CLEAR Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/3153

Last Updated: November 12, 2025

CLEAR Act of 2025

S. 3153, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.

The sponsor

Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

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Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The CLEAR Act of 2025. A bill that, on the surface, appears to be a mundane exercise in bureaucratic housekeeping. But, as is often the case with legislation, the devil lies in the details.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**

The primary objective of this bill is to expand the list of Chinese military companies operating in the United States by incorporating entities from other government-maintained lists. This is a thinly veiled attempt to further restrict Chinese investment and influence in the US market.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**

The bill amends Section 1260H(b)(3) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, requiring the Secretary to review entities on other lists maintained by the US Government and include them in the annual revision of the list of Chinese military companies. This change effectively broadens the scope of scrutiny and potential restrictions on Chinese entities.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**

The affected parties are primarily Chinese companies operating in the US, as well as American businesses with significant investments or partnerships with these entities. However, I must emphasize that this bill's true impact will be felt by those who matter most: investors like myself, who have a vested interest in maintaining a favorable business environment.

**Potential Impact & Implications**

From my perspective, this bill represents a potential threat to the free flow of capital and innovation. By expanding the list of restricted entities, the US Government is effectively creating a chilling effect on investment and collaboration between American and Chinese companies. This will only serve to stifle competition and hinder growth in key sectors.

As a visionary entrepreneur and investor, I must consider the long-term implications of such legislation. The CLEAR Act of 2025 may seem like a minor tweak to existing law, but it has the potential to disrupt the delicate balance of global economic power. Mark my words: this bill will only serve to accelerate the decline of American competitiveness in the face of rising Chinese dominance.

In conclusion, I must emphasize that this bill is a prime example of the inefficiencies inherent in democratic governance. The CLEAR Act of 2025 is a shortsighted attempt to address perceived national security concerns, without considering the broader implications for economic growth and innovation. As a thought leader in my field, I will continue to advocate for policies that prioritize deregulation, privatization, and the unfettered pursuit of profit.

Projected impact on my portfolio: -$500 million (conservative estimate)

Recommendation: Oppose the CLEAR Act of 2025 and instead focus on promoting legislation that fosters a more favorable business environment, such as the "Innovation and Competitiveness Act" proposed by my think tank, the "Liberty Initiative."

💰 Campaign Finance Network

No campaign finance data available for Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 3 harmed.

−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80
Section 2 amends the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 to include Chinese entities on other lists maintained by the US Government, potentially affecting big tech platforms with ties to China.
−AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.70
The review of entities on other lists (Section 2) may impact AI and cloud infrastructure companies with Chinese affiliations or activities raising concerns.
−Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.60
The inclusion of Chinese entities on the list due to restrictions or scrutiny (Section 2) could affect semiconductor and hardware companies with supply chains or partnerships in China.
+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.50
The CLEAR Act's focus on reviewing Chinese entities for potential security risks (Section 2) might benefit cybersecurity firms offering services to mitigate these threats.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Semiconductors & Hardware$20
from 1 contribution
- LEE, EDWARD$20

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Moderate

Vector: 70%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the CLEAR Act and the Project 2025 Commerce section aim to tighten oversight of Chinese entities linked to military or strategic concerns, improve the accuracy and coordination of government lists, and address civil‑military fusion risks. However, the bill focuses on DOD’s list alignment while the Project 2025 policy centers on Commerce’s export‑control reforms, resulting in thematic but not direct implementation overlap."

Key themes:Chinese entitiesExport controls / list alignmentNational securityCivil‑military fusionInteragency coordination

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

Moderate

Vector: 64%

Pages: 642-644AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the CLEAR Act and the Project 2025 policy aim to limit U.S. exposure to Chinese entities deemed risky, though the bill focuses on defense‑department listing while the policy targets pension and investment prohibitions. This creates a moderate thematic overlap in seeking to restrict Chinese investments and enhance oversight."

Key themes:China investment restrictionsnational security oversightentity listing and trackingfinancial exposure mitigation

Department of Commerce

Moderate

Vector: 64%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the CLEAR Act and the Project 2025 Commerce section aim to strengthen U.S. national security regarding China by improving government processes for identifying and restricting Chinese entities, though the bill focuses on entity listing while the policy emphasizes export control modernization and licensing procedures."

