Fostering the Use of Technology to Uphold Regulatory Effectiveness in Supervision Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8278
Last Updated: September 15, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Stutzman, Marlin A. [R-IN-3]

ID: S001188

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The bill

Fostering the Use of Technology to Uphold Regulatory Effectiveness in Supervision Act

HR. 8278, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.

The sponsor

Rep. Stutzman, Marlin A. [R-IN-3]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$6,250 raised

4 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

September 14, 2026

Introduced

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Committee Review

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Floor Action

✅

Passed House

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Senate Review

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Passed Congress

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Presidential Action

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Became Law

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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Summary of H.R. 8278: Fostering the Use of Technology to Uphold Regulatory Effectiveness in Supervision Act**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 8278 is to force financial regulators—like the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and CFPB—to stop pretending their 1990s-era mainframes and Excel macros constitute "modern supervision." The bill mandates that these agencies conduct a self-assessment of their technological shortcomings and procurement bottlenecks, then report back to Congress on how they plan to stop being digitally obsolete. In reality, this is less about innovation and more about giving regulators a bureaucratic fig leaf to cover years of neglect—while pretending they’re proactive about AI, cybersecurity, and real-time monitoring. The true objective? To create the *appearance* of reform without allocating real money, hiring actual tech talent, or challenging entrenched vendor contracts. It’s regulatory theater with a PowerPoint appendix.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill requires "covered agencies" (federal banking regulators) to: - Conduct an internal assessment within 180 days of enactment of their outdated tech infrastructure, supervision tools, data systems, and procurement practices. - Identify how these flaws hinder real-time risk detection, accurate reporting, and compliance monitoring (including BSA/AML and consumer protection). - Submit a joint report to Congress within 18 months of completing assessments—and every five years thereafter—detailing hardware/software use, workforce tech capacity, contractor reliance, and obstacles to data collection from supervised entities. Crucially, the bill *does not* authorize new funding, mandate technology upgrades, or penalize inaction. It’s purely a reporting requirement—an expensive audit of their own incompetence, with no enforcement teeth. Existing law already expects regulators to be competent; this bill just forces them to admit, in writing, that they’re not.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Regulatory Agencies (Fed, FDIC, OCC, CFPB, NCUA):** Forced to perform a humiliating self-diagnosis, likely resulting in sanitized reports that blame "legacy systems" and "procurement complexity" while avoiding accountability for decades of underinvestment. - **Banking Industry:** May benefit indirectly if regulators eventually modernize (fewer surprise exams, better data sharing), but more likely will face *increased* scrutiny if agencies actually follow through—though don’t hold your breath. - **Government Contractors & Tech Vendors:** Stand to gain if agencies use these reports to justify new sole-source contracts for "modernization" (read: expensive, delayed boondoggles). - **Taxpayers:** On the hook for funding these assessments and any subsequent tech upgrades—though the bill provides no budget, so expect unfunded mandates and creative accounting. - **Congress:** Gets to look tough on regulatory efficacy without doing anything substantive—perfect for reelection ads.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** In the best case, this bill could spark a long-overdue tech upgrade in financial supervision—enabling real-time risk detection, better fraud prevention, and more efficient exams. But given the lack of funding, enforcement, or timelines for action, the likeliest outcome is a glossy interagency report filled with jargon ("synergy," "leveraging blockchain," "AI-driven analytics") that sits on a shelf while regulators keep using fax machines and prayer to monitor systemic risk. The bill’s real impact is symbolic: it acknowledges the emperor has no clothes—but then hands him a fig leaf and calls it reform. It’s a diagnostic tool for a disease it refuses to treat. Expect more studies, more delays, and more excuses—while the financial system chugs along, one outdated mainframe at a time. In short: **H.R. 8278 is not a cure. It’s a symptom.** And the disease? Regulatory complacency, dressed up as oversight.

Related Topics

Banking & Financial ServicesGovernment Operations & AccountabilityResearch & Innovation Policy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Stutzman, Marlin A. [R-IN-3]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$6,250
4 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$6,250

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
BLEIBERG, PAUL E
1 transaction
$3,000
2
TORREY, MICHAEL K
1 transaction
$2,000
3
BECK, DANIELLE
1 transaction
$1,000
4
REY, MARK
1 transaction
$250

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Foster, Bill [D-IL-11]

ID: F000454

Top Contributors

24

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
2
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
May 24, 2023
3
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
May 24, 2023
4
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
May 24, 2023
5
SIVANANTHAN, SIVALINGAM
SIVANANTHAN LABORATORIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualNAPERVILLE, IL
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
6
TULLMAN, GLEN
TRANSCARENT • CEO
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
7
MCINTOSH, WILLIAM A.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualKENILWORTH, IL
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
8
STOWELL, MARY
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualWINNETKA, IL
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
9
KHOSLA, NEERU
CK-12 FOUNDATION • EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
IndividualPORTOLA VALLEY, CA
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
10
MORRISON, KATE B.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Stutzman, Marlin A. [R-IN-3]

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Organizations
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 10 nodes and 8 connections

Total contributions: $8

Top Donors - Rep. Stutzman, Marlin A. [R-IN-3]

Showing top 4 donors by contribution amount

4 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90

    Section 3(a)(1) requires covered agencies (including the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, etc.) to assess technological capabilities used in supervising entities, which includes commercial banks under their supervisory authority. This assessment could lead to improved supervisory tools and processes, potentially reducing compliance burdens and enhancing oversight effectiveness, which is a benefit to banks.

  • Section 3(b)(5)(B) requires reporting on 'the use of new technologies by supervised entities for compliance and risk management purposes,' which includes AI and cloud technologies used by financial institutions. This provision encourages agencies to understand and potentially facilitate the adoption of AI/cloud by supervised entities, creating market opportunities for AI/cloud providers.

  • +Health Insuranceconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a)(1) includes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) as a covered agency, which supervises certain financial products and services. While not directly regulating health insurers, the CFPB has authority over some financial aspects of health insurance (e.g., medical debt, billing practices). Improved technological capabilities could lead to more efficient supervision and potentially clearer guidance, benefiting health insurers through reduced compliance uncertainty.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on modernizing technology and procurement practices for financial regulators, while the Project 2025 excerpt primarily discusses the CFPB's structure, civil penalty fund, and legal challenges—there is some thematic overlap in financial regulatory oversight but no direct alignment on technology modernization."

Key themes:Consumer Financial Protection Bureaufinancial regulationregulatory oversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Trade

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 863-865AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8278 focuses on modernizing technology in financial regulatory supervision, while the Project 2025 Trade section emphasizes deregulating capital markets, reducing disclosure requirements, and expanding access to private offerings—there is minimal thematic overlap between technological upgrades in supervision and the specific deregulatory goals outlined."

Key themes:financial regulationregulatory efficiencySEC oversight

— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on modernizing technology and procurement practices across federal financial regulators to improve supervision, while the Project 2025 policy seeks to abolish or severely constrain the CFPB and limit its authority. There is no direct alignment in objectives; the bill enhances regulatory capacity, whereas the policy aims to dismantle a key agency."

Key themes:CFPBfinancial regulationregulatory oversight

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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