Promoting Resilient Buildings Act

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/s/388
Last Updated: September 15, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

ID: C001056

Follow the money

The bill

Promoting Resilient Buildings Act

S. 388, 119th Congress — read as touching Construction & Engineering.

The sponsor

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$440,480 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 186-188 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 616.

September 14, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Summary of S. 388: Promoting Resilient Buildings Act**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of S. 388 is to strengthen federal disaster resilience by amending the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to promote the adoption and implementation of modern, hazard-resistant building codes—particularly through residential retrofits. The bill claims to reduce future disaster damage and federal spending by incentivizing homes to withstand floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and storms. In reality, it’s a bureaucratic band-aid on a hemorrhaging system: instead of addressing why we keep building cardboard shacks in floodplains and wildfire zones, it offers grants to retrofit them after the fact—like handing out fire extinguishers to arsonists while ignoring the gasoline cans stacked nearby.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** - **Section 2** tweaks definitions in the Stafford Act’s predisaster hazard mitigation section, clarifying that “latest published editions” of building codes means the two most recent consensus-based standards (e.g., IBC, IRC). Riveting. - **Section 3** deletes an obsolete paragraph (5) from the Hazard Mitigation Revolving Loan Fund Program and renumbers the rest—purely administrative housekeeping, likely to offset the cost of actually doing something useful elsewhere. - **Section 4** is the meat: it creates a **Residential Retrofit and Resilience Pilot Program** administered by FEMA. States and localities can apply for grants (funded by diverting up to 10% of annual Section 203 hazard mitigation money) to give directly to homeowners for retrofits like elevating structures, floodproofing, tornado safe rooms, seismic upgrades, wildfire mitigation, and wind-resistant roofing. Priority goes to those demonstrating financial need. The program runs until 2030, with a mandatory report due in ~2029 detailing outcomes, cost savings, and demographic data—because nothing says “accountability” like another report nobody will read.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Homeowners in disaster-prone areas** (coastal, wildfire, seismic zones): Potential beneficiaries of grants—assuming they can navigate the application maze and prove poverty. - **State/local governments**: Must apply, administer, and prioritize funds—adding another layer of grant-writing burden to already overstretched agencies. - **FEMA**: Tasked with setting up, monitoring, and reporting on the pilot—more work for an agency already overwhelmed by disaster response. - **Taxpayers**: Ultimately fund this via diverted disaster relief money, under the illusion that spending now saves later—though history suggests most funds will go to administrative overhead and politically connected contractors. - **Building code officials & standards organizations**: May see increased adoption of newer codes, but only where grants flow—meaning resilience becomes a lottery, not a standard.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** If implemented as intended, the program could reduce individual home vulnerability and long-term disaster costs—*in theory*. But the pilot’s limited scope (10% of existing funds, temporary, need-based) ensures it will remain a drop in the bucket compared to the scale of climate-driven risk. Real impact? Likely minimal. More probable outcomes: - Grants flow to politically savvy localities with grant-writing staff, not the most vulnerable. - Administrative costs eat up a significant chunk of the 10% allocation. - The 2030 sunset ensures no long-term commitment—because why fix something permanently when you can pilot it, report on it, and defund it before anyone notices it didn’t work? - Meanwhile, we continue subsidizing rebuilding in the same high-risk zones after every disaster, because true resilience would require zoning reform, insurance accountability, and telling developers “no”—none of which this bill touches.

In short: S. 388 is FEMA’s version of prescribing vitamins to a patient with multiple gunshot wounds. It’s well-intentioned, mildly useful at the margins, and utterly avoids the underlying pathology: our collective refusal to stop building stupidly in dangerous places. A pilot

Related Topics

Research & Innovation PolicyWater & Air Quality RegulationsHousing & Urban Development
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$440,480
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$440,433

