The bill
SLASH Prices Act
HR. 9371, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Rep. Subramanyam, Suhas [D-VA-10]
ID: S001230
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9371, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Small Business Administration" section, p. 783-785 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H4134)
June 22, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 9371: The SLASH Prices Act (Shedding Light on Algorithms Setting Higher Prices Act)** *Introduced June 18, 2026 | Referred to House Committee on Energy and Commerce*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The SLASH Prices Act aims to curb the opaque and potentially exploitative use of personalized algorithmic pricing—where companies use individual consumer data (browsing history, purchase behavior, location, etc.) to charge different prices for identical goods or services. Its stated goal is transparency and consumer autonomy: force businesses to disclose when prices are personalized via algorithms and allow consumers to opt out without penalty. In reality, it’s a feeble attempt to slap a band-aid on surveillance capitalism while pretending to protect consumers from the very data-harvesting economy Congress has spent decades enabling. The bill assumes that merely telling people they’re being price-gouged by algorithms will somehow stop the gouging—like informing a mugger their victim noticed the knife will deter the mugging.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** - **Mandatory Disclosure**: Covered entities must clearly disclose in writing (“This price was set by an algorithm using your personal data”) and prominently display it alongside any personalized price. - **Opt-Out Mechanism**: Consumers must be able to easily opt out of personalized pricing, receive the standard non-personalized price, and not face discrimination (e.g., denial of service, price markups, or reduced quality) for doing so. - **Notification to FTC**: Companies must inform the Federal Trade Commission when they begin or cease using personalized algorithmic pricing. - **Enforcement**: Violations are treated as unfair or deceptive acts under the FTC Act, granting the FTC authority to investigate, penalize, and seek injunctions. State attorneys general may also bring civil actions on behalf of residents. - **Reporting Mechanism**: Within one year, the FTC must establish a public reporting system for violations, possibly integrated into the Consumer Sentinel Network.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Affected Businesses**: E-commerce platforms, travel sites, ride-sharing apps, streaming services, and any online retailer using behavioral data to tailor prices (e.g., Amazon, Uber, Expedia). - **Exempted Industries**: Insurance, credit services, dynamic pricing (e.g., surge pricing, airline tickets), broad-group discounts (teachers, seniors, military), location-based fare calculations (ride-shares), jurisdiction-based pricing (currency, taxes), delivery-cost variations, and service recovery credits (e.g., refunds for late deliveries). - **Consumers**: Theoretically empowered to see and reject personalized pricing—but likely overwhelmed by disclosures, confused by opt-out processes, and ultimately ignored as companies find loopholes or simply absorb minor fines as a cost of doing business. - **Regulators**: The FTC gains new enforcement tools but remains underfunded and politically neutered, likely to prioritize headline cases over systemic abuse. - **State AGs**: Gain litigation authority, creating a patchwork of enforcement that favors states with aggressive attorneys general (e.g., CA, NY) while leaving others behind.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** The bill’s impact will be minimal—more theatrical than transformative. While disclosure and opt-out sound consumer-friendly, they ignore the power imbalance: most users won’t understand the notice, won’t bother to opt out, or will find the process too cumbersome. Companies will likely redesign interfaces to bury disclosures or make opt-outs intentionally obstructive (dark patterns), then claim compliance. The exemptions are vast and self-serving: dynamic pricing (the very model used by airlines and Uber) is excluded, meaning algorithmic price discrimination remains rampant in high-impact sectors. Insurance and credit—two areas where personalized pricing can be deeply discriminatory—are carved out entirely, revealing whose interests Congress truly protects.
Ultimately, the SLASH Prices Act is a placebo for a malignant tumor. It pretends to address algorithmic exploitation while leaving the core business model—surveillance-based price discrimination—intact. It’s less
Rep. Subramanyam, Suhas [D-VA-10]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000604
Top Contributors
20
ID: M001196
Top Contributors
21
ID: F000476
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 34 nodes and 48 connections
Total contributions: $48
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2(a) requires disclosure of personalized algorithmic pricing, which may affect big tech platforms' pricing strategies and potentially lead to increased regulatory scrutiny.
