Federal Acquisition Security Council Improvement Act of 2026

Download PDF

Bill ID: 119/hr/7274

Last Updated: June 26, 2026

Federal Acquisition Security Council Improvement Act of 2026

HR. 7274, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$71,300 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 128-130 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 40 - 1.

February 3, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: HR 7274 - Federal Acquisition Security Council Improvement Act of 2026**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect this bill through the lens of its potential impact on my business empire and the broader landscape of wealth creation.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill aims to enhance national security by strengthening the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC), which oversees the acquisition process for federal agencies. The primary objective is to mitigate risks associated with foreign adversaries infiltrating the supply chain.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Expanded definitions**: The bill introduces new terms, such as "covered source of concern" and "designated order," to clarify the scope of FASC's authority. 2. **Council membership**: The legislation reconstitutes the FASC with a more comprehensive representation from various executive agencies, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. 3. **Enhanced information sharing**: Members are required to ensure that their respective agencies provide requested information to the Council, promoting interagency collaboration.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Federal agencies**: The bill directly impacts executive agencies involved in procurement processes, particularly those with national security implications. 2. **Contractors and suppliers**: Companies bidding on federal contracts may face increased scrutiny and potential exclusion if deemed a "source of concern." 3. **Private sector innovators**: As a champion of technological advancements, I'm concerned that overregulation could stifle innovation and hinder the development of cutting-edge solutions.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Increased regulatory burden**: The bill's provisions may lead to additional compliance costs for contractors and suppliers, potentially stifling competition and driving up prices. 2. **National security benefits**: Enhanced oversight and information sharing may mitigate risks associated with foreign adversaries infiltrating the supply chain, ensuring a more secure procurement process. 3. **Opportunities for consolidation**: As a visionary entrepreneur, I see potential opportunities for my companies to capitalize on the increased demand for secure, innovative solutions that meet the bill's stringent requirements.

In conclusion, HR 7274 presents both challenges and opportunities for my business empire. While it may impose additional regulatory burdens, it also creates openings for innovation and consolidation in the federal procurement landscape. As a thought leader, I'll continue to monitor this legislation and adapt my strategies to maximize its benefits while minimizing its drawbacks.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$71,300

21 donors

PACs

Organizations

$5,300

Committees

Individuals

$66,000

No PAC contributions found

OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE

1 transaction

$3,300

CATAWBA INDIAN NATION

1 transaction

$2,000

No committee contributions found

BURGAMY, LARRY G. JR.

2 transactions

$6,600

CHEVES, WALLACE

1 transaction

$3,300

HODGES, MICHAEL LYNN

1 transaction

$3,300

CARROLL, WILLIAM

1 transaction

$3,300

FLOYD, KAREN K

1 transaction

$3,300

ADAMS, C. DAN

1 transaction

$3,300

RODRIGUEZ, RAUL

1 transaction

$3,300

MILLEGAN, BRANTLY

1 transaction

$3,300

ELLIS, SLOAN P.

1 transaction

$3,300

SOLTAN, MOHAMED

1 transaction

$3,300

GREGORY, PHILLIP W.

1 transaction

$3,300

MCKISSICK, A. FOSTER III

1 transaction

$3,300

JOHNSON, ROBERT M.

1 transaction

$3,300

WINKLEVOSS, CAMERON

1 transaction

$3,300

SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE

1 transaction

$3,300

WINKLEVOSS, TYLER

1 transaction

$3,300

SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN

1 transaction

$3,300

CASCARILLA, MARISSA

1 transaction

$3,300

CASCARILLA, CHARLES

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Subramanyam, Suhas [D-VA-10]

