The bill
SHIELD Against CCP Act
HR. 708, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.
Sponsored by
Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]
ID: S001220
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 708, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 251-253 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
March 10, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
The SHIELD Against CCP Act - because what the US government really needs is another acronym and a working group to "counter" the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) alleged threats. How quaint.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** This bill establishes a working group within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to examine, assess, and report on efforts to counter CCP-related threats in various areas, including terrorism, cybersecurity, border security, and transportation security. The real purpose? To create more bureaucratic red tape, justify increased funding for DHS, and provide a platform for politicians to grandstand about China.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a new working group with a Director appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. This group will:
1. Examine and report on CCP-related threats (because no one has done that before). 2. Account for resources dedicated to countering these threats (a.k.a., justify budget increases). 3. Identify gaps in policies, processes, and activities (code for "we need more money and personnel"). 4. Facilitate cooperation among DHS offices and components (read: create more meetings and paperwork).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. The Chinese Communist Party (because they're the boogeyman du jour). 2. US citizens (who will foot the bill for this bureaucratic exercise). 3. DHS employees (who'll have to deal with more red tape and pointless meetings). 4. Politicians (who'll use this as a talking point to sound tough on China).
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater" - it provides the illusion of action without actually addressing any real issues. The impact will be:
1. Increased bureaucracy and inefficiency within DHS. 2. More taxpayer dollars wasted on redundant efforts and unnecessary personnel. 3. Politicians getting to pretend they're doing something about China, while accomplishing nothing.
In short, this bill is a symptom of the disease that afflicts Washington: a desperate need for relevance, a lack of real solutions, and an abundance of hot air.
Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 8 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S001201
Top Contributors
10
ID: H001077
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ID: G000590
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ID: G000591
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ID: L000603
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ID: E000300
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ID: M001194
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ID: P000048
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10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 65 nodes and 41 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $141,450
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 2(b)(1)(B) directs the Working Group to examine DHS efforts to counter cybersecurity threats posed by the CCP, and Section 2(f) mandates R&D for technologies enhancing security and situational awareness relating to countering such threats, which benefits cybersecurity firms through potential contracts and increased demand.
Section 2(f) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out research and development, including operational testing, of technologies and techniques for enhancing DHS security relating to countering threats from the CCP, which likely involves defense contractors for technology development and testing.
Section 2(c) requires the Working Group to review and disseminate information gathered by Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners and the National Network of Fusion Centers, which supports law enforcement and surveillance technology vendors through increased information sharing and potential demand for surveillance tools.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The SHIELD Against CCP Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on countering Chinese Communist Party threats through enhanced intelligence coordination, particularly in cyber, economic, and technological espionage domains, by establishing a DHS working group to assess and improve counter-CCP efforts across federal, state, local, and private sectors."
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 DHS section seek to strengthen Department of Homeland Security capabilities related to border and port security and improve interagency coordination, but the bill targets CCP‑specific threats while Project 2025 focuses on immigration enforcement, USCIS reforms, and border wall funding, resulting in only partial thematic overlap."
— 147 — Department of Homeland Security Personnel USCIS should be classified as a national security–sensitive agency, and all of its employees should be classified as holding national security–sensitive posi- tions. Leaks must be investigated and punished as they would be in a national security agency, and the union should be decertified. Any employees who cannot accept that change and cannot conform their behavior to the standards required by such an agency should be separated. USCIS’s D.C. personnel presence should be skeletal, and agency employees with operational or security roles should be rotated out to offices throughout the United States. These USCIS employees should live and work in the communities that are most affected by their daily duties and decisions. NECESSARY BORDER AND IMMIGRATION STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES The current border security crisis was made possible by glaring loopholes in our immigration system. The result was a preventable and predictable his- toric increase in illegal and inadmissible encounters along our southern border. This pulled limited resources from the front lines of our nation’s borders and away from their national security mission, releasing a vast and complex set of threats into our country. To regain our sovereignty, integrity, and security, Congress must pass meaningful legislation to close the current loopholes and prevent future Administrations from exploiting them for political gain or per- sonal ideology. Legislative Proposals l Title 42 authority in Title 8. Create an authority akin to the Title 42 Public Health authority that has been used during the COVID-19 pandemic to expel illegal aliens across the border immediately when certain non- health conditions are met, such as loss of operational control of the border. l Mandatory appropriation for border wall system infrastructure. The monies appropriated would be used to fund the construction of additional border wall systems, technology, and personnel in strategic locations in accordance with the Border Security Improvement Plan (BSIP). l Appropriation for Port of Entry infrastructure. Border security is not addressed solely by systems in between the ports of entry. POEs require technology and physical upgrades as well as an influx of personnel to meet capacity demands and act as the literal gatekeepers for the country. This is the first line of defense against drug and human smuggling operations. — 148 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unaccompanied minors 1. Congress should repeal Section 235 of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA),9 which provides numerous immigration benefits to unaccompanied alien children and only encourages more parents to send their children across the border illegally and unaccompanied. These children too often become trafficking victims, which means that the TVPRA has failed. 2. If an alternative to repealing Section 235 of the TVPRA is necessary, the section should be amended so that all unaccompanied children, regardless of nationality, may be returned to their home countries in a safe and efficient manner. Currently, the TVPRA allows only children from contiguous countries (Canada and Mexico) to be returned while every other unaccompanied minor must be placed into a lengthy process that usually results in the minor’s landing in the custody of an illegal alien family member. 3. Congress must end the Flores Settlement Agreement by explicitly setting nationwide terms and standards for family and unaccompanied detention and housing. Such standards should focus on meeting human needs and should allow for large-scale use of temporary facilities (for example, tents). 4. Congress should amend the Homeland Security Act and portions of the TVPRA to move detention of alien children expressly from the Department of Health and Human Services to DHS. l Asylum reform 1. The standard for a credible fear of persecution should be raised and aligned to the standard for asylum. It should also account specifically for credibility determinations that are a key element of the asylum claim. 2. Codify former asylum bars and third-country transit rules. 3. Congress should eliminate the particular social group protected ground as vague and overbroad or, in the alternative, provide a clear definition with parameters that at a minimum codify the holding in Matter of A-B- that gang violence and domestic violence are not grounds for asylum.10
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on DHS-led counter-CCP threat coordination, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on responding vigorously to the Chinese threat and improving interagency coordination, though it does not directly address treaty reform or State Department leadership as outlined in the policy."
— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.