Section 2(a) applies to covered persons who sell goods or services online, which includes ecommerce and retail tech companies, and may impact their pricing practices.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Subramanyam, Suhas [D-VA-10])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The SLASH Prices Act focuses on consumer protection and algorithmic pricing transparency, while the Project 2025 SBA policy emphasizes streamlining operations, strengthening the Office of Advocacy, and reducing regulatory burdens on small businesses. There is minimal direct overlap, though both touch on regulatory impact and small business considerations."
— 751 — Small Business Administration implement relevant initiatives to reach small businesses. Programs would be nonduplicative and implemented on a first-come, first-served basis. l A modern, revamped, and streamlined SBA that better utilizes current technology and platforms for operations, for reporting, and in its programs to reach, service, and engage small businesses. l An Office of Advocacy that is strengthened by a renewed mandate and additional resources to protect against overregulation along with a research agenda that includes measuring the total cost that federal regulation imposes on small businesses. Accountability and Managerial Practice. The SBA lacks accountability and managerial practices to measure the effectiveness, success, and integrity of its various programs. As a future Administration evaluates agency structure and the particulars of how the SBA is spending appropriated funds, it should immediately require actions and procedures to compel a culture of accountability and perfor- mance. Specifically: l Require performance metrics and internal procedures to safeguard taxpayer dollars and program integrity. As noted in an October 2022 IG report, failure to adopt procedures that would reliably capture data and information for various programs, coupled with significant challenges and weaknesses regarding IT investments, systems development, and security controls, presents significant risks to program integrity and increased risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.34 Addressing these shortcomings and risks should be a priority challenge and action item for the next Administration. As underscored by the Inspector General in his introduction to the report, “Pandemic response has, in many instances, magnified the challenging systemic issues in SBA’s mission-related work.”35 l Review all internal government watchdog recommendations and require that SBA management implement or address outstanding and ongoing OIG and GAO recommendations within a specified time frame (ideally within 90 days of a recommendation) and on an ongoing basis. Strengthening the Office of Advocacy. The SBA Office of Advocacy (Advo- cacy) is “an independent office” within the SBA.36 It accounts for about one one-thousandth of SBA spending and 0.75 percent of SBA personnel. Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, both under its current authority and with suggested — 752 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reforms, the Office of Advocacy could be a powerful weapon against the adminis- trative state’s regulatory extremism. l Amend the RFA so that all agencies are required to provide a copy of any proposed rule (other than bona fide emergency rules) along with initial regulatory flexibility analysis to the Office of Advocacy at least 60 days before a notice of proposed rulemaking is submitted for publication in the Federal Register. The Office of Advocacy would submit comments to agencies within 30 days, and each agency would have to consider these comments, make changes in the proposed rule based on those comments, or explain in a revised regulatory flexibility analysis why it chose not to change the proposed rule. The Office of Advocacy’s pre-proposing comments would be published on the agencies’ and its own websites. RFA economic analysis should be expanded to include indirect costs along with direct costs. In addition, the next Administration should require other agencies to seek Advocacy’s input. Currently, other agencies deny Advocacy the ability to enforce their duty to consider the effect of regulations on small entities by construing their regulations as not having significant economic impact, which would otherwise serve as a trigger for Advocacy’s input. Congress should presumptively exempt small businesses from new agency rules to force agencies to seek Advocacy’s input and permit new rules to apply to small businesses only with Advocacy signoff under specified criteria. l Increase the Office of Advocacy’s budget by at least 50 percent ($4.6 million). This would allow Advocacy to hire approximately 25 attorneys, economists, and scientists and enhance its role in the regulatory process. l Explicitly direct federal agencies to comply with the RFA. This would be similar to the approach adopted by President Trump in his January and February 2017 executive orders directing agencies to relieve the cost and burden of regulation on business.37 Advocacy should organize regional roundtables, onsite small-business visits, and an online platform to hear directly from small businesses and entities as it did from June 2017 through September 2018.38 This activity produced 26 letters to federal agencies and highlighted specific regulations that need reform and how Congress had addressed the most burdensome rules through the Congressional Review Act.39
AI Analysis:
"The SLASH Prices Act focuses on algorithmic pricing transparency and consumer opt-out rights in digital markets, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt addresses labor union recognition, contract bars, Davis-Bacon Act repeal, and worker-led benefits experimentation—there is no substantive overlap in subject matter or policy objectives."