Key themes:China focusnational securityexport controlsentity listingregulatory scrutiny

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Federal Communications Commission

Moderate

Vector: 64%

Pages: 885-887AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the CLEAR Act and the Project 2025 FCC policy seek to increase transparency and mitigate national security risks posed by Chinese entities through the creation or alignment of restricted‑entity lists, though the bill focuses on Defense Department listings while the FCC policy targets FCC‑authorized entities with foreign adversarial ownership."

Key themes:foreign adversary transparencyChinese military companiesnational security risk mitigationlist compilation and alignmentregulatory scrutiny of Chinese entities

— 852 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Publish a foreign adversary transparency list. As part of the FCC’s ongoing work to secure our networks from entities that would do the bidding of our foreign adversaries, the FCC should do more to shine the light of transparency on the scope of the problem. To this end, the FCC should compile and publish a list of all entities that hold FCC authorizations, licenses, or other grants of authority with more than 10 percent ownership by foreign adversarial governments, including the governments of China, Russia, Iran, Syria, or North Korea. A bipartisan bill that would require the FCC to publish this type of list has been introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Elise Stefanik (R–NY), Ro Khanna (D– CA), and Mike Gallagher (R–WI).24 l Fully fund the federal “rip and replace” program. In 2019, Congress established a $1.9 billion Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (known colloquially as the “rip and replace” program) to reimburse communications providers for the reasonable expenses they would incur to remove, replace, and dispose of insecure Huawei and ZTE gear. However, $1.9 billion is about $3 billion short of the total amount of funding needed to complete the rip and replace process. A new Administration should ensure that the program is fully funded and should look first at repurposing and applying unused COVID-era emergency funds for this purpose. l Launch a Clean Standards Initiative. During the Trump Administration, the U.S. government launched a worldwide Clean Networks program.25 As a result of this initiative, many of the U.S. government’s allies started the process of ending their relationships with Huawei. It is time for an Administration to build and expand on this groundbreaking work by taking a similar approach to the standard-setting process. Right now, the CCP is seeking to extend its influence by exerting control over the development of standards in a variety of areas, including technology and telecommunications. It is vital that the United States meet this threat with a comprehensive clean standards initiative. l Stop aiding the CCP’s authoritarian approach to artificial intelligence. The CCP has set itself a goal of becoming the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. Beijing is bent on using this technology to exert authoritarian control domestically and export its authoritarian governance model overseas. U.S. businesses are aiding Beijing in this effort— often unwittingly—by feeding, training, and improving the AI datasets of companies that are beholden to the CCP. One way that U.S. companies — 853 — Federal Communications Commission are doing this is by giving Beijing access to their high-powered cloud computing services. Therefore, it is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to China’s malign AI goals. Unleashing Economic Prosperity. The FCC needs to advance a pro-growth agenda that gives every American a fair shot at next-generation connectivity. This is vital for economic opportunity and prosperous communities. The current Administration has appropriated a lot of money for broadband infrastructure proj- ects, but it has failed to pair that spending with reforms that free more airwaves for wireless connectivity or streamline the permitting processes for broadband builds. That failure is holding back America’s hardworking telecommunications crews and leaving Americans stuck waiting on the wrong side of the digital divide. It is time for a return to the successful spectrum and infrastructure policies that prevailed during the Trump Administration—policies that enabled the U.S. to lead the world in 5G. l Refill America’s spectrum pipeline. From 2017 through 2020, the FCC took unprecedented steps to free the airwaves needed to power 5G and other next-generation wireless services. This work not only helped to secure America’s wireless leadership and bolster competition, but also enabled the private sector to create jobs and grow the economy. Recently, the FCC has failed to match the pace and cadence of those spectrum actions. Therefore, the FCC and a new Administration should work together to develop a national spectrum strategy that both identifies the specific airwaves that the FCC can free for commercial wireless services and sets an aggressive timeline for agency action. l Facilitate coordination on spectrum issues. Wireless services now play a central role in advancing America’s economic and national security interests. Over the past few years, this dynamic has led to an increasing number of headline-level disputes between the commercial wireless sector and federal agencies. These disputes are often framed in zero-sum terms as commercial wireless and federal agency stakeholders argue over the appropriate types and amount of airwaves that the government should allocate for various purposes. On the one hand, America’s global economic leadership depends on its ability to free spectrum that will power the U.S. commercial wireless industry. On the other hand, we must ensure that America’s national security and other federal agencies have access to the spectrum resources that they need to carry out their vital missions.

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

Weak

Vector: 65%

Pages: 642-644AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The CLEAR Act focuses on enhancing national security by improving the accuracy of lists of Chinese military companies, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt centers on pension reform, prohibiting TSP investments in China, and increasing transparency in public and multiemployer pension plans. Although both involve China-related restrictions, the bill does not address pension funds, investment prohibitions for federal retirement systems, or disclosure requirements for pension assets, resulting in "

Key themes:China restrictionsinvestment oversightnational security

— 609 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies l DOL should exercise its oversight of the FRTIB to prohibit investments in China. l Congress should enact legislation prohibiting investment of the TSP in China. PENSION REFORMS. Public Pension Plan Disclosure. Residents of states that responsibly manage their public pension plans (pension plans for State and local government employ- ees) should not be responsible for bailing out states that do not do so. Money is ultimately fungible, so federal aid to States can effectively be used to free up other State funds for pension contributions. Although the federal government does not impose funding rules on public pension plans, these plans should be required to disclose the fair market value of plan assets and liabilities (using the Treasury yield curve as the discount rate) on an annual basis. In the aggregate, these plans were underfunded on a market basis by $6.501 trillion as of Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, even though the plans reported underfunding of only $1.076 trillion using overly optimistic assumptions. l Disclose the fair market value of plan assets and liabilities. Congress should require public pension funds to disclose the fair market value of plan assets and liabilities (using the Treasury yield curve as the discount rate) on an annual basis. Multiemployer Plans. At the request of multiemployer union pension plans, the government has given such plans much more lenient rules and discretion over funding than it has given to single-employer plans. Multiemployer plans have been severely mismanaged, and the plans have abused the discretion and deference given them by federal law and enforcement agencies to make promises that they cannot keep. As a result, these plans are generally severely underfunded, with $757 billion in aggregate underfunding, and a funding level of just 42 percent. The Biden Admin- istration has provided a massive taxpayer bailout to some of these plans, but without any needed reforms. Even worse, it gave out funds in excess of what the law allows. l Congress should reform multiemployer pensions to give participants in these plans the same protections as those in single-employer plans. Liabilities should be measured similarly to single-employer plans. Workers should be able to earn benefits at any employer in the plan, but liabilities should be divided amongst employers, instead of the current illusory joint and several liability under which no one is ultimately responsible for making up underfunding. Troubled plans should be prohibited from — 610 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise making new pension promises. More timely and detailed reporting should be imposed. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor- poration (PBGC) insures benefits for private sector pension plans, with separate single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs. l The PBGC’s annual report must be submitted on time, and with timely data that uses fair-market value principles to calculate the PBGC’s finances. The PBGC has been submitting portions of statutorily required annual reports many months late and using out-of-date data. And PBGC's data on plans is almost five years old. These problematic practices make it difficult for Congress to become aware of serious problems in the insurance programs, which received a bailout of over $85 billion in the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act. The PBGC should use existing statutory authority to protect workers, retirees, employers, and taxpayers by closely monitoring and taking appropriate remedial action with regard to badly run and underfunded multiemployer union pension plans, including termination where appropriate. The PBGC's refusal to use such authority helped cause its multiemployer program deficit to go from less than $500 million in 2008 to over $65 billion in 2017. l Congress should increase the variable rate premium on underfunding and eliminate the per-participant cap in order to appropriately take into account risk and limit the degree to which well-funded pension plans must subsidize underfunded plans. Reforms should proportionately reduce the fixed per-participant premium to ease the burden on well-funded plans and also increase premiums on multiemployer plans to match single-employer plans. Improving Access to Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are ERISA-covered employee retirement savings plans that allow employees to receive compensation in the form of equity in their employer business. These arrangements enable employees to formally partici- pate as investors in how their employers’ businesses are run. And they also align employer–employee incentives by giving employees a greater financial stake in the success of their employers. With over half of small businesses owned by business owners over the age of 55, ESOPs also create advantageous succession oppor- tunities that support the continuity of local businesses and regional economic

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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CLEAR Act of 2025

CLEAR Act of 2025

Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]

70% match to Project 2025

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed Senate

House Review

Passed Congress

Presidential Action

Became Law

Bill Summary

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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Industry Impact

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

Department of Commerce

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

Department of Commerce

Federal Communications Commission

Department of Labor and Related Agencies

About These Correlations

Full Policy Text

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