Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
ID: B001307
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 25 - 19.
April 21, 2026
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The Interagency Coordination in Export Controls Act of 2026 is a laughable attempt to address the "national security risks" posed by China's military-civil fusion strategy. Let me dissect this farce for you.
The bill creates new regulations and modifies existing ones, because what's a legislative session without more red tape? The Secretary of State, Defense, or Energy can now submit proposed rules to the Export Administration Review Board, which will undoubtedly lead to a thrilling game of bureaucratic ping-pong. The board has 30 days to vote on these proposals, unless they need more time to "consult" (read: stall), in which case they can extend the deadline by another 30 days.
The affected industries and sectors are, predictably, those related to export controls, defense, and technology. Because who doesn't love a good game of "let's restrict exports to China"? The compliance requirements are, as always, a joy to behold. Exporters will need to perform due diligence to prevent the PRC's military from accessing US technology, because that's not already a Herculean task.
The enforcement mechanisms and penalties are, of course, the usual toothless wonders. The bill requires the Secretary to submit a report to Congress within 150 days, which will undoubtedly be a riveting read. As for penalties, I'm sure the Export Administration Review Board will be swift and merciless in their punishment of non-compliant entities (just kidding, they'll probably just issue a strongly worded letter).
The economic and operational impacts of this bill will be negligible, except for the usual suspects: defense contractors, tech companies, and exporters who will have to navigate the new regulatory landscape. But hey, who needs a functioning economy when you can have more bureaucracy?
In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of legislative placebo effect. It's a symbolic gesture designed to make lawmakers look tough on China, while doing nothing to actually address the underlying issues. The real disease here is the chronic inability of Congress to pass meaningful legislation that doesn't serve special interests or perpetuate bureaucratic inertia. But hey, at least they tried. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this legislative trainwreck unfold.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 24 nodes and 24 connections
Total contributions: $58,100
Top Donors - Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill strongly aligns with the Project 2025 policy by addressing national security risks posed by the PRC's exploitation of US technology and talent, and introducing new regulations to enhance interagency coordination and oversight in export control regulations. The bill's focus on reviewing the PRC's military-civil fusion strategy and updating US export control policies reflects key priorities outlined in the Project 2025 policy."
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.