— 603 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies decision-making is required under the law, basing this theory on an old NLRB case, Joy Silk, even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected mandatory card-check recognition. l Discard “card check.” Congress should discard “card check” as the basis of union recognition and mandate the secret ballot exclusively. Contract Bar Rule. Although current labor law allows a union to establish itself at a workplace at more or less any time, the calendar for any attempt to decertify a union is considerably more constrained. If a union is recognized as a collective bargaining agent, then employees may not decertify it or substitute another union for it for at least one year under federal law (the “certification bar”). Similarly, when a union reaches a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, it is immune from a decertification election for up to three years (the “contract bar”). A typical consequence of these rules is that employees must often wait four years before they are allowed a chance at decertification. Employees then have only a 45-day window to file a decertification petition; if the employer and union sign a successor contract, then the contract bar comes into play once again—meaning employees with an interest in decertification must wait another three years. l Eliminate the contract bar rule. NLRB should eliminate the contract bar rule so that employees with an interest in decertification have a reasonable chance to achieve their goal. Tailoring National Employment Rules. National employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)21 and the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act22 set out one-size-fits-all “floors” regulating the employment rela- tionship. These substantive worker protections often do not mesh well with the procedural worker protections offered through the NLRA’s collective bargaining process. Unions could play a powerful role in tailoring national employment rules to the needs of a particular workplace if, in unionized workplaces, national rules were treated as negotiable defaults rather than non-negotiable floors. l Congress should amend the NLRA to authorize collective bargaining to treat national employment laws and regulations as negotiable defaults. For example, this reform would allow a union to bless a relaxed overtime trigger (e.g., 45 hours a week, or 80 hours over two weeks) in exchange for firm employer commitments on predictable scheduling. Alternative Policy. While some conservatives (including the author of this chap- ter) believe that it would be a mistake to antagonize unions’ core interests, others — 604 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise argue that the next Administration should end Project Labor Agreement require- ments and repeal the Davis–Bacon Act. And while some conservatives have chosen not to address massive federal subsidies for unionized labor, others believe that current laws and regulations that pick winners and losers to the detriment of the majority of construction workers and to all taxpayers should not be ignored. Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) are short-term collective bargaining agreements that apply to construction projects. There are a few reasons that con- struction projects may benefit from a PLA, and there are many reasons that even when actively encouraged to do so public construction projects have declined to use PLAs. Among the consequences: The majority of construction firms and construction workers are not unionized and their temporary forced unionization results in large-scale wage theft; construction companies are significantly less likely to bid on projects with PLAs; and PLAs consistently drive up construction costs by 10 percent to 30 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act23 requires federally financed construction projects to pay “prevailing wages.” In theory, these wages should reflect going market rates for construction labor in the relevant area. However, both the Government Account- ability Office and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General have repeatedly criticized the Labor Department for using self-selected, statistically unrepresenta- tive samples to calculate the prevailing-wage rates that drive up the cost of federal construction by about 10 percent. The Davis–Bacon Act redistributes wealth from hardworking Americans to those that benefit from government-funded construc- tion projects. Repealing the Davis–Bacon Act would increase worker freedom and end a longstanding effective tax on American families. l End PLA requirements. Agencies should end all mandatory Project Labor Agreement requirements and base federal procurement decisions on the contractors that can deliver the best product at the lowest cost. l Repeal Davis–Bacon. Congress should enact the Davis–Bacon Repeal Act and allow markets to determine market wages. THE STATES Worker-led Benefits Experimentation. Workers depend on unemployment benefits to navigate inevitable market frictions and seek new employment oppor- tunities. But existing unemployment insurance (UI) is bureaucratic, ineffective, and unaccountable. The outdated system’s myriad failures during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for innovations that respond to recipients’ needs. The most promising avenue for innovation is to involve workers and private-sec- tor organizations more directly, freed from unnecessary bureaucratic strictures. Americans take for granted that unemployment benefits must be administered by
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on consumer protection and algorithmic pricing transparency in commerce, while the Project 2025 policy addresses intelligence sharing, declassification reform, and cyber threat information dissemination within the Intelligence Community. There is no substantive overlap in subject matter, objectives, or policy mechanisms."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.