The bill
A bill to expand the sharing of information with respect to suspected violations of intellectual property rights in trade.
S. 2677, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]
ID: G000386
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2677, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 852-854 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
August 9, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of S. 2677: A Bill to Expand the Sharing of Information with Respect to Suspected Violations of Intellectual Property Rights in Trade**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of S. 2677 is to enhance U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) ability to combat intellectual property (IP) infringement by expanding the sharing of information with private parties who suspect their IP rights are being violated in imported goods. Ostensibly, this aims to strengthen enforcement against counterfeit and pirated goods entering the U.S. market. In reality, it’s a bureaucratic tweak dressed up as a tough-on-piracy measure—likely designed to appease corporate lobbyists while doing little to address the root causes of global IP theft, which are often rooted in foreign jurisdictions beyond CBP’s reach. The bill’s real objective? To make it look like Congress is “doing something” about counterfeiting without actually funding meaningful international cooperation or investing in smarter, risk-based targeting systems.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 628A of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1628a), which currently allows CBP to share certain nonpublic information with individuals or entities that have a “reasonable suspicion” of IP infringement. Key changes include: - Lowering the threshold from “suspects” to “has a reasonable suspicion” (a semantic tweak that sounds stricter but likely changes little in practice). - Expanding the types of goods for which images and details can be shared to explicitly include **packing materials, containers, and labels**—not just the merchandise and its packaging. - Most significantly, **adding paragraph (3)**, which permits CBP to share **nonpublic information generated by online marketplaces, express consignment operators, freight forwarders, or other intermediaries** involved in the sale or importation of goods—if that information has been provided to or obtained by CBP. - Adding paragraph (4), requiring CBP to notify the recipient when such nonpublic information is shared. - In subsection (b), expanding the list of parties who may receive information to include **“any other party with an interest in the merchandise, as determined appropriate by the Commissioner”**—a vague, open-ended grant of discretion that could allow CBP to share sensitive data with virtually anyone it deems relevant.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Rights holders (corporations, especially in pharma, luxury goods, tech, and entertainment)**: Primary beneficiaries, gaining greater access to potentially actionable data about suspected infringing shipments. - **Online marketplaces (e.g., Amazon, eBay), logistics firms, and freight forwarders**: Now potential sources of shared data—and possibly conduits for CBP to access commercial information they collect. Privacy advocates will howl about mission creep and corporate surveillance. - **Importers and exporters**: Face increased scrutiny and potential exposure of confidential business information if CBP shares data derived from third parties. - **U.S. Customs and Border Protection**: Gets expanded authority without additional resources or oversight—classic unfunded mandate. - **The public**: Indirectly affected through potential erosion of trade secrecy and due process concerns, though most won’t notice until their Amazon seller account gets flagged based on a tip from a freight forwarder.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill is a classic example of **legislative theater**: minor procedural changes masquerading as substantive reform. While it may marginally improve CBP’s ability to tip off rights holders about suspicious shipments—particularly in the e-commerce era where small parcels flood in via express carriers—it does nothing to address the systemic issues: underfunding of CBP’s IPR division, lack of international coordination, or the sheer volume of low-value de minimis shipments that evade inspection.
The real danger lies in the expansion of information-sharing to include data from private logistics and e-commerce actors. This blurs the line between law enforcement and corporate intelligence-gathering, raising serious **privacy, due process
Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: H001076
Top Contributors
20
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 42 nodes and 59 connections
Total contributions: $59
Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 2 harmed.
Section 1 of the bill amends the Tariff Act of 1930 to allow for the sharing of nonpublic information about merchandise with online marketplaces and other similar platforms, which could increase regulatory burdens on big tech platforms like Amazon or Google (19 U.S.C. 1628a, subsection (a)(3))
Section 1 of the bill amends the Tariff Act of 1930 to allow for the sharing of nonpublic information about merchandise with online marketplaces and other similar platforms, which could increase regulatory burdens on ecommerce and retail tech companies (19 U.S.C. 1628a, subsection (a)(3))
The bill's focus on sharing information about suspected intellectual property rights violations could lead to increased demand for cybersecurity services to protect against counterfeiting and other IP-related threats (Section 1, generally)
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"S. 2677 aligns closely with Project 2025's focus on combating China's intellectual property theft and strengthening trade enforcement, particularly through enhanced information sharing to protect U.S. innovation and technologies. The bill directly supports the policy objective of using trade tools to counter unfair practices that threaten American IP, as emphasized in the cited White House and Commission reports."
