The bill
Lulu’s Law
S. 1003, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Sen. Britt, Katie Boyd [R-AL]
ID: B001319
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1003, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 879-881 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Became Public Law No: 119-100.
June 25, 2026
📍 Current Status
This bill has become law!
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Bill S. 1003 – “Lulu’s Law” – Regulatory Analysis** *Diagnosis: Legislative hypochondria with a side of performative grief exploitation*
**1. New Regulations Being Created or Modified** This bill amends nothing substantive—it merely directs the FCC to classify a *shark attack* as a qualifying event for Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) under existing 47 CFR §10.10(a). No new regulatory framework is created; instead, it tacks a bizarrely specific condition onto an already overbroad alert system. The FCC must issue an order within 180 days of enactment (by ~December 2026) declaring that if a great white decides to audition for *Jaws: The Sequel* near a public beach, your phone will shriek like you’re under nuclear attack.
**2. Affected Industries and Sectors** - **Telecommunications/Wireless Carriers**: Must ensure their WEA systems can transmit shark-attack alerts (though technically, the system already supports arbitrary event types—this is just FCC permission to use it for aquatic horror). - **Coastal Tourism & Recreation**: Beach towns, lifeguard services, surf schools, and coastal real estate now face the PR nightmare of having their shorelines associated with imminent, phone-screaming doom. - **Emergency Management Agencies (FEMA, NOAA, state/local)**: Now expected to vet and issue shark-attack alerts—presumably based on unverified 911 calls, drone footage, or a lifeguard’s hysterical WhatsApp voice note. - **Marine Biology & Shark Conservation Groups**: Will spend taxpayer-funded time debunking false alerts caused by dolphins, seals, or idiots on jet skis.
**3. Compliance Requirements and Timelines** FCC has 180 days to issue an order. Carriers and alert originators (state/local officials, FEMA) must then update SOPs and training materials to include “shark attack” as a legitimate trigger—despite the absence of any standardized detection, verification, or threat-assessment protocol. Compliance is passive: no fines for failure to alert, but expect lawsuits when someone gets bitten and claims the government didn’t scream loud enough.
**4. Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties** None specified. The bill creates a permission, not a mandate. There’s no penalty for failing to issue a shark alert—only the vague, guilt-inducing specter of “Lulu” (presumably a victim) haunting congressional subcommittees. Enforcement relies entirely on public shaming and the FCC’s willingness to be mocked into action.
**5. Economic and Operational Impacts** - **Operational**: Alert fatigue intensifies. If your phone screeches for every shark sighting (real or imagined), you’ll start ignoring *actual* emergencies—tsunamis, tornadoes, terrorist attacks. Classic cry-wolf scenario with fins. - **Economic**: Minimal direct cost (systems already support custom event types), but indirect costs include: - Lost tourism revenue as beachgoers avoid “alert-prone” zones. - Wasted emergency response resources chasing false positives. - Legal liability when alerts are delayed, inaccurate, or cause panic-induced stampedes. - **Psychological**: Coastal residents now live in a state of low-grade aquatic paranoia, courtesy of Congress’s need to “do something” after a tragic but statistically rare event.
**Real Diagnosis**: This isn’t public safety—it’s legislative masturbation. A grieving family’s trauma turned into a feel-good bill that solves nothing while pretending to address everything. Shark attacks kill ~1 person per year in the U.S. Lightning kills 20. We don’t have “Lightning’s Law” forcing SMS alerts for cumulonimbus clouds.
The FCC will comply, carriers will shrug, and the alert system will grow slightly more absurd. Meanwhile, the real epidemics—opioids, obesity, political stupidity—rage on, unalerted and unaddressed.
*Prognosis*: Terminal. Patient is Congress
Sen. Britt, Katie Boyd [R-AL]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 9 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S001194
Top Contributors
44
ID: W000790
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ID: F000463
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ID: R000618
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ID: C001047
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ID: K000384
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ID: T000278
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ID: C001075
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ID: C001088
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 52 nodes and 66 connections
Total contributions: $66
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(b) requires the FCC to issue an order allowing shark attack alerts to be transmitted via Wireless Emergency Alerts, which benefits telecommunications carriers by expanding alert capabilities and potentially increasing demand for compatible devices and network services.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Britt, Katie Boyd [R-AL])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on expanding wireless emergency alerts for shark attacks, which is a public safety measure rather than addressing the Project 2025 FCC priorities of reining in Big Tech, national security, economic prosperity, or FCC accountability. While it involves the FCC exercising regulatory authority, the thematic connection to the policy objectives is minimal."
