ROUTERS Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/244
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]

ID: B001243

Follow the money

The bill

ROUTERS Act

S. 244, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.

The sponsor

Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$166,000 raised

26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 720-722 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 87.

June 1, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant example of congressional theater, masquerading as a legitimate attempt to address national security concerns. The ROUTERS Act (Removing Our Unsecure Technologies to Ensure Reliability and Security Act) - how cute. It's like they think we're all idiots who can't see through the obvious acronym.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to conduct a study on the national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and combo devices manufactured or supplied by countries deemed "covered" (read: China). The real purpose? To create a smokescreen for politicians to pretend they're doing something about cybersecurity while actually accomplishing nothing.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a study and submit a report within a year. Wow, that's a whole 12 months to gather information we already know - that many consumer routers and modems are insecure by design. The only "change" is that this bill will create another layer of bureaucratic red tape, ensuring that actual action on cybersecurity remains stalled.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

* Consumer router and modem manufacturers (who'll likely just lobby for exemptions or watered-down regulations) * The Secretary of Commerce (who'll get to pretend they're doing something important while collecting a paycheck) * Politicians like Blackburn, Lujan, and Warner (who'll tout this bill as proof of their "commitment" to national security)

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will have all the impact of a placebo on a patient with a terminal illness. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real implications are:

* More taxpayer dollars wasted on bureaucratic studies and reports that won't lead to meaningful change * Continued vulnerability of consumer routers and modems, putting Americans' personal data at risk * Politicians getting to claim they're "doing something" about cybersecurity without actually addressing the root problems

In short, this bill is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to create the illusion of action while ignoring the real issues. I'd prescribe a strong dose of reality and a healthy dose of skepticism for anyone who thinks this bill will make a difference.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$166,000
23 donors
PACs
$5,000
Organizations
$7,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$153,100
1
FRIENDS OF COMMUNITY ONCOLOGY PAC
1 transaction
$5,000
1
THE COGGIN GROUP
2 transactions
$5,400
2
DOSS BROTHERS FARM
2 transactions
$2,000
3
BL PARTNERS GROUP LLC
1 transaction
$500

No committee contributions found

1
KING, RODNEY W.
1 transaction
$13,200
2
KINNEY, CHRIS
2 transactions
$13,200
3
BEAN, BILL G.
1 transaction
$10,000
4
SMITH, THOMAS
1 transaction
$10,000
5
GAMBLE, KATHRYN
1 transaction
$9,900
6
NEWVERRY, KARMA
1 transaction
$9,900
7
WETHERINGTON, WILLIAM MICHAEL MR.
1 transaction
$7,600
8
HAMPTON, GEORGE
1 transaction
$6,700
9
HARWELL, SAMUEL K. MR. IV
1 transaction
$6,600
10
HARWELL, SAMUEL K.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
KING, MARY L.
1 transaction
$6,600
12
SENSING, LUCY T. MRS.
1 transaction
$6,600
13
VITAL, GREG A.
1 transaction
$6,600
14
BRADLEY, JACQUELINE
1 transaction
$6,600
15
PRESTON, CASEY MS.
1 transaction
$6,600
16
DEVOS, BETSY
1 transaction
$6,600
17
DEVOS, DANIEL G. MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
18
DEVOS, DOUGLAS L. MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
19
DEVOS, RICHARD M. JR.
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Luján, Ben Ray [D-NM]

ID: L000570

Top Contributors

45

1
LYTTON BAND OF POMO INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA ROSA, CA
$3,300
Dec 5, 2023
2
OTOE-MISSOURIA TRIBE
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Dec 7, 2023
3
LYTTON BAND OF POMO INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA ROSA, CA
$3,300
Dec 5, 2023
4
TAOS PUEBLO GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
OrganizationTAOS, NM
$3,300
Dec 2, 2024
5
OHKAY OWINGEH TRIBE
OrganizationOHKAY OWINGEH, NM
$3,300
Dec 2, 2024
6
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$3,300
Apr 18, 2023
7
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$3,300
May 22, 2024
8
MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE
OrganizationMESCALERO, NM
$3,300
Sep 25, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2,500
Jun 25, 2024
10
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$2,000
Mar 21, 2024

Sen. Warner, Mark R. [D-VA]