ID: S001230

Top Contributors

FRIENDS OF RUSSET PERRY

OrganizationLEESBURG, VA

$1,000

May 16, 2024

GRO MORE DULANY BUILDERS

OrganizationMCLEAN, VA

$1,000

Sep 19, 2024

ELECT ATOOSA REASER

OrganizationSTERLING, VA

$250

Sep 30, 2024

IRUDHAYANATHAN, ANTHONY

ZILLION • IT

IndividualASHBURN, VA

$6,600

Jun 12, 2024

JACOBS, IRWIN M

IndividualLA JOLLA, CA

$3,300

Dec 31, 2024

ACHARYA, SANKET

7-ELEVEN • BUSINES OWNER

IndividualNEWPORT NEWS, VA

$3,300

Nov 19, 2023

ALDANA, AIME

DLA PIPER • OF COUNSEL

IndividualBURBANK, CA

$3,300

Nov 14, 2023

ALI, TAJAMMAL

TAJAMMAL ALI • SELF EMPLOYED

IndividualLEESBURG, VA

$3,300

Dec 11, 2023

BHUTADA, RISHI

STAR PIPE PRODUCTS • SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

IndividualSUGAR LAND, TX

$3,300

Dec 8, 2023

CHALLA, JAYANTH

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualVIENNA, VA

$3,300

Nov 16, 2023

Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

ID: M001194

Top Contributors

MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND POTTAWATOMI INDIANS

OrganizationSHELBYVILLE, MI

$3,300

Aug 30, 2023

PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS

OrganizationTEMECULA, CA

$3,300

Aug 30, 2023

POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS

OrganizationDOWAGIAC, MI

$3,300

Aug 30, 2023

SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE TRIBAL OPERATIONS

OrganizationMOUNT PLEASANT, MI

$3,300

Sep 30, 2023

SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS

OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA

$3,300

Sep 30, 2023

NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI

OrganizationFULTON, MI

$3,300

Mar 12, 2024

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$3,300

Jun 20, 2024

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE CHIPPEWA INDIANS

OrganizationSAULT SAINTE MARIE, MI

$2,900

Dec 19, 2023

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA

$2,500

Mar 4, 2024

SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS

OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA

$2,500

Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8]

ID: K000391

Top Contributors

HONOR AGING LLC

OrganizationEAST BRUNSWICK, NJ

$3,300

Jul 16, 2024

PINNACLE HOSPITAL

OrganizationCROWN POINT, IN

$2,500

Mar 3, 2023

HOME BEE LLC

OrganizationWEST BLOOMFIELD, MI

$1,000

Sep 18, 2024

SAKA, SAMUEL

SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR

IndividualCHICAGO, IL

$6,600

Jun 2, 2023

SAKA, SAMUEL

IndividualCHICAGO, IL

$6,600

Jun 2, 2023

GAITONDE, SUJATA

UIC • PROFESSOR

IndividualCHICAGO, IL

$3,700

Feb 6, 2024

GAITONDE, SUNIL

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualCHICAGO, IL

$3,700

Feb 6, 2024

KALSI, RAHUL S

NICOR GAS • EXECUTIVE

IndividualOAK BROOK, IL

$3,700

Sep 22, 2023

KOZAKIEWICZ, BEATA

STERLING GROUP INC. • PRINCIPAL

IndividualCHICAGO, IL

$3,300

Oct 31, 2024

JAIN, RAJ

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualORLAND PARK, IL

$3,300

Nov 3, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 61 nodes and 31 connections (47 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $90,250

Top Donors - Rep. Timmons, William R. [R-SC-4]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 3 harmed.

