The bill
Safe Cloud Storage Act
S. 3023, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
ID: B001243
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3023, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 201-204 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
May 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The "Safe Cloud Storage Act" - because who doesn't love a good oxymoron? Let's dissect this farce and uncover the real motivations behind it.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to limit liability for cloud service providers storing child pornography, child obscenity, and intimate visual depictions of minors for law enforcement agencies. How noble. In reality, this is a cleverly crafted attempt to shield corporations from accountability while pretending to protect children.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the PROTECT Our Children Act of 2008 by inserting a new section that defines "approved vendors" and limits their liability for storing and processing child pornography. It also establishes cybersecurity requirements for these vendors, because apparently, they need guidance on how not to be completely incompetent.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill affects cloud service providers, law enforcement agencies, and - ostensibly - children. But let's be real, the only parties that truly matter here are the corporations and their lobbyists, who have managed to convince lawmakers to grant them immunity from liability.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of corporate power on our legislative system. By limiting liability for approved vendors, Congress is essentially giving them a free pass to prioritize profits over accountability. The cybersecurity requirements are a token gesture, a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real implication is that corporations will continue to exploit loopholes and lack of oversight to maximize their gains, while the public is left to foot the bill.
In medical terms, this bill is akin to treating a patient's symptoms without addressing the underlying condition. It's a classic case of legislative malpractice, where the diagnosis is clear - corruption, greed, and a complete disregard for the public interest - but the treatment is a placebo designed to appease corporate interests.
To summarize: the "Safe Cloud Storage Act" is a masterclass in doublespeak, a bill that pretends to protect children while actually shielding corporations from accountability. It's a testament to the boundless creativity of lawmakers in serving their corporate masters, and a stark reminder that in the world of politics, the only thing more abundant than hypocrisy is stupidity.
Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 9 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000367
Top Contributors
25
ID: C001056
Top Contributors
21
ID: B001277
Top Contributors
20
ID: B001319
Top Contributors
26
ID: C001088
Top Contributors
22
ID: L000577
Top Contributors
20
ID: M001244
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
ID: W000790
Top Contributors
26
ID: W000779
Top Contributors
30
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 47 nodes and 55 connections
Total contributions: $55
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 2(b)(1) provides limited liability for approved vendors (cloud service providers) storing child sexual abuse material for law enforcement, which benefits cloud service providers such as Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, etc., by reducing legal exposure.
Section 2(b)(1) grants limited liability to approved vendors (cloud service providers) for storing and processing child sexual abuse material, directly benefiting AI and cloud infrastructure providers like AWS, Azure, Google Cloud that may contract with law enforcement for such storage and forensic processing.
Section 2 defines cloud service provider broadly to include organizations providing digital storage services, which may encompass telecom companies offering cloud/storage benefits, and the limited liability provision could apply to them if they act as approved vendors.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Blackburn, Marsha [R-TN])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The Safe Cloud Storage Act directly supports DHS priorities under Project 2025 by strengthening cybersecurity protections for law‑enforcement‑held child sexual abuse material and limiting vendor liability, thereby enhancing the department’s ability to combat child exploitation and secure sensitive data."
— 168 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, § 101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 2. See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News, December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed March 14, 2023). 3. H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79- Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 4. Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No. 104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/ PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 5. 8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023). 6. 18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023). 7. 5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed March 14, 2023). 8. Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/ sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_ Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20 %24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20 President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5. 9. H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW- 110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 10. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/ download (accessed January 18, 2023). 11. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed January 18, 2023). 12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974] [As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20 Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 14. Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023). 15. 5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023). 16. S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 17. H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www. congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 18. H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 FTC section aim to protect children, but the bill focuses on limiting liability for cloud providers storing child sexual abuse material for law enforcement, while the FTC policy targets unfair online contracts and platform practices affecting children's mental health and privacy. The overlap is limited to the general goal of child safety online."
— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on limiting liability for cloud providers storing child sexual abuse material for law enforcement, while the Project 2025 FTC policy targets platforms' exploitative contracts and data collection from children; both concern child safety online but address different mechanisms and stakeholders."
