The bill
SAFEGUARDS Act of 2025
S. 2378, 119th Congress — read as touching Airlines.
Sponsored by
Sen. Moran, Jerry [R-KS]
ID: M000934
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2378, 119th Congress — read as touching Airlines.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Transportation" section, p. 664-666 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.
April 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The full Senate will vote on whether to pass the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt denizens of Congress. The SAFEGUARDS Act of 2025 is a laughable attempt to feign concern for aviation security while lining the pockets of special interests and perpetuating the cycle of bureaucratic incompetence.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to establish funds for investments in aviation security checkpoint technology, because, apparently, the current system isn't bloated enough. The sponsors claim it's about enhancing safety and security, but we all know that's just a euphemism for "securing more funding" and "expanding bureaucratic fiefdoms."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends title 49 of the United States Code to create two new funds: the Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF) and the Aviation Security Checkpoint Technology Fund (ASCTF). The ASCF will receive $250 million annually from the 9/11 Security Fee, while the ASCTF will get an additional $250 million starting in fiscal year 2026. Because what's a few hundred million dollars between friends, right? The bill also grants the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority to make grants for aviation security checkpoint technology, because who needs oversight or accountability?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: airline passengers (who'll foot the bill through increased fees), airlines, airports, and the TSA. But let's be real, the only stakeholders who truly matter are the lobbyists, contractors, and politicians who'll benefit from this legislative largesse.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a textbook example of "security theater," where the appearance of security is prioritized over actual effectiveness. The increased funding will likely lead to more bureaucratic red tape, inefficiencies, and opportunities for corruption. Airline passengers can expect higher fees, longer lines, and more intrusive screening procedures, all under the guise of "enhanced security." Meanwhile, the real beneficiaries – politicians, lobbyists, and contractors – will reap the rewards of this legislative boondoggle.
In conclusion, the SAFEGUARDS Act of 2025 is a farcical attempt to address aviation security concerns while serving the interests of special groups. It's a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease where politicians prioritize their own self-interest over the well-being of the citizens they're supposed to serve. As with any terminal illness, the prognosis is grim: more waste, more corruption, and more security theater. Joy.
Sen. Moran, Jerry [R-KS]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: V000128
Top Contributors
22
ID: B001267
Top Contributors
24
ID: B001236
Top Contributors
23
ID: D000618
Top Contributors
30
ID: S001232
Top Contributors
100
ID: C001047
Top Contributors
23
ID: H000273
Top Contributors
23
ID: H001079
Top Contributors
24
ID: R000608
Top Contributors
42
ID: C000880
Top Contributors
25
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 46 nodes and 46 connections
Total contributions: $46
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(1)-(4) states that the 9/11 Security Fee is an airline passenger-paid fee established to enhance aviation safety and security, and that its revenue should be used exclusively for aviation security purposes, directly benefiting airlines by improving security infrastructure they rely on.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The SAFEGUARDS Act focuses on aviation security funding and checkpoint technology, while the Project 2025 DOT section emphasizes market competition, regulatory reform, FAA structure, pilot training, and essential air service. Both concern aviation improvements but address distinct policy areas, resulting only tangential overlap."
— 631 — Department of Transportation are providing access to capital to foreign airlines for innovations and new equipment purchases that U.S. airlines cannot match. The U.S. should use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process to keep out nefarious foreign actors while allowing investment from investors in designated like-minded countries so long as U.S.-based investors maintain plurality ownership. l Establish a New Entry Initiative that commits the federal government to approving or rejecting the applications of new air carriers within 12 months. l Initiate a rulemaking to allocate slot-pairs more consistently to airlines at capacity-controlled airports on the primary basis of safety, maximizing capacity, and competition. In a perfect world, the market would dictate these options, but in the highly regulated international aviation sector, the current incentives are to keep out com- petitors. Slot regulations have not been updated since the 1990s. Well-meaning legislation and the pilot shortage are adversely affecting aviation safety. In the wake of the 2009 Colgan Airlines crash, all commercial pilots and copilots were required to have 1,500 flight hours. Today, facing a pilot shortage, larger and safer twin-engine planes with two pilots are being phased out of service at smaller airports and replaced by single-engine planes that have only one pilot. This trend could be reversed if copilots were required to have fewer flight hours or could count certified simulator training. Federal subsidies are also distorting the commercial market. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program subsidizes flights to 200 small airports that are not otherwise commercially viable. The program was established in the 1970s as a temporary measure to cushion deregulation. It has since been made permanent. Finally ending the program would free hundreds of pilots to serve larger markets with more passengers. A new Administration could reform regulations to encour- age airports in lower-served areas of the nation. International air travel is regulated and restricted by individual treaties between the United States and other countries. The new Administration should remain committed to the laudatory goal of “Open Skies.” However, many of the largest emerging markets are not fully open, and our aviation policies should reflect that reality and ensure that U.S. air carriers compete on a level playing field. Specifically, so long as U.S. carriers are not able to fly over Russian airspace, the U.S. should not allow foreign carriers serving markets in East Asia and South Asia to enjoy a com- petitive advantage by continuing to allow them to fly to the U.S. China has failed to put in place several of the policies to which it has already agreed; the U.S. should — 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It
AI Analysis:
"The SAFEGUARDS Act focuses on aviation security funding and technology, while the Project 2025 DOT section addresses market competition, pilot training, Essential Air Service reform, and foreign investment—topics with little direct overlap."