+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90
Section 2(c)(2)(B) establishes a Federal Acquisition Security Council Program Office within the Executive Office of the President to provide analysis and subject matter expertise on information communications technology, acquisition security, and supply chain risk, which benefits cybersecurity firms through increased government focus and potential contracts.
+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85
Section 2(c)(2)(B) creates a Program Office to support the Council with expertise in acquisition security and supply chain risk, likely increasing defense-related procurement oversight and contracts for defense contractors involved in secure supply chains.
−Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80
Section 2(c)(3)(B)(viii) and related provisions allow for designated orders requiring removal of covered articles (which could include telecom equipment from foreign adversaries) from executive agency information systems, potentially harming telecom firms whose equipment is deemed a security risk.
−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.75
Sections 2(c)(3)(A) and (B) authorize recommended and designated orders for exclusion or removal of covered articles from executive agency procurement and information systems, which could apply to big tech platforms deemed sources of concern, restricting their government sales.
−Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.70
The bill's focus on excluding or removing covered articles from executive agency information systems (Section 2(c)(3)(B)) could impact semiconductor and hardware manufacturers if their products are designated as covered articles from sources of concern, limiting government purchases.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill strengthens supply chain risk management in federal acquisitions, aligning with Project 2025's focus on securing the defense industrial base, prioritizing domestic production, and improving acquisition agility to counter adversarial threats."

Key themes:supply chain securitydefense industrial basedomestic sourcingacquisition reformnational security

— 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities. — 97 — Department of Defense 3. Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engage in multiyear procurements and block buys. This will improve private-sector rates of return, thereby incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the government. It will also reduce government overhead by reducing the number of procurement competitions. 4. Prioritize the U.S. and allies under the “domestic end product” and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America, Buy America Act.5 Currently, defense companies are required to manufacture defense items for the U.S. government that are 100 percent domestically produced and at least 50 percent composed of domestically produced components. However, there are loopholes that allow companies to manufacture these items overseas. This can create supply chain and other issues, especially in wartime. Manufacturing components and end products domestically and with allies spurs factory development, increases American jobs, and builds resilience in America’s defense industrial base. 5. Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or “friendshoring” of manufacturing (kinetic capabilities, castings and forgings, critical materials, microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle batteries); evaluate them according to the strategic landscape; and expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate. 6. Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors, which encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters competition. Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses so they also have commercial/private-sector customers and are not solely dependent on defense orders, which can be highly specialized, expensive, and irregular. 7. Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them of DOD’s needs and how they could work with DOD to meet national security priorities. l Optimize the DOD acquisition community. 1. Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making for prototyping and program-of-record starts and terminations. Most bureaucrats would rather follow a checklist and fail than go outside the procedures and win because failure means negative

Intelligence Community

Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 251-253AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill strengthens interagency supply chain risk mitigation through the Federal Acquisition Security Council, directly supporting Project 2025's emphasis on countering foreign adversary supply chain threats and enhancing NCSC-led counterintelligence coordination."

Key themes:supply chain riskcounterintelligenceforeign adversary threatsinteragency coordinationnational security protection

— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.

Intelligence Community

Strong

Vector: 63%

Pages: 251-253AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill strengthens federal procurement supply chain defenses against foreign adversary control, directly supporting Project 2025's focus on countering espionage and enhancing counterintelligence capabilities in supply chains."

Key themes:supply chain riskforeign adversary controlcounterintelligencenational securityprocurement security

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 63%

Pages: 248-250AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill strengthens federal acquisition security to counter foreign adversary control, which aligns with Project 2025's focus on protecting national security from threats like Chinese espionage and adopting a whole‑of‑government approach, though it does not directly address intelligence community politicization or FISA reforms."

Key themes:supply chain securityforeign adversary controlnational securityChina threatwhole‑of‑government coordination

— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?

Department of Defense

Moderate

Vector: 62%

Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on strengthening supply chain risk management in federal acquisitions, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on reforming defense acquisition processes and strengthening the defense industrial base. While not directly addressing nuclear forces or counterterrorism, it supports broader DOD modernization goals by improving procurement resilience and efficiency."

Key themes:defense acquisition reformsupply chain securitydefense industrial baseprocurement modernizationnational security risk mitigation

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be — 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Related Bills

Other Bills by Rep. Timmons, William R.

Improving Capital Allocation for Newcomers Act of 2025

119/hr/4431

SMART Act of 2025

119/hr/4437

Timely and Accurate Benefits Act

119/hr/1755