— 875 — Federal Trade Commission Protecting Children Online. The FTC has long protected children in a variety of different contexts. Internet platforms profit from obtaining information from children without parents’ knowledge or consent—and social media’s effect on the well-being of American children is well-documented. Around 2012, American teens experienced a dramatic decline in wellness. Depression, self-harm, suicide attempts, and suicide all increased sharply among U.S. adolescents between 2011 and 2019,16 with similar trends worldwide.17 The increase occurred at the same time that social media use moved from rare to ubiquitous among teens,18 making social media a prime suspect for the sudden rise in mental health issues among teens. In addition, excessive social media use is strongly linked to mental health issues among individuals. Several studies strongly support the notion that social media use is a cause, not just a correlation, of subjective well-being and poor mental health.19 Social media and other large platforms form millions of contracts every year with American children. And even though a minor can void most contracts into which he or she enters, most jurisdictions have laws that hold minors accountable for the benefits received under the contract. Thus, children can make enforceable contracts for which parents could end up bearing responsibility. Targeting chil- dren to create potentially harmful contracts or making parents responsible for such contractual relationships is an unfair trade practice. The FTC, therefore, has the authority, interest, and duty to protect children online from such contractual relationships. l The FTC should examine platforms’ advertising and contract- making with children as a deceptive or unfair trade practice, perhaps requiring written parental consent. Currently, the Child Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)20 regulates the information internet firms can obtain from children. COPPA fails because it (1) only protects children under the age of 13, leaving older teenagers completely unprotected and (2) only prohibits platforms from collecting information from a child using “actual knowledge” rather than abiding by the “constructive knowledge” standard, which prohibits collecting information from a user reasonably assumed to be underage. The FTC has rulemaking authority under this statute but has done little with this authority, nor can it—given the statutory constraints. However, l The FTC can and should institute unfair trade practices proceedings against entities that enter into contracts with children without parental consent. Personal parental responsibility is, of course, key, but the law must respect, not undermine, lawful parental authority. — 876 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Other conservatives are more skeptical concerning the effect of online expe- rience on the young, comparing the concern about social media to concern about video games, television, and bicycle safety. They point out, as does Cato fellow Jeffrey A. Singer, that the psychiatric profession has yet to designate “internet addiction” or “social media addiction” as a mental disorder in the authoritative Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5-TR).21 These con- servatives also maintain that calling for regulation undermines conservatives’ calls for parental empowerment on education or vaccines as well as personal parenting responsibility. In addition, some of the methods used to regulate children’s internet access pose the risk of unintended harms. For instance, age verification regulations would inevitably increase the amount of data collection involved, increasing privacy con- cerns. Users would have to submit to platforms proof of their age, which raises the risks of data breach or illegitimate data usage by the platforms or bad actors. Limited-government conservatives would prefer the FTC play an educational role instead. That might include best practices or educational programs to empower parents online. Antitrust Enforcement. As is evidenced by a relentless focus on bringing Big Tech lawsuits, state attorneys general (AGs) are far more responsive to their con- stituents than is the FTC. Such a “boots on the ground” approach would benefit the FTC enormously. Practically, this would mean establishing a distinct role in the FTC Chairman’s office focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, D.C., to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth. FTC regional offices are substantially more in touch with local issues. Over the past few decades, the reach and influence of regional offices has shrunk dramati- cally. The FTC should consider returning authority to these offices. Some conservatives however are less supportive of this idea. Conservative enthusiasm for the idea of adding regional FTC offices to the states is a break from the majority conservative position. Endorsing the federal government as a pre- mier job creator runs counter to decades of conservative opinion that holds that New Deal agencies and subsequent government bodies should never have been created in the first place, and that their red tape and interference is a dominant cause of economic inefficiency. Republicans used to seethe when Democrats tried to move federal offices into the states. In the early 1990s, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich fumed about Senator Robert Byrd’s campaign to transfer certain national intelligence facilities to West Virginia, calling it a “pure abuse of power.” Some contributors to this chapter would remind conservatives that the unseen mechanics of redistribution—by which taxpayer money paid to state employees is taken from taxpayers nationwide—is a drag on the economy of the entire country. Many conservatives fear that it would be impossible to uproot or even prune back
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.