DFC Modernization Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5299

Last Updated: December 17, 2025

DFC Modernization Act of 2025

HR. 5299, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.

The sponsor

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$98,736 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Agency for International Development" section, p. 288-290 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 28 - 23.

September 17, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: HR 5299 - DFC Modernization Act of 2025**

As a visionary entrepreneur and investor, I'll cut through the bureaucratic jargon and distill this bill's essence into its core implications for wealth creation and power dynamics.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The DFC Modernization Act aims to reauthorize and modify the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018. Its primary objectives are to:

1. Increase risk tolerance in investments, mobilizing private capital for development projects. 2. Counter strategic competitors' influence by supporting diversified private sector options. 3. Advance U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic development goals.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

* The bill expands the definition of "high-income country" and introduces a new term, "country of concern," which includes nations like China, Russia, and Venezuela. * It allows for more frequent use of risk-mitigation tools, such as equity, hybrid securities, and partial guarantees. * The bill encourages lending, investing, or offering insurance in high-risk countries, regions, or sectors to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

* Private sector investors and companies involved in development projects * Strategic competitors (e.g., China, Russia) * Countries of concern (listed above) * Allied and partner countries seeking energy security and diversified private sector options

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has significant implications for my business interests and the global economic landscape:

1. **Increased investment opportunities:** By expanding risk tolerance and introducing new financial tools, this bill can unlock billions of dollars in private capital for development projects. 2. **Consolidation of power:** The U.S. government's increased focus on countering strategic competitors will likely lead to a more bipolar world order, with the U.S. and its allies seeking to consolidate their influence. 3. **Regulatory arbitrage:** The bill's emphasis on market-based private sector development may create opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, allowing companies like mine to navigate complex regulatory environments and capitalize on emerging markets.

In conclusion, HR 5299 is a strategic move by the U.S. government to assert its economic and geopolitical influence. As a visionary entrepreneur, I see this bill as a catalyst for growth, innovation, and wealth creation – but only for those who are willing to adapt and thrive in this new landscape.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$98,736

20 donors

PACs

$6,850

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$91,886

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE PAC

2 transactions

$5,850

WINRED

1 transaction

$1,000

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

LEVY, EDWARD JR.

2 transactions

$13,200

HART, NANCY MRS.

1 transaction

$6,600

LIPSCHULTZ, MARC MR.

1 transaction

$6,600

TAYLOR, MARGARETTA MISS

1 transaction

$6,600

BLAVATNIK, LEONARD

2 transactions

$6,600

PIKE, ROBERT

1 transaction

$6,534

BAKER, MAXINE

1 transaction

$5,352

YOUNKER, MARLIN E.

1 transaction

$5,000

DAVIS, GLEEANN

1 transaction

$5,000

HILLMAN, TATNALL L. CAPT. RET.

1 transaction

$4,000

WEITMAN, AARON

1 transaction

$3,300

OBERHELMAN, DIANE A. MS.

1 transaction

$3,300

DEZERTZOV, MICHAEL MR.

1 transaction

$3,300

FAITH, KEVIN MR.

1 transaction

$3,300

GEHLSEN, KURT R. MR. M.D. PH.D

1 transaction

$3,300

GILMARTIN, GLADYS H. MS.

1 transaction

$3,300

LYND, MICHEAL J.

1 transaction

$3,300

MALONE, JOHN C.

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 39 nodes and 23 connections (42 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $98,736

Top Donors - Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

2 PACs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 10 helped.

+Pipelines & Energy Infrastructureconfidence 0.85
Section 2(b)(5) encourages US investment in energy infrastructure in allied countries, and Section 2(b)(4) promotes energy security via diversification, directly aiding energy infrastructure firms.
+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Section 2(b)(2) states policy to counter strategic competitor inroads in key sectors such as infrastructure, critical minerals, and supply chains, which benefits defense contractors involved in those areas.
+Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80
Section 2(b)(5) includes telecommunications in infrastructure projects to be supported, and Section 2(b)(6) facilitates export of US telecommunications technology.
+Construction & Engineeringconfidence 0.80
Section 2(b)(5) supports infrastructure projects in allied countries, which directly benefits construction and engineering firms.
+Private Equity & Hedge Fundsconfidence 0.75
Title III expands equity investment authorities (Sections 301-302), increasing the equity limit from 30% to 49% and creating an Equity Investments Account, which benefits private equity firms able to participate in DFC-backed deals.
+Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.70
Section 2(b)(6) facilitates export of US technology to global markets, which includes big tech platforms' services and cloud offerings.