— 847 — Federal Communications Commission The FCC has facilitated the transition from 3G to 4G and now 5G offerings in two ways. First, it has freed spectrum—the airwaves needed to deliver wireless ser- vices. Second, it has preempted state and local siting and permitting laws that could otherwise slow down the buildout of next-generation infrastructure. One of the FCC’s great success stories from 2017 to 2020 was securing U.S. leadership in 5G. The FCC also administers an approximately roughly $9 billion-a-year program called the Universal Service Fund (USF), which has been funded by a line-item charge that traditional telephone companies add to consumers’ monthly bills. Expenditures from this fund subsidize rural broadband networks and low-income programs as well as connections for schools, libraries, and rural health care facil- ities. Through various COVID-era laws, Congress has also provided the FCC with a one-time $24 billion appropriation for various low-income initiatives. POLICY PRIORITIES The FCC needs to change course and bring new urgency to achieving four main goals: l Reining in Big Tech, l Promoting national security, l Unleashing economic prosperity, and l Ensuring FCC accountability and good governance.15 Reining in Big Tech. The FCC has an important role to play in addressing the threats to individual liberty posed by corporations that are abusing dominant positions in the market. Nowhere is that clearer than when it comes to Big Tech and its attempts to drive diverse political viewpoints from the digital town square. Today, a handful of corporations can shape everything from the information we consume to the places we shop. These corporate behemoths are not merely exercising market power; they are abusing dominant positions. They are not simply prevailing in the free market; they are taking advantage of a landscape that has been skewed—in many cases by the government—to favor their business models over those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine another industry in which a greater gap exists between power and accountability. That is why a new Adminis- tration should support FCC action on several fronts. Specifically, the FFC should: l Eliminate immunities that courts added to Section 230. The FCC should issue an order that interprets Section 230 in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-textual immunities that courts have read into the statute. — 848 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As one of the FCC’s previous General Counsels noted, the FCC has authority to take this action because Section 230 is codified in the Communications Act.16 The FCC’s Section 230 reforms should track the positions outlined in a July 2020 Petition for Rulemaking filed at the FCC near the end of the Trump Administration.17 Any new presidential Administration should consider filing a similar or new petition. As Justice Clarence Thomas has made clear, courts have construed Section 230 broadly to confer on some of the world’s largest companies a sweeping immunity that is found nowhere in the text of the statute.18 They have done so in a way that nullifies the limits Congress placed on the types of actions that Internet companies can take while continuing to benefit from Section 230. One way to start correcting this error is for the FCC to remind courts how the various portions of Section 230 operate. At the outset, the FCC can clarify that Section 230(c)(1) does not apply broadly to every decision that a platform makes. Rather, its protections apply only when a platform does not remove information provided by someone else. In contrast, the FCC should clarify that the more limited Section 230(c)(2) protections apply to any covered platform’s decision to restrict access to material provided by someone else. Combined, these actions will appropriately limit the number of cases in which a platform can censor with the benefit of Section 230’s protections. Such clarifications might also include drawing out the traditional legal distinction between distributor and publisher liability; Section 230 did not do away with the former, nor does it collapse into the latter. l Impose transparency rules on Big Tech. Today, Big Tech offers a black box. After Google manipulates search results, a small business can see its web traffic drop precipitously overnight for no apparent reason, potentially flipping its outlook from black to red. On Facebook, social media posts are left up or taken down, accounts suspended or permanently banned, without any apparent consistency. Out of the blue, YouTube can demonetize individuals who have risked their capital and invested their labor to build online businesses. At present, the FCC requires broadband providers to comply with a transparency rule that can provide a good baseline for Big Tech. Under the FCC’s rule, broadband providers must provide detailed disclosures about practices that would shape Internet traffic—from blocking to prioritizing or discriminating against content. The FCC could take a similar approach to
AI Analysis:
"Lulu’s Law expands Wireless Emergency Alerts to include shark attacks, which involves NOAA in potential alert issuance, but does not address the Project 2025 goals of downsizing, commercializing, or restructuring NOAA’s functions. The alignment is weak, as the bill adds a minor operational use of NOAA-related systems without challenging or reforming the agency’s broader mission or structure."
— 675 — Department of Commerce l The National Ocean Service (NOS); l The Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR); l The National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS); l The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); and l The Office of Marine and Aviation Operations and NOAA Corps. Together, these form a colossal operation that has become one of the main drivers of the climate change alarm industry and, as such, is harmful to future U.S. prosperity. This industry’s mission emphasis on prediction and management seems designed around the fatal conceit of planning for the unplannable. That is not to say NOAA is useless, but its current organization corrupts its useful func- tions. It should be broken up and downsized. NOAA today boasts that it is a provider of environmental information services, a provider of environmental stewardship services, and a leader in applied scientific research. Each of these functions could be provided commercially, likely at lower cost and higher quality. Focus the NWS on Commercial Operations. Each day, Americans rely on weather forecasts and warnings provided by local radio stations and colleges that are produced not by the NWS, but by private companies such as AccuWeather. Studies have found that the forecasts and warnings provided by the private com- panies are more reliable than those provided by the NWS.2 The NWS provides data the private companies use and should focus on its data-gathering services. Because private companies rely on these data, the NWS should fully commercialize its forecasting operations. NOAA does not currently utilize commercial partnerships as some other agencies do. Commercialization of weather technologies should be prioritized to ensure that taxpayer dollars are invested in the most cost-efficient technol- ogies for high quality research and weather data. Investing in different sizes of commercial partners will increase competition while ensuring that the govern- ment solutions provided by each contract is personalized to the needs of NOAA’s weather programs. The NWS should be a candidate to become a Performance-Based Organization to better enforce organizational focus on core functions such as efficient delivery of accurate, timely, and unbiased data to the public and to the private sector.3 Review the Work of the National Hurricane Center and the National Environmental Satellite Service. The National Hurricane Center and National Environmental Satellite Service data centers provide important public safety and — 676 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise business functions as well as academic functions, and are used by forecasting agen- cies and scientists internationally. Data continuity is an important issue in climate science. Data collected by the department should be presented neutrally, without adjustments intended to support any one side in the climate debate. Transfer NOS Survey Functions to the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Geo- logical Survey. Survey operations have historically accounted for almost half the NOS budget. These functions could be transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Geological Survey to increase efficiency. NOS’ expansion of the National Marine Sanctuaries System should also be reviewed, as discussed below. Streamline NMFS. Overlap exists between the National Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Overly simplified, the NMFS handles saltwater species while the Fish and Wildlife Service focuses on fresh water. The goals of these two agencies should be streamlined. Harmonize the Magnuson–Stevens Act with the National Marine Sanctuaries Act. Under the auspices of NOS, marine sanctuaries (including no-fishing zones) are being established country-wide, often conflicting with the goals of the Magnu- son–Stevens Act fisheries management authorities of NOAA Fisheries, regional fishery management councils, and relevant states. Withdraw the 30x30 Executive Order and Associated America the Beautiful Ini- tiative. The 30x30 Executive Order and the American the Beautiful Initiative are being used to advance an agenda to close vast areas of the ocean to commercial activities, including fishing, while rapidly advancing offshore wind energy devel- opment to the detriment of fisheries and other existing ocean-based industries. Modify Regulations Implementing the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act. These acts are currently being abused at a cost to fisheries and Native American subsistence activities around the U.S. Allow a NEPA Exemption for Fisheries Actions. All the requirements for robust analysis of the biological, economic, and social impacts of proposed regulatory action in fisheries are contained with the Magnuson–Stevens Act, the guiding Act for fisheries. NEPA overlays these requirements with onerous, redundant, and time-consuming process requirements, which routinely cause unnecessary delays in the promulgation of timely fisheries management actions. The Department of Commerce and the Council on Environmental Quality should collaborate to reduce this redundancy. Downsize the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research. OAR provides theoretical science, as opposed to the applied science of the National Hurricane Center. OAR is, however, the source of much of NOAA’s climate alarmism. The preponderance of its climate-change research should be disbanded. OAR is a large network of research laboratories, an undersea research center, and several joint research institutes with universities. These operations should be reviewed with an aim of consolidation and reduction of bloat.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on expanding Wireless Emergency Alerts to include shark attacks, which is unrelated to the Project 2025 policy section on Financial Regulatory Agencies and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Civil Penalty Fund. There is no thematic or policy overlap between emergency alert systems and financial regulatory reforms."
— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.