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W
1 transaction
$100,000
2
MCINGVALE, JAMES F
1 transaction
$50,000
3
MCINGVALE, LINDA
1 transaction
$50,000
4
DUNN, TIMOTHY
1 transaction
$45,000
5
MIDDLETON, MAYES
2 transactions
$25,000
6
MARTIN, KIMBERLY R
1 transaction
$20,000
7
BLAINE, JAY C.
1 transaction
$16,478
8
THOMPSON, JERE W. MR. JR.
1 transaction
$13,200
9
MIDDLETON, MACEY
1 transaction
$12,500
10
BOLDRICK, MILES
1 transaction
$12,500
11
BOLDRICK, LAURIE
1 transaction
$12,500
12
MIDDLETON, MACY
1 transaction
$12,500
13
WHITEHILL, KIT
1 transaction
$10,755
14
CARROLL, TRACEY
1 transaction
$10,000
15
HUFFINES, PHILLIP
1 transaction
$10,000
16
ALBIN, ALAN S.
1 transaction
$10,000
17
AGRESTI, JOSEPH A
1 transaction
$10,000
18
ADAMSON, MARK
1 transaction
$10,000
19
WILKS, JO ANN
1 transaction
$10,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Fetterman, John [D-PA]

ID: F000479

Top Contributors

23

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$2,000
Feb 9, 2024
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Nov 29, 2023
3
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jun 18, 2024
4
SIMMS, RONALD
RONALD SIMMS REAL ESTATE • PRINCIPAL
IndividualBEVERLY HILLS, CA
$6,700
Jun 18, 2024
5
SIMMS, RONALD
IndividualBEVERLY HILLS, CA
$3,400
Aug 15, 2024
6
ADLERSTEIN, ARI
SELF EMPLOYED • FINANCIAL ADVISOR
IndividualMERION STATION, PA
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024
7
GOLDMAN, AMIR
SUSQUEHANNA INTERNATIONAL GROUP • VENTURE CAPITALIST
IndividualBALA CYNWYD, PA
$3,300
Oct 6, 2024
8
GOLDMAN, AMIR
SUSQUEHANNA INTERNATIONAL GROUP • VENTURE CAPITALIST
IndividualBALA CYNWYD, PA
$3,300
Oct 6, 2024
9
LEPRINO, TERRY
LEPRINO FOODS • OWNER
IndividualDENVER, CO
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024
10
MAYER, ABRAHAM
AFTON PROPERTIES • PRINCIPAL
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
Dec 12, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 32 nodes and 34 connections

Total contributions: $34

Top Donors - Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

1 Committee19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • Section 4 establishes a residential resilience pilot program to provide grants for residential retrofits, which would benefit the construction and engineering industry (SEC. 4. RESIDENTIAL RETROFIT AND RESILIENCE PILOT PROGRAM).

  • +Real Estateconfidence 0.70

    The bill promotes resilient buildings and provides assistance for residential retrofits, which could increase property values and benefit the real estate industry (SEC. 2. PROMOTING RESILIENT BUILDINGS).

  • The bill aims to reduce disaster impacts and Federal disaster payments, which could lead to lower insurance claims and benefit the insurance industry (SEC. 4. RESIDENTIAL RETROFIT AND RESILIENCE PILOT PROGRAM).

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Cornyn, John [R-TX])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 186-188AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on FEMA reform and resilience, particularly through improving pre-disaster mitigation and reducing long-term federal costs, though it does not address specific Project 2025 proposals like raising disaster declaration thresholds or shifting to private flood insurance."

Key themes:FEMA reformdisaster resiliencepre-disaster mitigationfederal cost reductionhazard mitigation

— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Weak
Vector: 69%
Pages: 548-550AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on disaster resilience and home retrofitting through FEMA-administered grants, while the Project 2025 HUD section emphasizes deregulation, eliminating DEI/ESG influences, reforming housing finance, and opposing Housing First policies—there is minimal thematic overlap."