+ 4 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Mast, Brian J. [R-FL-21])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Private Equity & Hedge Funds$3,300
from 1 contribution
- RAETHER, PAUL E. MR.$3,300
Agribusiness$1,000
from 1 contribution
- CARGILL, BARBARA MS.$1,000
Construction & Engineering$510
from 3 contributions
- ZIMMERLE, JEROME$510
Defense Contractors$200
from 1 contribution
- WAKELIN, JANIS MS.$200

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Agency for International Development

Strong

Vector: 66%

Pages: 288-290AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The DFC Modernization Act shares the Project 2025 focus on countering China's development influence, advancing U.S. national security and foreign policy goals through development finance, and promoting energy security in partner countries, though it does not directly implement the USAID Administrator/DFA role change."

Key themes:countering Chinastrategic competitionenergy securityforeign assistance coordinationprivate sector mobilization

— 255 — Agency for International Development The USAID Administrator should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) with the rank of Deputy Secretary at the Department of State in charge of all U.S. foreign assistance. The DFA role would empower this person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance programs across the U.S. government and carry out the agenda of the next con- servative President more effectively. A version of this role existed during the last two years of the George W. Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration eliminated it in 2009. Countering China’s Development Challenge. Through its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective of displacing the United States as the premier global power. The PRC leverages its transactions—termed “debt traps” by many critics—to strengthen its global influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. In Latin America, 25 of 29 countries participate in the BRI, and the PRC ranks as the region’s largest trading partner. Since 2005, Chinese state-owned banks have issued $138 billion in loans to Latin American countries, and other Chinese entities have invested an additional $140 billion. In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global energy development. The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of all BRI loans are in financial distress, leading many countries to seek emergency financial help from Western donors. Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial deci- sions by governments, advancing China’s geostrategic interests, and creating an unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. For example, Brazil, a world leader in shoe production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap Chinese imports. China’s mercantilist penetration of the developing world and the negative consequences for developing countries’ healthy economic growth have undercut U.S. strategic relationships in those countries and wasted billions in U.S. foreign aid. During the Trump Administration, USAID: l Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3 that contrasted America’s development approach based on liberty, sovereignty, and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political subordination to Beijing. — 256 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Launched its first Digital Strategy4 to promote safe 5G access in emerging markets and combat Beijing’s efforts to equip regimes with tools to stifle democracy. l Struck bilateral development relationships with Japan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan to support projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. l Established an office in Greenland to help counter China’s claims of being “a near Arctic state” and reoriented its programming across Asia—including establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia—in line with America’s Indo- Pacific strategy.5 l Joined with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to help coastal countries detect and halt illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and confront criminal activities practiced by state-run Chinese fishing fleets that violate international norms, ravage fishing industries in developing countries, worsen food insecurity, rob vulnerable communities of their livelihoods, and deplete maritime resources. USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations. An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and USAID–U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Working Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China lens. A senior executive–level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Adminis- trator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat. The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’s counter-China architecture to waste away, subordinating our national security interests to progressive climate politics in which Communist China is viewed as a global partner. The next conservative Administration should restore and build on the Trump Administration’s counter-China infrastructure at USAID, end the climate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of U.S. national security interests, rewarding those countries that resist China’s debt diplomacy. It should finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to any partner that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly. USAID’s Bangkok-based Regional Development Mission for Asia should focus its strategic attention on supporting cross-border initiatives designed to counter Chinese influence.

Agency for International Development

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 303-305AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on enhancing DFC's role in countering strategic competitors like China and Russia, promoting energy security, and focusing on development that advances U.S. foreign policy and national security goals—while de-emphasizing climate and diversity programs. Both prioritize DFC as a tool for geopolitical influence and private sector mobilization in high-risk environments."

Key themes:countering strategic competitorsenergy securityDFC risk toleranceprivate sector mobilizationforeign policy alignment