— 819 — Trade 14. Adam Behsudi, “Duffy Finds 18 Co-sponsors for Bill to Increase Trump’s Tariff Powers,” Politico, January 24, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/24/duffy-finds-18-co-sponsors-for-bill-to-increase-trumps- trade-powers-2555509 (accessed February 26, 2023). 15. FTAs like NAFTA represent a carve-out from the WTO’s unconditional MFN rule and generally lead to tariffs that tend to be set at more reciprocal levels. 16. H.R.764, United States Reciprocal Trade Act, § 3(b)(1) and (b)(2). 17. Damian Paletta, “Speaker Ryan Admits Defeat, Giving up on Border Adjustment Tax,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/27/paul-ryan-admits-defeat-giving- up-on-border-adjustment-tax/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 18. This section draws on analyses in White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology- Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 19. Bloomberg News, “Xi’s Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets,” October 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill- through-markets?leadSource=uverify%20wall (accessed February 25, 2023). 20. Executive Office of the President, United States Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20 WTO%20Report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 21. White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World. 22. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020): An Outline, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, p. [55], https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/ Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 23. Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessments of the Challenge and United States Policy, February 2017, pp. 2, 11, and 12, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). 24. The laws, which have been put in place for national security purposes, have been promulgated under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 39, §§ 2751–2756, 2761–2781, 2785, and 2791–27999aa-2, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/chapter-39 (accessed February 25, 2023) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. Ch. 35, §§ 1701–1708, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ uscode/text/50/chapter-35 (accessed February 25, 2023). 25. Ministry of Education, People’s Republic of China, “Statistics on Studying in China in 2018,” http://www.moe. gov.cn/was5/web/search?searchword=Statistics+on+Studying+in+China+in+2018&channelid=254028&page=1 (accessed March 21, 2023). 26. Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), January 2018, https://admin.govexec. com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf (accessed February 25, 2023). The DIUx describes itself as “the only DOD Organization focused on accelerating the adoption of commercial and dual- use technology to solve operational challenges at speed and scale.” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, “About,” https://www.diu.mil/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 27. Brown and Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, Updated with 2016 and 2017 Data,” p. 18. 28. Ingrid Lunden, “Huawei Puts $1M into a New AI Research Partnership with UC Berkeley,” TechCrunch, October 11, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/11/huawei-puts-1m-into-a-new-ai-research-partnership-with- ucberkeley/ (accessed February 25, 2023). 29. Press release, “President Trump Announces Strong Actions to Address China’s Unfair Trade,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/ press-releases/2018/march/president-trump-announces-strong (accessed February 25, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"S. 2677 aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening intellectual property protections and combating infringement, particularly through enhanced enforcement mechanisms and interagency coordination. The bill's focus on empowering rights holders and improving CBP's ability to share information supports the policy goal of taking action against trademark infringers and counterfeiters."
— 685 — Department of Commerce l Establishing MBDA as a data and research clearinghouse for minority business enterprises and policymakers; l Coordinating amongst Cabinet agencies, state and local government, and trade associations to best leverage resources and encourage growth and innovation; and l Evaluating the harmful effects of unfair trade practices on minority-owned businesses and their employees. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office carries out a core constitutional man- date from Section 8, Article 1: “The Congress shall have Power...[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover- ies.” Strong intellectual property (IP) protections form the bedrock of American business and are a key factor in making the U.S. economy the most innovative in the world. As such, a conservative Administration must constantly work to strengthen IP rights and combat the incorrect view that strong IP rights some- how limit innovation. Political leadership in a new conservative Administration should: l Support like-minded countries as candidates for leadership in the World Intellectual Property Organization and build strong relationships with international partners to strengthen intellectual property rights. l Re-examine patent eligibility requirements in Section 101 of the Patent Act7 and support internal and/or legislative reforms to enable U.S. leadership in critical and emerging technologies such as quantum computing, 5G, and artificial intelligence. l Take a balanced approach to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and prioritize rapid and transparent processing of applications and appeals. l Work with Administration partners and Congress to find and punish trademark infringers and counterfeiters. l Oppose efforts to provide intellectual property waivers for cutting-edge technologies, including for COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics, through the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement or any other mechanism. — 686 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY The National Institute of Standards and Technology is charged with promoting U.S. innovation and competitiveness by “advancing measurement science, standards, and technology.”8 NIST carries out cutting edge research, helps industry establish standards and best practices, and is the nation’s foremost authority on measurements. NIST’s atomic clock, for instance, maintains the official time of the United States. An incoming Administration should evaluate the federal government’s civilian research footprint and consolidate those functions while ensuring that any research conducted with taxpayer dollars serves the national interest in a concrete way in line with conservative principles. Beyond this, an incoming Administration should: l Privatize the Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership. The Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) establishes and manages a network of centers focused on advising small- and medium-sized manufacturers in order to improve processes and thereby strengthen the U.S. industrial base. When Congress created the program, MEP centers were intended to transition to self-sustaining private institutions after using government funds to begin operations, but the prohibition on long-term funding was abolished in 1998. MEP’s business advisory services would be more properly carried out by the private sector. The next Administration should propose legislation to zero out this $150 million program and fully privatize existing MEP centers. l Transfer the Baldridge Performance Excellence Program. This program’s “process” assists companies in improving management and operations, a function more properly and effectively carried out by the private sector. This program operates at a cost to taxpayers, despite thousands of dollars in fees charged to each participating company or entity and long-term plans to make the program self-sufficient. Maintenance and operation of the program should be entirely handed over to the Baldridge Award Foundation to be run by non-government staff via fees. l Increase value to taxpayers. NIST should reinvigorate the Technology Transfer and ROI (return on investment) initiatives begun under the Trump Administration. These initiatives help speed the process of commercializing science funded by the federal government. l Reestablish U.S. dominance in international standards. NIST should explore ways to incentivize broader U.S. participation in standards-setting bodies and the exclusion of participants from adversaries like China. Standards are set to facilitate trade in countries that utilize those standards: Countries
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on expanding information sharing for intellectual property enforcement with private rights holders, which aligns thematically with Project 2025's emphasis on sharing defensive intelligence with private-sector partners to enhance security. However, the bill deals with IP and trade enforcement rather than cyber threat intelligence or national security intelligence sharing, resulting in moderate rather than strong alignment."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.