Sponsored by
Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]
ID: S001208
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3163, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 155-157 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
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Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant example of congressional genius, where our esteemed leaders attempt to cure the world's problems with a healthy dose of bureaucratic doublespeak and pork-barrel politics.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to create a joint program between the US Department of Defense and Taiwan to develop and deploy uncrewed systems (drones) and counter-uncrewed systems capabilities. Because, you know, what could possibly go wrong with arming a region already on high alert? The real purpose, of course, is to further entrench the military-industrial complex's grip on our foreign policy and line the pockets of defense contractors.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes the Secretary of Defense to engage in a joint program with Taiwan, which includes co-development and co-production of uncrewed systems. It also requires regular reports to Congress, because we all know how well that's worked out in the past (cough, Afghanistan, cough). The bill's language is deliberately vague, allowing for maximum flexibility in interpreting its provisions – a hallmark of effective legislation (sarcasm alert).
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: defense contractors, politicians with ties to the military-industrial complex, and Taiwanese officials eager to strengthen their relationship with the US. Oh, and let's not forget the poor souls who will be on the receiving end of these uncrewed systems – the civilians in Taiwan and China.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "diagnosing" a problem (China's growing military presence) with a treatment that will only exacerbate the symptoms. By escalating tensions in the region, we're playing into China's hands, allowing them to justify further militarization. Meanwhile, the US gets to sell more arms and maintain its grip on the global defense market – a win-win for everyone involved (except the civilians caught in the crossfire).
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative malpractice, where our elected officials prioritize special interests over sound policy and human lives. It's a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of money and power on our politics. So, let's all take a moment to applaud the sponsors of this bill for their outstanding work in further destabilizing an already volatile region. Bravo!
Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 60 nodes and 30 connections (84 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $127,700
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 1(a) requires the Secretary of Defense to engage with Taiwan officials in a joint program for fielding uncrewed and counter-uncrewed systems, including co-development and co-production, which would benefit defense contractors involved in such systems.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments.
— 122 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Direct that irregular warfare resources, capabilities, and strategies be incorporated directly into the overall National Defense Strategy instead of being relegated to a supporting document. 4. Establish an Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence to help DOD train, equip, and organize to conduct irregular warfare as a core competency across the spectrum of competition, crisis, and conflict. l Counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) globally. DOD, in conjunction with the Interagency, allies, and partner nations, must work proactively to counter China’s BRI around the globe. 1. Task USSOCOM and corresponding organizations in the Pentagon with conceptualizing, resourcing, and executing regionally based operations to counter the BRI with a focus on nations that are key to our energy policy, international supply chains, and our defense industrial base. 2. Use regional and global information operations to highlight Chinese violations of Exclusive Economic Zones, violations of human rights, and coercion along Chinese fault lines in Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in addition to China’s weaponization of sovereign debt. 3. Directly counter Chinese economic power with all elements of national power in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean to maintain maritime freedom of movement and protect the digital infrastructure of nations in the region. l Establish credible deterrence through irregular warfare to protect the homeland. A whole-of-government approach and willingness to employ cyber, information, economic, and counterterrorist irregular warfare capabilities should be utilized to protect the homeland. 1. Include the designation of USSOCOM as lead for the execution of irregular warfare against hostile state and nonstate actors in the National Defense Strategy. 2. Demonstrate a willingness to employ offensive cyber capabilities against adversaries who conduct cyberattacks against U.S. infrastructure, businesses, personnel, and governments. — 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
A bill to require the Secretary of the Army to submit to Congress a report on locations in which the Secretary could establish or expand Arctic training and exercises in order to test soldiers and equipment to meet requirements for operating in Arctic and cold weather conditions.
119/s/3203
No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2025
119/s/3167
A bill to provide for interagency tabletop exercises to assess the impacts of Department of Defense decisions during crises and evaluate United States Government tools available to augment Department of Defense capabilities in competition, crisis, and conflict, and for other purposes.
119/s/3160