Key themes:housing equityfederal assistance programsresidential stability

— 515 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 25. Process must prioritize where political leadership can implement administrative reforms through regulatory action and subregulatory guidance reforms. 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation’s housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. 27. These initiatives are maintained under such designations as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); critical race theory (CRT); black, indigenous, Pacific Islander, and other people of color (BIPOC); and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). 28. At a minimum, these efforts duplicate what the federal government already collects and assesses; at worst, they institute arbitrary procedures in real estate appraisal practices that undermine integrity and perversely introduce arbitrary biases into what should be an unbiased system for determining financial value. 29. Revise regulatory and subregulatory guidance, where applicable within statutory authorities, that adds unnecessary delay and costs to the construction and development of new housing and has been estimated to account for about 40 percent of new housing unit costs in multifamily housing. 30. The Biden Administration has issued a proposed rule to replace the Trump Administration’s “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice” rule that had repealed earlier rules expanding AFFH enforcement. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 153 (August 7, 2020), pp. 47899–47912, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-07/pdf/2020-16320.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 27 (February 9, 2023), pp. 8516–8590, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-17032.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 31. Certain pilot initiatives may encourage greater take-up of loan products designed for faster equity accumulation, including loans with shorter terms and accelerated amortization schedules. In concept, the FHA’s Home Equity Accelerator Loan (HEAL) and Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) pilot initiatives might lead to meaningful wealth generation for first-time buyers, but they should be available to all eligible households only when they do not arbitrarily discriminate based on race or other characteristics. 32. Housing supply does remain a problem in the U.S., but constructing more units at the low end of the market will not solve the problem. Investors and developers can deliver at more efficient cost new units that will allow for greater upward mobility of rental and ownership housing stock and better target increased construction of mid-tier rental units. Further, and more fundamental to the housing supply challenge in markets across the U.S., localities can consider revising land use, zoning, and building regulations that constrict new housing development, adding time delays and costs that impede construction. Federal housing policy should get out of the way where possible and minimize the distortive impact that stimulating greater demand through loose lending can have in driving up housing prices for households that are looking for affordable entry into the housing market. 33. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 91 (May 10, 2019), pp. 20589–20595, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-10/pdf/2019-09566.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 34. Reforms should contemplate rent payment flexibilities, allow escrow savings, and set maximum term limits that can reduce implicit penalties for increasing household incomes over eligibility terms for housing assistance and reweight waiting-list prioritization for two-parent households. 35. Some PHAs have been able to implement work requirements and term limit policies in various congressionally authorized demonstration programs, notably the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program established in 1996 for 39 PHAs (Congress has since authorized another 100 PHAs) in which participating MTW PHAs were given authority to implement rent reforms, work requirements and other experimental policies in rental assistance programs along with flexibilities in the use of capital and operating appropriations. 36. The FSS program has a general five-year term with a possible two-year extension, which could be applied at the term limit for overall benefits, and certain PHAs have imposed five-year to seven-year term limits. Families in these programs build escrow savings during their term eligibility that helps to facilitate successful transitions to family self-sufficiency and unassisted housing. — 516 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 37. HUD should implement administrative changes in regulation and guidance and seek statutory authority to end all Housing First directives of Continuum of Care (CoC) grantees and contract homelessness providers in addition to establishing restrictions on local Housing First policies where HUD grant funds are used. 38. The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) was established in the 1990s, and numerous Administrations have devoted enormous resources to the Housing First model, experimenting with various ways to provide federally financed rapid rehousing and permanent housing opportunities. Housing First is a far-left idea premised on the belief that homelessness is primarily circumstantial rather than behavioral. The Housing First answer to homelessness is to give someone a house instead of attempting to understand the underlying causes of homelessness. Federal intervention centered on Housing First has failed to acknowledge that resolving the issue of homelessness is often a matter of resolving mental health and substance abuse challenges. Instead of the permanent supportive housing proffered by Housing First, a conservative Administration should shift to transitional housing with a focus on addressing the underlying issues that cause homelessness in the first place. 39. The Senate Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers (LIFT) Act would address this policy goal. See S. 2797, Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers Act of 2021 (LIFT Homebuyers Act of 2021), 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s2797/BILLS-117s2797is.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 40. FHA did not facilitate the widespread use of 30-year mortgages until the 1950s when, interacting with Federal Reserve policies, federal agencies began broader adoption of the mortgages, which, despite lowering the monthly repayment terms, result in slow equity accumulation and wealth-building opportunities. 41. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 fundamentally revised the scope of federal regulation in the nation’s housing finance system, placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the purview of a newly established Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and establishing a Housing Trust Fund (HTF) that is administered in the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development. See H.R. 3221, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-289, 110th Congress, July 30, 2008, https://www.congress. gov/110/plaws/publ289/PLAW-110publ289.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 42. Guiding questions: What reforms should be proposed that could be accomplished within five years? What reforms can be done administratively, and what reforms would need legislative authorization? Are there functions that HUD administers that could be achieved more effectively at another department or agency? What big-picture reforms should be proposed that might take more than five years that would reorganize HUD and its programs to meet the objectives in the vision or mission? What would occur in the absence of these public finance subsidies? How much crowd-out do these subsidies create in the market? Would America be a seriously underhoused nation without these subsidies? Who are the policies intended to benefit? What organizational changes must be made? 43. The Faircloth Amendment (Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998) amended the Housing Act of 1937 to maintain public housing units at 1999 levels, preventing housing authorities from maintaining more public housing than they did then. H.R. 4194, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105-276, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ276/PLAW-105publ276.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). In recent years, the statutory restriction on new construction of public housing units has been circumvented through some narrow uses of preservation programs such as the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, initially authorized in 2012 and reauthorized several times since under higher program unit conversion caps. Congress also provided paths for renewal and continuation of a portion of existing public housing; project/site-based housing stock (refinancing with long-term HAP contract commitments); and Section 8 units through the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRA). H.R. 2158, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Public Law No. 105-65, 105th Congress, October 27, 1997, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ65/PLAW-105publ65.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 44. As the evolution of HUD rental assistance transitions away from the public housing model toward housing choice vouchers, there should be adequate landlord participation to ensure that the supply of housing units for rent in these programs meets the demand for rent among eligible tenants. This issue has been addressed in various ways, including by a task force instituted at the department during the Trump Administration, but could likely remain a challenge in the administration of the program.

