GRID Power Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Hoeven, John [R-ND]
ID: H001061
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy. Hearings held.
April 14, 2026
Introduced
Committee Review
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The GRID Power Act, a bill so cleverly crafted that it's almost as if they're trying to make me roll my eyes out of their sockets.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to "reform" the interconnection queue process for prioritizing and approving certain projects, because, apparently, the current system is just too darn slow. The sponsors claim it will improve grid reliability and resource adequacy by allowing dispatchable power projects to jump the queue. How noble.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to initiate a rulemaking process within 90 days, which will:
1. Amend existing procedures for processing interconnection requests. 2. Allow transmission providers to submit proposals to prioritize new dispatchable power projects that improve grid reliability and resource adequacy. 3. Require regular reporting on the state of grid reliability and resilience.
Oh, and let's not forget the pièce de résistance: a 60-day review period for FERC to approve or deny these proposals. Because, clearly, the most pressing issue in energy policy is the lack of bureaucratic red tape.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. Transmission providers (i.e., utilities and grid operators). 2. Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations. 3. Dispatchable power project developers (read: fossil fuel interests).
And, of course, the American people, who will be treated to a healthy dose of regulatory capture and crony capitalism.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "solution in search of a problem." The real issue isn't the interconnection queue process; it's the fact that our energy policy is still beholden to fossil fuel interests. By prioritizing dispatchable power projects, this bill will likely:
1. Perpetuate our reliance on dirty energy sources. 2. Stifle innovation and investment in renewable energy technologies. 3. Increase costs for consumers and ratepayers.
But hey, who needs a sustainable future when you can have more of the same old fossil fuel-friendly policies?
In conclusion, the GRID Power Act is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak, designed to appease special interests while pretending to address pressing energy issues. It's a bill that will make you wonder if our lawmakers are genuinely clueless or simply corrupt. Either way, it's a lose-lose for the American people.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Hoeven, John [R-ND]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]
ID: Y000064
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]
ID: M001198
Top Contributors
10
Sen. Moreno, Bernie [R-OH]
ID: M001242
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Sen. Hoeven, John [R-ND]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 32 nodes and 33 connections
Total contributions: $100,160
Top Donors - Sen. Hoeven, John [R-ND]
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped,1 harmed.
- +Electric Utilities confidence 0.85
Section 3(a)(2)(A) allows transmission providers (including electric utilities) to submit proposals to prioritize dispatchable power projects, giving them influence over queue positioning and potential operational benefits.
- −Renewable Energy confidence 0.80
Section 3(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) prioritize dispatchable power projects in the interconnection queue, which disadvantages non-dispatchable renewable energy sources like solar and wind that cannot provide forecastable supply on demand.
- +Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure confidence 0.75
Section 3(a)(2)(A) and (b) enable transmission providers (including midstream operators and pipeline companies) to propose queue adjustments for dispatchable power, potentially accelerating infrastructure projects tied to grid reliability.
- +Nuclear Power confidence 0.70
Nuclear power qualifies as dispatchable power under Section 2(3) (capable of known and forecastable supply), so it would benefit from prioritization in the interconnection queue under Section 3(a)(2)(A).
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Hoeven, John [R-ND]) received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HELPS
- from 3contributions
- GRINDBERG, TONY$290
- NISBET, ALEX$270
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The GRID Power Act aligns with the Project 2025 policy by prioritizing grid reliability and resilience, which is a key objective of the policy. The bill's focus on streamlining the interconnection queue process for dispatchable power projects also supports the policy's goal of enhancing grid reliability."
— 380 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Budget EERE was funded at slightly more than $2.8 billion in FY 2021, and DOE requested slightly more than $4.0 billion for FY 2023.47 Congress needs to rescind the appropriated monies that EERE has not spent and begin fresh with new appropriations. GRID DEPLOYMENT OFFICE (GDO) Mission/Overview The Grid Deployment Office was established to implement parts of the Infra- structure Investment and Jobs Act. Pursuant to the IIJA, GDO administers funds appropriated by Congress to support transmission expansion and low/zero carbon resources. In addition, GDO is developing studies of the electric grid to address congestion, enhance reliability and resilience, and promote “clean” energy.48 Needed Reforms l End grid planning and focus instead on reliability. FERC and NERC have the primary responsibility for addressing reliability, states have the primary authority to site and permit transmission lines, and regional transmission organizations assist in planning regional transmission needs for parts of the country, but Congress granted some grid planning and siting authority to FERC and DOE through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and IIJA, as well as grid funding through the Inflation Reduction Act. Instead of focusing on grid expansion for the benefit of renewable resources or supporting low/carbon generation, GDO should be incorporated into the reformed Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, which would work to enhance the grid’s reliability and resilience. To the extent that they remain in effect, the funding programs that GDO oversees and administers should emphasize grid reliability, not renewables expansion. l Consider whether to defund the civil nuclear tax credit program and hydroelectric power efficiency and production incentives established in the IIJA and administered through GDO. If subsidies for renewable resources are not repealed, it may be necessary to continue subsidies for nuclear and hydro to ensure grid reliability. New Policies l Eliminate GDO and assign necessary activities to the reformed CESER. It appears that GDO’s current purpose is to promote the integration of low/zero carbon resources onto the grid by supporting subsidies for such resources and building new transmission facilities at — 381 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions a cost that poses a barrier to renewable generation expansion. However, some of the grants that it administers under the IIJA appear to be properly focused on enhancing the reliability and security of the electric grid. They should be reassigned to the reformed and expanded CESER. l End DOE/GDO’s role in grid planning for the benefit of renewable developers. Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and IIJA, DOE is to perform grid congestion studies and has authority to identify National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETC). Under the Biden Administration, GDO is working on a National Transmission Planning Study and is administering $2.5 billion to support “nationally significant transmission lines, increase resilience by connecting regions of the country, and improve access to cheaper clean energy sources.”49 l Defund most GDO programs. GDO oversees nearly $20 billion in new appropriations created by the IIJA, including a grid modernization grant program, the transmission facilitation program, and the civil nuclear credit program, among others. Congress should rescind any money not already spent. Budget Congress appropriated $10 million for GDO in FY 2021, and DOE has requested $90.2 million for FY 2023.50 OFFICE OF CLEAN ENERGY DEMONSTRATION (OCED) Mission/Overview The OCED was established in December 2021 to implement the IIJA. Its mis- sion is “[to] deliver clean energy demonstration projects at scale in partnership with the private sector to accelerate deployment, market adoption, and the equi- table transition to a decarbonized energy system.”51 Needed Reforms l End market distortions and stop shifting technology and development risks to taxpayers. The OCED is distorting energy markets and shifting the risk of new technology deployment from the private sector to taxpayers. The IIJA provided more than $20 billion in government subsidies to help the private sector deploy and market clean energy and decarbonizing resources. Government should not be picking winners and losers and should not be subsidizing the private sector to bring resources to market.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The GRID Power Act aligns with the Project 2025 policy by focusing on improving grid reliability and resilience, which is a key objective of the policy. However, the bill does not directly address the elimination of the Grid Deployment Office or the reform of subsidies for renewable resources, which are also important aspects of the policy."
— 380 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Budget EERE was funded at slightly more than $2.8 billion in FY 2021, and DOE requested slightly more than $4.0 billion for FY 2023.47 Congress needs to rescind the appropriated monies that EERE has not spent and begin fresh with new appropriations. GRID DEPLOYMENT OFFICE (GDO) Mission/Overview The Grid Deployment Office was established to implement parts of the Infra- structure Investment and Jobs Act. Pursuant to the IIJA, GDO administers funds appropriated by Congress to support transmission expansion and low/zero carbon resources. In addition, GDO is developing studies of the electric grid to address congestion, enhance reliability and resilience, and promote “clean” energy.48 Needed Reforms l End grid planning and focus instead on reliability. FERC and NERC have the primary responsibility for addressing reliability, states have the primary authority to site and permit transmission lines, and regional transmission organizations assist in planning regional transmission needs for parts of the country, but Congress granted some grid planning and siting authority to FERC and DOE through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and IIJA, as well as grid funding through the Inflation Reduction Act. Instead of focusing on grid expansion for the benefit of renewable resources or supporting low/carbon generation, GDO should be incorporated into the reformed Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, which would work to enhance the grid’s reliability and resilience. To the extent that they remain in effect, the funding programs that GDO oversees and administers should emphasize grid reliability, not renewables expansion. l Consider whether to defund the civil nuclear tax credit program and hydroelectric power efficiency and production incentives established in the IIJA and administered through GDO. If subsidies for renewable resources are not repealed, it may be necessary to continue subsidies for nuclear and hydro to ensure grid reliability. New Policies l Eliminate GDO and assign necessary activities to the reformed CESER. It appears that GDO’s current purpose is to promote the integration of low/zero carbon resources onto the grid by supporting subsidies for such resources and building new transmission facilities at
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The GRID Power Act aligns with Project 2025's policy objective of prioritizing grid reliability and ensuring that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued, although it does not directly address all aspects of the policy such as reexamining the premise of RTOs or creating dual energy markets. The bill's focus on reforming the interconnection queue process to prioritize dispatchable power projects shares significant overlap with Project 2025's goals."
— 404 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC. Even then, however, accountability is indirect through the tariffs (rules) that the RTOs adopt and FERC approves. In addition, unlike utilities, generators in an RTO have no obligation to serve customers. New Policies FERC must make reliability of the grid and service to end use top priorities. To do so, it should: l Reexamine the premise of RTOs. RTOs no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people. Marginal price auctions for energy are not ensuring the reliability of the grid and are not passing the full economic benefits of subsidized renewables on to customers. FERC needs to reexamine the RTOs under its jurisdiction to make sure that they procure reliable and affordable electricity for the benefit of the American people. l Ensure that RTOs return to market fundamentals so that they serve customers, not special interests and political causes. FERC should require RTOs to ensure that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued to provide electricity when needed for the benefit of customers. Potential reforms could include: 1. Requiring renewable generators to provide intra-day backup by dispatchable on-demand generation so that bids by intermittent resources into RTOs equate fairly with far more valuable on-demand dispatchable resources; 2. Creating dual energy markets for dispatchable and nondispatchable resources; or 3. Eliminating capacity markets where intermittent resources participate and instead establishing “reliability” markets where dispatchable on-demand resources participate. Alternatives to marginal price auctions also should be considered. l Direct the RTOs to ensure that the economic benefits of renewables (like tax credits and no fuel costs) are passed on to customers. — 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.