ID: W000805

Top Contributors

23

1
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE, LLC
OrganizationROANOKE, VA
$5,300
Sep 25, 2024
2
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$600
Sep 28, 2023
3
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$400
Sep 28, 2023
4
DEKKER, DAVID T.
PILLSBURY • VICE CHAIR
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$9,900
Dec 31, 2024
5
TULL, THOMAS
TULCO • CEO
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$6,000
Nov 21, 2024
6
SWARTZ, SUSAN
SELF EMPLOYED • ARTIST
IndividualPARK CITY, UT
$3,300
Jul 31, 2023
7
MATNEY, JOHN
RAPOCA ENERGY COMPANY • PARTNER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023
8
MILLONES, PETER
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. • ATTORNEY
IndividualDARIEN, CT
$3,300
Sep 29, 2023
9
MATNEY, JUSTIN K
SELF EMPLOYED • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023
10
MATNEY, JOHN
RAPOCA ENERGY COMPANY • PARTNER
IndividualBRISTOL, VA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023

Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]

ID: S001217

Top Contributors

22

1
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 22, 2023
2
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 12, 2024
3
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$90,795
May 31, 2024
4
SCOTT, RICK SEN
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$77,714
May 31, 2023
5
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$69,607
Apr 30, 2024
6
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$68,538
Aug 31, 2023
7
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$53,187
Sep 30, 2023
8
SCOTT, RICK SEN
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$49,992
Jun 30, 2023
9
SCOTT, RICK SENATOR
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualTAMPA, FL
$39,695
Jun 30, 2024
10
SCOTT, RICK
US SENATE • US SENATOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$34,494
Jan 31, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 47 nodes and 55 connections

Total contributions: $55

Top Donors - Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC3 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.

  • −Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a) directs a study of national security risks posed by consumer routers, modems, and combined devices from covered countries, which could lead to regulatory scrutiny or restrictions affecting telecom equipment manufacturers and providers.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

  • from 6 contributions
    • ERGEN, CANTEY$9,900
    • ERGEN, CHARLES W. MR.$9,900
    • LANCASTER, SAMUEL G.$2,000

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 60%
Pages: 720-722AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The ROUTERS Act aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on utilizing NTIA's authority to address national security threats in telecommunications and information technology, particularly by assessing risks from foreign-influenced equipment in consumer networking devices."

Key themes:national securitytelecommunications securityforeign influenceICTS authoritiesconsumer device vulnerabilities

— 687 — Department of Commerce that do not allow open access to their markets should not be setting the standards for markets that do allow open access. The incoming Administration should consider increased government-sponsored participation by private companies and government employees with relevant expertise. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICE The independent National Telecommunications and Information Service (NTIS) is charged with ensuring that federally funded research and data are accessible to the public. NTIS operates through user fees but is largely obsolete due to modern usage of the internet by federal agencies and researchers. NTIS’s functions should be moved to NIST and consolidated with the Tech Transfer and ROI initiatives. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is the exec- utive branch’s statutory lead on telecommunications and information policy. It focuses on broadband access, spectrum utilization, and other issues that are crucial to the high-tech economy. For decades, NTIA has suffered from organizational malaise and will require strong and energetic leadership by political appointees to implement conservative policies. The next Administration will face the primary challenge of rapidly deploying 5G without compromising other priorities. Further recommendations include: l Support free speech and hold big tech accountable. Immediately conduct a thorough review of federal policy regarding free speech online and provide policy solutions to address big tech’s censorship of speech. l Utilize new tools to eliminate threats to national security. Fully implement the Trump Administration’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Executive Order authorities in a way that ensures long-term success and the legal viability of this new national security tool.9 l Expand utilization of federal spectrum. Begin short term, temporary leasing of government allocated spectrum to ensure optimum utilization while preserving federal agency use rights. l Support the commercial space industry. Advocate for licensing decisions at the Federal Communications Commission that continue to enable U.S. dominance in the commercial space industry.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 434-436AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The ROUTERS Act focuses on studying cybersecurity risks of consumer networking equipment from certain foreign countries, which shares Project 2025's concern about foreign cyber threats to critical infrastructure, though the bill targets communications devices rather than the electric grid specifically."

Key themes:cybersecuritynational securityforeign influencecritical infrastructuresupply chain security

— 401 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions nation in the summer110 and winter.111 Cyber and physical attacks also threaten the grid. Specific areas for reform include the following: l Limit the impact of subsidized renewables on price formation. Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs. The increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support the reliable dispatchable generation that is needed to serve the grid at all times.112 l Reform the application of reserve margins. Reserve margins have become largely meaningless. Traditionally, the electric industry has used “reserve margins” to ensure that the grid has enough power plants to guarantee reliability. Generally, reserve margins represent the amount of generation available (power plants) to meet peak electric demand (the time of day and year when people are using the most electricity) plus a percentage of additional generation for backup.113 However, given the increasing number of intermittent resources (like solar, which may be available during the heat of the day but disappears as the sun sets), other dispatchable generation needs to be available to meet customers’ electricity requirements. Therefore, the definitions and calculations of reserve margins and peak load need to be updated to focus on the modern grid’s reliability challenges for all times of the day and year. l Recognize the interdependence of electric generation and natural gas. The interdependence of electric generation and natural gas pipelines continues to grow. Given natural gas’s important role in generating electricity, especially as backup when renewables are not available, lack of natural gas pipelines or attacks on existing pipelines could threaten our ability to generate electricity. l Expand resource diversity and reliability. Resource diversity is needed to support grid reliability. Pressure to use 100 percent renewables or non– carbon emitting resources threatens the electric grid’s reliability. A grid that has access to dispatchable resources such as coal, nuclear, and natural gas for generating power is inherently more reliable and resilient. l Protect against cyber and physical attacks. The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. The attacks with guns on substations in North Carolina in December 2022 that left customers without power demonstrate the grid’s vulnerability.114 — 402 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise New Policies l Reform RTOs to require reliability. FERC should direct RTOs to establish reliability pricing for eligible dispatchable generation resources or require intermittent resources to procure backup power for times when they are not available to operate. In addition, Congress should repeal subsidies for generation resources. l Update the definition and calculation of reserve margins to support reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE should revise the definition of reserve margins to ensure the grid’s reliability throughout the day and the year. This will mean recognizing that reserve margins may need to consider “net peak” and exclude non-dispatchable resources from inclusion in reserve margin calculations. l Expand and protect natural gas infrastructure in support of electric generation. FERC needs to ensure that its consideration of natural gas pipeline applications recognizes the role that natural gas plays in electric reliability. FERC also needs to make sure that RTO pricing mechanisms support generators that need to contract for natural gas service on a firm basis. l Support resource diversity and reliability. FERC, NERC, and DOE play key roles in balancing consumer, industrial, and national defense interests to ensure an ongoing reliable, plentiful, and accessible national electricity supply. NERC reliability reviews and FERC’s reliability roles should be aware that overreliance on any one power generation fuel source entails concurrent cost and availability risk. FERC should reform market rules that unduly discriminate against dispatchable resources needed for reliability. l Strengthen security against cyber and physical threats. FERC and NERC need to enhance the security of the bulk power system by, for example, banning Chinese-made components, investing in transformers, and hardening substations and other critical infrastructure. DOE should play a leading role in identifying and addressing threats to the grid. FERC: RTOS/ISOS AND “ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS” Mission/Overview For more than 20 years, FERC has issued regulations and directed policies for the creation and operation of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) to manage the dispatch of generation and

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Weak
Vector: 62%
Pages: 434-436AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on studying cybersecurity risks in consumer networking equipment from certain foreign countries, while the Project 2025 policy addresses grid reliability, renewable energy integration, reserve margins, and cyber/physical threats to electric infrastructure—only sharing a broad concern about foreign cyber threats without substantive overlap in domain or solution."

Key themes:cybersecurity threatsforeign actorsinfrastructure vulnerabilities

— 401 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions nation in the summer110 and winter.111 Cyber and physical attacks also threaten the grid. Specific areas for reform include the following: l Limit the impact of subsidized renewables on price formation. Subsidized renewable resources are undermining electric reliability in RTOs. The increase in subsidized, intermittent resources is undermining the ability of RTOs’ pricing models to support the reliable dispatchable generation that is needed to serve the grid at all times.112 l Reform the application of reserve margins. Reserve margins have become largely meaningless. Traditionally, the electric industry has used “reserve margins” to ensure that the grid has enough power plants to guarantee reliability. Generally, reserve margins represent the amount of generation available (power plants) to meet peak electric demand (the time of day and year when people are using the most electricity) plus a percentage of additional generation for backup.113 However, given the increasing number of intermittent resources (like solar, which may be available during the heat of the day but disappears as the sun sets), other dispatchable generation needs to be available to meet customers’ electricity requirements. Therefore, the definitions and calculations of reserve margins and peak load need to be updated to focus on the modern grid’s reliability challenges for all times of the day and year. l Recognize the interdependence of electric generation and natural gas. The interdependence of electric generation and natural gas pipelines continues to grow. Given natural gas’s important role in generating electricity, especially as backup when renewables are not available, lack of natural gas pipelines or attacks on existing pipelines could threaten our ability to generate electricity. l Expand resource diversity and reliability. Resource diversity is needed to support grid reliability. Pressure to use 100 percent renewables or non– carbon emitting resources threatens the electric grid’s reliability. A grid that has access to dispatchable resources such as coal, nuclear, and natural gas for generating power is inherently more reliable and resilient. l Protect against cyber and physical attacks. The threat of cyber and physical attacks on electric infrastructure by foreign actors like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well as terrorists, continues to grow. The attacks with guns on substations in North Carolina in December 2022 that left customers without power demonstrate the grid’s vulnerability.114

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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