— 270 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As development agencies, USAID and DFC must do a better job of aligning their respective activities and closely integrate both structurally and operation- ally. The easiest way to foster this alignment is to “dual hat” the role of DFC’s chief development officer so that he or she serves simultaneously in both institu- tions. Like all U.S. federal bodies, DFC should be restored to its original intent of deploying its commercial risk-reducing financial services instead of its current misuse as another global vehicle to promote economy-killing climate programs, meet irrelevant diversity objectives, and overfocus on low-impact or misguided gender-based activities. Branding. A deeply embedded culture within the foreign aid bureaucracy views public recognition of U.S. assistance as secondary to a larger philanthropic mission and is embarrassed by the American flag. Citing vaguely defined secu- rity concerns, USAID’s implementers—U.N. agencies, international NGOs, and contractors—often fail to credit the American people for the billions of dollars in assistance they provide the rest of the world even as they engage in self-promoting public relations to raise other donor funds. This approach has negative foreign policy implications as China relentlessly promotes its own self-serving efforts to gain influence and resources. Worst of all, malign actors sometimes appropriate credit for unbranded U.S. assistance: Houthi terrorists, for example, claim to pro- vide for the people under their occupation with anonymous U.S. humanitarian aid. The United States is in a struggle for influence with China, Russia, and other competitors, and American generosity must not go unacknowledged. The next conservative Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s brand- ing policy, which revamped ADS Chapter 320, to force the aid bureaucracy to fully credit the American people for the aid they are providing. The Senior Advisor for Brand Management in the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) (dis- cussed infra) should be a political appointee who is responsible for maximizing the visibility of U.S. assistance by enforcing branding policy on every grant, coopera- tive agreement, and contract. The LPA should liaise with counterparts at the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to ensure local media pickup of these activities. OTHER OFFICES AND BUREAUS Office of Administrator. The next conservative Administration should leave in place the current structure of two presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Deputy Administrators, one for Policy and one for Management. The Deputy Administrators and the Chief of Staff must be individuals with extensive previous service in the executive branch, ideally at foreign-affairs agencies, and be fluent in the language and practice of federal procurement. Bureau for Foreign Assistance. As noted above, the next conservative Administration should name the USAID Administrator as Director of Foreign Assistance (F) at the Department of State with the rank of Deputy Secretary. It — 271 — Agency for International Development should reorient the bulk of F staff from focusing on the formulation of the annual President’s budget proposal to the execution of already appropriated resources. This should include eliminating the duplicative Mission and Bureau Resource Requests; speeding up the availability of appropriations by delivering to Congress within 60 days the report required by Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA); and fast-tracking the approval of Congressional Notifications (CNs) and other pre-obligation requirements. Management Bureau. As indicated previously, the next conservative Admin- istration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Senior Procurement Executive and Director of the agency’s Office of Acquisition and Assistance (M/ OAA). Political appointees with the appropriate credentials (including warrants) should be placed within M/OAA, and the agency should exercise its authority to engage qualified experts from other federal departments and agencies and outside of government (if they are free of conflicts of interest) on the Technical Commit- tees that review applications for USAID’s contract and grant competitions. The Administration should change the designation of USAID’s Competition Advocate to an individual favorable to innovative types of contracts that can reduce the aid oligopoly’s grip on the agency. Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. As soon as possible after Inauguration Day, the next conservative Administration should name a political appointee as USAID’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) and Director of the Office of Human Capital and Talent Management. USAID’s White House Liaison must be an individual with substantial experience with federal personnel sys- tems. The White House Office of Presidential Personnel should allow the USAID Administrator to explore with counterparts at the Office of Personnel Management whether the agency could hire personnel under both the Administratively Deter- mined authority and Schedule C of the Excepted Service of the Federal Civil Service. USAID should be one of the agencies to pilot-test a reinstated Executive Order 13957,16 which created a Schedule F within the Excepted Service, and should aggres- sively recruit and place candidates into term-limited positions under Schedule A of the Excepted Service (especially veterans). The new CHCO should examine how the existing members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) at USAID should be reworked throughout the agency and should institute an SES Mobility Program to encourage the regular rotation of senior career leaders, including through details to other departments and agencies. Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The next conservative Admin- istration should shift the policy functions of the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) to the Office of Budget and Resource Management (BRM), located in the Office of the Administrator. It should rename BRM the Office of Budget, Policy, and Resource Management (BPRM) and staff the policy team with political appointees. The Administration should also move the responsibility for reviewing

Department of Defense

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The DFC Modernization Act of 2025 aligns with Project 2025's defense and national security objectives by aiming to counter strategic competitors like China and Russia through economic statecraft, enhancing energy security, and promoting allied resilience—though it focuses on development finance rather than direct defense modernization or nuclear deterrence."

Key themes:countering strategic competitorsenergy securityallied burden-sharingnational securityeconomic statecraft

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be — 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

Department of the Treasury

Moderate

Vector: 65%

Pages: 736-738AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The DFC Modernization Act shares Project 2025's focus on countering strategic competitor influence (especially China/Russia) and advancing U.S. national and economic security through overseas investment, but it does not address the Treasury‑centric CFIUS reforms, financial warfare school, or domestic regulatory changes emphasized in the Project 2025 Treasury section."

