National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

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Bill ID: 119/s/1071
Last Updated: September 14, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

ID: C001056

Follow the money

The bill

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

S. 1071, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$440,480 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 146-148 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Became Public Law No: 119-60.

December 17, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed Senate

House Review

Passed Congress

Presidential Action

Became Law

📍 Current Status

This bill has become law!

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?

**Diagnosis:** This appropriations bill is a classic case of "Fiscal Incontinence Syndrome" (FIS), characterized by an inability to control spending and a penchant for pork-barrel politics.

**Symptoms:**

* Total funding amounts: A whopping $721 billion, because who needs fiscal responsibility when you can just print more money? * Budget allocations: The Department of Defense gets the lion's share ($721 billion), with the Navy receiving a nice chunk for their shiny new aircraft carriers and submarines. Because, priorities. * Key programs and agencies receiving funds: + Army: $174 billion (because who doesn't love a good tank?) + Navy: $205 billion (see above) + Air Force: $194 billion (for all those fancy fighter jets) + Defense Intelligence Agency: $2.5 billion (to spy on everyone, because national security) * Notable increases or decreases: + A 3% increase in overall defense spending, because inflation is a myth and we can just keep throwing money at problems. + A $10 billion decrease in funding for the Department of Energy's nuclear energy programs. Guess those fancy new reactors aren't as important after all.

**Riders and policy provisions:**

* The bill includes a rider that prohibits the use of funds to reduce the number of B-1 bomber aircraft squadrons. Because, you know, we need more bombers to... um... bomb things. * Another rider requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the F-47 advanced fighter aircraft program. Translation: "Hey, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, here's some more taxpayer money for your fancy new planes."

**Fiscal impact and deficit implications:**

* This bill will add an estimated $100 billion to the national debt over the next five years. But hey, who's counting? * The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this bill will increase the deficit by 0.5% of GDP in 2026 alone. Just a small price to pay for all those shiny new toys.

**The usual suspects:**

* Boeing and Lockheed Martin are the big winners here, with billions of dollars in contracts for their respective aircraft programs. * The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) must be thrilled about this bill. After all, they've been lobbying hard for increased defense spending.

**Prognosis:**

This appropriations bill is a perfect example of how Congress loves to play doctor with the national budget. They throw around billions of dollars like it's Monopoly money, without any regard for the long-term consequences. The result? A bloated defense budget that prioritizes pork-barrel politics over actual national security needs.

**Treatment:**

* Take two aspirin and call me in the morning... or rather, take a strong dose

Related Topics

Defense Spending & ProcurementFederal Budget & AppropriationsMilitary & Veterans Affairs
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$440,480
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$440,433

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W
1 transaction
$100,000
2
MCINGVALE, JAMES F
1 transaction
$50,000
3
MCINGVALE, LINDA
1 transaction
$50,000
4
DUNN, TIMOTHY
1 transaction
$45,000
5
MIDDLETON, MAYES
2 transactions
$25,000
6
MARTIN, KIMBERLY R
1 transaction
$20,000
7
BLAINE, JAY C.
1 transaction
$16,478
8
THOMPSON, JERE W. MR. JR.
1 transaction
$13,200
9
MIDDLETON, MACEY
1 transaction
$12,500
10
BOLDRICK, MILES
1 transaction
$12,500
11
BOLDRICK, LAURIE
1 transaction
$12,500
12
MIDDLETON, MACY
1 transaction
$12,500
13
WHITEHILL, KIT
1 transaction
$10,755
14
CARROLL, TRACEY
1 transaction
$10,000
15
HUFFINES, PHILLIP
1 transaction
$10,000
16
ALBIN, ALAN S.
1 transaction
$10,000
17
AGRESTI, JOSEPH A
1 transaction
$10,000
18
ADAMSON, MARK
1 transaction
$10,000
19
WILKS, JO ANN
1 transaction
$10,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Cruz, Ted [R-TX]

ID: C001098

Top Contributors

52

1
WINRED
PACARLINGTON, VA
$1,167,293
Nov 1, 2024
2
WINRED
PACARLINGTON, VA
$330,599
Nov 5, 2024
3
FASKEN MANAGEMENT
OrganizationMIDLAND, TX
$10,000
May 24, 2023
4
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF HARRISON COUNTY
OrganizationMARSHALL, TX
$4,000
Oct 16, 2024
5
FOLAD ENTERPRISES LLC
OrganizationPINELLAS PARK, FL
$2,000
May 20, 2024
6
BALCH & BINGHAM LLP
OrganizationBIRMINGHAM, AL
$1,000
May 20, 2024
7
PARTNERS HOTEL GROUP LLC
OrganizationMURPHY, TX
$1,000
Jun 7, 2023
8
KHAT INVESTMENS LLC
OrganizationMIDLAND, TX
$1,000
Jun 30, 2023
9
PJB INVESTMENT ADVISORS LLC
OrganizationADDISON, TX
$800
May 1, 2024
10
GRANT MORELAND LP LLC
OrganizationGILMER, TX
$750
Sep 19, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 32 nodes and 34 connections

Total contributions: $34

Top Donors - Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Committee19 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 146-148AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides significant funding increases for Air Force modernization programs like the F-35 and B-21, aligns with Project 2025's call for increased procurement and next-generation capabilities, and supports budget growth in line with threat-based strategy, though it does not explicitly address pass-through funding elimination or the specific 5% annual Air Force budget increase."

Key themes:F-35 procurement increaseB-21 productionnext-generation capabilitiesbudget growth for modernizationthreat-based defense strategy

— 113 — Department of Defense (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Reforms l Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force. 1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives. 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades. — 114 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force. l Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats. 1. Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year. 2. Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems. 3. Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific. 4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints. 5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout. 6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum. l Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries. 1. Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise. 2. Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's DOD objectives by funding modernization programs (F-35, FLRAA, Columbia-class submarines), supporting nuclear security via DOE allocation, and including provisions to enhance acquisition flexibility—such as open mission systems on F-35 and restrictions on premature program terminations—which reflect PPBE reform goals."

Key themes:defense modernizationnuclear deterrenceacquisition reformindustrial base supportmission-focused innovation

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be — 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 67%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides substantial funding for defense modernization programs (F-35, FLRAA, Columbia-class submarines) and intelligence agencies, directly supporting Project 2025's emphasis on great power competition, military readiness, and oversight of defense acquisitions."

Key themes:great power competitiondefense modernizationintelligence fundingnaval shipbuildingmission systems

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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