— 631 — Department of Transportation are providing access to capital to foreign airlines for innovations and new equipment purchases that U.S. airlines cannot match. The U.S. should use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process to keep out nefarious foreign actors while allowing investment from investors in designated like-minded countries so long as U.S.-based investors maintain plurality ownership. l Establish a New Entry Initiative that commits the federal government to approving or rejecting the applications of new air carriers within 12 months. l Initiate a rulemaking to allocate slot-pairs more consistently to airlines at capacity-controlled airports on the primary basis of safety, maximizing capacity, and competition. In a perfect world, the market would dictate these options, but in the highly regulated international aviation sector, the current incentives are to keep out com- petitors. Slot regulations have not been updated since the 1990s. Well-meaning legislation and the pilot shortage are adversely affecting aviation safety. In the wake of the 2009 Colgan Airlines crash, all commercial pilots and copilots were required to have 1,500 flight hours. Today, facing a pilot shortage, larger and safer twin-engine planes with two pilots are being phased out of service at smaller airports and replaced by single-engine planes that have only one pilot. This trend could be reversed if copilots were required to have fewer flight hours or could count certified simulator training. Federal subsidies are also distorting the commercial market. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program subsidizes flights to 200 small airports that are not otherwise commercially viable. The program was established in the 1970s as a temporary measure to cushion deregulation. It has since been made permanent. Finally ending the program would free hundreds of pilots to serve larger markets with more passengers. A new Administration could reform regulations to encour- age airports in lower-served areas of the nation. International air travel is regulated and restricted by individual treaties between the United States and other countries. The new Administration should remain committed to the laudatory goal of “Open Skies.” However, many of the largest emerging markets are not fully open, and our aviation policies should reflect that reality and ensure that U.S. air carriers compete on a level playing field. Specifically, so long as U.S. carriers are not able to fly over Russian airspace, the U.S. should not allow foreign carriers serving markets in East Asia and South Asia to enjoy a com- petitive advantage by continuing to allow them to fly to the U.S. China has failed to put in place several of the policies to which it has already agreed; the U.S. should
AI Analysis:
"The SAFEGUARDS Act focuses on TSA aviation security checkpoint technology funded by passenger fees, whereas the Project 2025 DOT section emphasizes FAA organizational reform, ATC modernization, and adapting to emerging aviation technologies. Both address aviation technology investment and funding, but their primary objectives and agencies differ, resulting only tangential alignment."
— 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It — 633 — Department of Transportation needs to hire people trained to oversee mechanics, engineers, and pilots. It is time to consider promoting the FAA’s top executive team from within and requiring strict professional requirements for its top appointees. Organizations such as the FAA whose sole responsibility is public safety should be fully auditable and led by experts in their field or industry with oversight from DOT leadership. For 60 years, the FAA was the global leader in aerospace, from general aviation to commercial space, but the U.S. lead has vanished. The FAA’s overly bureaucratic, legalistic, byzantine, and more recently hyperpoliticized way of processing regu- lations, adopting innovation, publishing rules, and procuring new technologies has been eclipsed by foreign CAAs and ANSPs that are eagerly certifying drones and creating environments in which new technologies and new entrants, such as air taxis, can thrive. To regain America’s global leadership in aviation, the next Administration should: l Separate the FAA from DOT or, at a minimum, separate the ATO from the FAA. l Completely restructure the FAA’s funding system so that the nation’s aviation system is not held prisoner to annual appropriations or used as a political football to solve nonaviation problems. l Require the FAA to operate more like a business. The FAA has not made good use of the unique authority it has been given in areas like personnel and acquisition. In Europe, conventional control towers are being replaced by digital/remote towers with high-resolution cameras and other sensors on tall structures and at points adjoining runways. In Germany and Scandinavia, as many as 15 small air- ports can be controlled from one remote tower center. The FAA has yet to certify a single digital/remote tower. Text messaging between controllers and pilots is widespread over the oceans. The ATO began to implement what is now called DataComm in 2002 but sus- pended the project in 2003. This was restarted at airport control towers in 2016, but as of October 2022, it was available in only seven of the 20 high-altitude control centers. Current technology enables flights to be managed “anywhere from anywhere,” but the ATO resists consolidating its 20 aging centers into a much smaller number—and lacks the funds to consolidate them. The FAA as regulator and the ATO as traffic manager have no plans in place to handle millions of drones and other emerging technologies such as electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
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