Key themes:countering strategic competitorsnational securityeconomic securityenergy securityforeign investment oversight

— 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis. — 705 — Department of the Treasury Treasury must also seriously evaluate U.S. foreign direct investment in China. Particular focus should be paid to investments in CCP or other state-owned enter- prises, investments that result in technology transfers from the U.S. to China, investments that enhance China’s military capacity, and investments that pose risks to critical U.S. supply chains by sourcing critical components or feedstocks in China. An enhanced reporting system is warranted, and greater legal authority and restrictions are appropriate. IMPROVED FINANCIAL REGULATION One of the priorities of the incoming Administration should be to restructure the outdated and cumbersome financial regulatory system in order to promote financial innovation, improve regulator efficiency, reduce regulatory costs, close regulatory gaps, eliminate regulatory arbitrage, provide clear statutory authority, consolidate regulatory agencies or reduce the size of government, and increase transparency. Merging Functions. The new Administration should establish a more stream- lined bank and supervision by supporting legislation to merge the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Reserve’s non-monetary supervisory and regulatory functions. U.S. banking law remains stuck in the 1930s regarding which functions finan- cial companies should perform. It was never a good idea either to restrict banks to taking deposits and making loans or to prevent investment banks from taking deposits. Doing so makes markets less stable. All financial intermediaries function by pooling the financial resources of those who want to save and funneling them to others that are willing and able to pay for additional funds. This underlying principle should guide U.S. financial laws. Policymakers should create new charters for financial firms that eliminate activ- ity restrictions and reduce regulations in return for straightforward higher equity or risk-retention standards. Ultimately, these charters would replace government regulation with competition and market discipline, thereby lowering the risk of future financial crises and improving the ability of individuals to create wealth. Dodd–Frank Revisions. Congress should repeal Title I, Title II, and Title VIII of the Dodd–Frank Act.52 Title I of Dodd–Frank created the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a kind of super-regulator tasked with identifying so-called systemically important financial institutions and singling them out for especially stringent regulation. The problem, of course, is that this process effectively iden- tifies those firms regulators believe are “too big to fail.”53 Title VIII of Dodd–Frank gives the FSOC similarly broad special-designation authority for specialized financial companies known as financial market utilities.54 Title II of Dodd–Frank established the controversial provision known as orderly

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Minimal

Vector: 66%

Pages: 548-550AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The DFC Modernization Act of 2025 focuses on international development finance, energy security, and countering strategic competitors like China and Russia through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. The Project 2025 HUD section addresses domestic housing policy, including opposition to ESG/DEI/CRT in housing, reducing regulatory barriers to construction, and reforming homelessness and rental assistance programs. There is no substantive overlap in subject matter, geographic s"