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 545-547AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on disaster resilience through building code modernization and home retrofits, while the Project 2025 HUD section emphasizes financial management reform, devolving federal housing functions, and promoting private investment in public housing—there is minimal thematic overlap."

Key themes:housing policyfederal assistancestate/local administration

— 512 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise housing model. At best, any new public investments will provide maintenance funds to bring substandard housing units and properties up to livability standards but will still fail to address larger aims of upward mobility and dynamism for local housing markets where land can be sold by PHAs and put to greater economic use, thereby benefiting entire local economies through greater private investment, productivity and employment opportunities, and increased tax revenue. Any long-term view of HUD’s future must include maintaining the strong financial operations and reliable reporting that are needed to run a $50 billion- per-year agency. Before the Trump Administration, HUD effectively did not have a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for eight years, and HUD’s financial infrastructure inevitably deteriorated. The department’s auditors were unable to conclude that HUD’s internal operations were producing accurate financial reporting. The audi- tors had identified multiple material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the department’s internal financial controls. Overall, the deterioration of HUD’s financial infrastructure led to a lack of accountability with respect to the use of taxpayer funds as well as to pervasive difficulties with operations and program implementation. However, by hiring a new CFO from the private sector with a proven track record of visionary leadership, HUD was able to implement an agencywide governance structure that improved its financial processes and internal controls and harnessed the power of innovative new technologies to bring a modernized business mindset to the agency’s financial infrastructure. By the end of the Trump Administration, for the first time in nearly a decade, HUD was able to address all of its previously identified material weaknesses, and the auditors were able to issue their first clean audit report on HUD’s financial statements and internal controls. Finally, and more fundamentally, Congress could consider a wholesale overhaul of HUD that contemplates devolving many HUD functions to states and localities with any remaining federal functions consolidated to other federal agencies (for example, by transferring loan guarantee programs to SBA; moving Indian housing programs to the Department of the Interior; moving rental assistance, mortgage insurance programs, and GNMA to a redesignated Housing and Home Finance Agency). Generally, this reform path could consolidate some programs, elimi- nate others that have failed to produce meaningful long-run results, and narrow the scope of many programs so that they are closer to what they were when they were created. — 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills