 725 — Export-Import Bank l China’s export credit activity is greater than that of the ECAs of the entire G7 combined. Today, China is the world’s largest official creditor, maintaining a portfolio more than twice the size of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund combined. l China’s highly aggressive Belt and Road Initiative, which has prompted international criticism for ensnaring the developing world in “debt-trap diplomacy,” has created a sphere of economic and strategic influence that includes about 150 countries, rivaling the relationships of the United States and her allies. Unlike America and the G7 economies, China does not subscribe to the rules- based order that has governed export credit financing for nearly a century. As in so many other things, China plays by its own rules and is opaque in how it operates, weaponizing its export credit financing deals by offering developing nations terms that are often “too good to be true.” Once the project is underway, the Chinese have been known to change the terms, making a project unaffordable for the purchasing country. These tactics have yielded China important strategic plunder like mines and critical minerals, satellites, and even ports like those in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Mombasa, Kenya. Export credit is a strategic weapon in China’s whole-of-government approach to enhance its global power, economic might, and national security. The only country that has the economic heft to counter China’s aggressions in export credit financing is the United States. Not only do American companies risk losing out to Chinese competitors for international opportunities if EXIM is not there to offer support, but a United States without a functioning export credit agency also leaves an unchecked China with a wide-open field to claim jurisdiction over swaths of ocean and shipping lanes, expand its economic influence, and create major changes in the global balance of power. In response to Chinese aggression in export credit, the ECAs of other coun- tries have reacted defensively to change their policies and programs to avoid losing access to large chunks of global markets. Many countries, including strong U.S. allies like the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Italy, have changed the mission of their ECAs from one of leveling the playing field for their exporters to hunting proactively for transactions for their businesses and advancing their national strategic interests over the long term. In addition, foreign buyers, par- ticularly those looking to build large international projects, have been indicating that the availability of government-backed financing is a core component of their evaluation of bids and identification of sourcing. Allied nations have taken steps like lowering their content requirements in order to lure more deals, often at U.S. expense.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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