— 515 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 25. Process must prioritize where political leadership can implement administrative reforms through regulatory action and subregulatory guidance reforms. 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation’s housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. 27. These initiatives are maintained under such designations as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); critical race theory (CRT); black, indigenous, Pacific Islander, and other people of color (BIPOC); and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). 28. At a minimum, these efforts duplicate what the federal government already collects and assesses; at worst, they institute arbitrary procedures in real estate appraisal practices that undermine integrity and perversely introduce arbitrary biases into what should be an unbiased system for determining financial value. 29. Revise regulatory and subregulatory guidance, where applicable within statutory authorities, that adds unnecessary delay and costs to the construction and development of new housing and has been estimated to account for about 40 percent of new housing unit costs in multifamily housing. 30. The Biden Administration has issued a proposed rule to replace the Trump Administration’s “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice” rule that had repealed earlier rules expanding AFFH enforcement. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 153 (August 7, 2020), pp. 47899–47912, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-07/pdf/2020-16320.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 27 (February 9, 2023), pp. 8516–8590, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-17032.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 31. Certain pilot initiatives may encourage greater take-up of loan products designed for faster equity accumulation, including loans with shorter terms and accelerated amortization schedules. In concept, the FHA’s Home Equity Accelerator Loan (HEAL) and Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) pilot initiatives might lead to meaningful wealth generation for first-time buyers, but they should be available to all eligible households only when they do not arbitrarily discriminate based on race or other characteristics. 32. Housing supply does remain a problem in the U.S., but constructing more units at the low end of the market will not solve the problem. Investors and developers can deliver at more efficient cost new units that will allow for greater upward mobility of rental and ownership housing stock and better target increased construction of mid-tier rental units. Further, and more fundamental to the housing supply challenge in markets across the U.S., localities can consider revising land use, zoning, and building regulations that constrict new housing development, adding time delays and costs that impede construction. Federal housing policy should get out of the way where possible and minimize the distortive impact that stimulating greater demand through loose lending can have in driving up housing prices for households that are looking for affordable entry into the housing market. 33. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 91 (May 10, 2019), pp. 20589–20595, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-10/pdf/2019-09566.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 34. Reforms should contemplate rent payment flexibilities, allow escrow savings, and set maximum term limits that can reduce implicit penalties for increasing household incomes over eligibility terms for housing assistance and reweight waiting-list prioritization for two-parent households. 35. Some PHAs have been able to implement work requirements and term limit policies in various congressionally authorized demonstration programs, notably the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program established in 1996 for 39 PHAs (Congress has since authorized another 100 PHAs) in which participating MTW PHAs were given authority to implement rent reforms, work requirements and other experimental policies in rental assistance programs along with flexibilities in the use of capital and operating appropriations. 36. The FSS program has a general five-year term with a possible two-year extension, which could be applied at the term limit for overall benefits, and certain PHAs have imposed five-year to seven-year term limits. Families in these programs build escrow savings during their term eligibility that helps to facilitate successful transitions to family self-sufficiency and unassisted housing. — 516 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 37. HUD should implement administrative changes in regulation and guidance and seek statutory authority to end all Housing First directives of Continuum of Care (CoC) grantees and contract homelessness providers in addition to establishing restrictions on local Housing First policies where HUD grant funds are used. 38. The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH) was established in the 1990s, and numerous Administrations have devoted enormous resources to the Housing First model, experimenting with various ways to provide federally financed rapid rehousing and permanent housing opportunities. Housing First is a far-left idea premised on the belief that homelessness is primarily circumstantial rather than behavioral. The Housing First answer to homelessness is to give someone a house instead of attempting to understand the underlying causes of homelessness. Federal intervention centered on Housing First has failed to acknowledge that resolving the issue of homelessness is often a matter of resolving mental health and substance abuse challenges. Instead of the permanent supportive housing proffered by Housing First, a conservative Administration should shift to transitional housing with a focus on addressing the underlying issues that cause homelessness in the first place. 39. The Senate Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers (LIFT) Act would address this policy goal. See S. 2797, Low-Income First-Time Homebuyers Act of 2021 (LIFT Homebuyers Act of 2021), 117th Congress, introduced September 22, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s2797/BILLS-117s2797is.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 40. FHA did not facilitate the widespread use of 30-year mortgages until the 1950s when, interacting with Federal Reserve policies, federal agencies began broader adoption of the mortgages, which, despite lowering the monthly repayment terms, result in slow equity accumulation and wealth-building opportunities. 41. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 fundamentally revised the scope of federal regulation in the nation’s housing finance system, placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the purview of a newly established Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and establishing a Housing Trust Fund (HTF) that is administered in the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development. See H.R. 3221, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-289, 110th Congress, July 30, 2008, https://www.congress. gov/110/plaws/publ289/PLAW-110publ289.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 42. Guiding questions: What reforms should be proposed that could be accomplished within five years? What reforms can be done administratively, and what reforms would need legislative authorization? Are there functions that HUD administers that could be achieved more effectively at another department or agency? What big-picture reforms should be proposed that might take more than five years that would reorganize HUD and its programs to meet the objectives in the vision or mission? What would occur in the absence of these public finance subsidies? How much crowd-out do these subsidies create in the market? Would America be a seriously underhoused nation without these subsidies? Who are the policies intended to benefit? What organizational changes must be made? 43. The Faircloth Amendment (Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998) amended the Housing Act of 1937 to maintain public housing units at 1999 levels, preventing housing authorities from maintaining more public housing than they did then. H.R. 4194, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105-276, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ276/PLAW-105publ276.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). In recent years, the statutory restriction on new construction of public housing units has been circumvented through some narrow uses of preservation programs such as the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, initially authorized in 2012 and reauthorized several times since under higher program unit conversion caps. Congress also provided paths for renewal and continuation of a portion of existing public housing; project/site-based housing stock (refinancing with long-term HAP contract commitments); and Section 8 units through the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRA). H.R. 2158, Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Public Law No. 105-65, 105th Congress, October 27, 1997, Title V, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ65/PLAW-105publ65.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 44. As the evolution of HUD rental assistance transitions away from the public housing model toward housing choice vouchers, there should be adequate landlord participation to ensure that the supply of housing units for rent in these programs meets the demand for rent among eligible tenants. This issue has been addressed in various ways, including by a task force instituted at the department during the Trump Administration, but could likely remain a challenge in the administration of the program.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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